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User’s Guide
Alistair Rieu-Clarke
Ruby Moynihan 
Bjørn-Oliver Magsig
Adopted in 1997 by the UN General Assembly, the Convention on the Law of the Non-
navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UN Watercourses Convention), seeks 
to, ‘ensure the utilisation, development, conservation, management and protection of 
international watercourses and the promotion of the optimal and sustainable utilisation 
thereof for present and future generations’ (Preamble). The User’s Guide to the UN Wa-
tercourses Convention provides an Article by Article explanation of the text of this global 
framework instrument.  In so doing, the Guide explains the meaning and purpose of 
each Article, and offers guidance on how the rights and obligations of contained therein  
policymakers and decision makers, implementation agencies and other bodies responsi-
ble for transboundary water issues. It is hoped that the document will also be useful for 
managers and stakeholders from other sectors with a direct relevance to water, such as 
health, environment, education, agriculture, food, energy, fisheries and industrial 
water users.
“I have absolutely no doubt that this User’s Guide will quickly become an indispensable tool for all those 
engaged in making sense of the provisions of the  UN Watercourses Convention, or of any legal regime apply-
ing to the management of transboundary water resources. I have already found myself routinely reaching 
for it to look up the authors’ incisive commentary on a range of specific issues – the role of transboundary 
EIA, the meaning of ‘equity’ in the specific context of transboundary waters, the significance of procedural 
and informational obligations, the nature of the obligation to protect watercourse ecosystems, etc. – and 
can honestly say that I’ve learned something new on each occasion.  The commentary on each provision 
of the Convention is also pleasantly readable, concise and readily accessible to the non-expert reader – a 
hugely important achievement!  Indeed, I feel certain that this Guide will play a key role in addressing lingering 
uncertainties and misconceptions about this important instrument, which can only encourage ratification by 
States and thus promote the Convention’s ultimate entry into force!”
Dr. Owen McIntyre, Senior Lecturer in Environmental Law, Faculty of Law, University College Cork.
“The Guide is very user friendly, is a model work and will, undoubtedly, become the standard training manual 
in the field for the UN Watercourses Convention.”
Dr. Bennett L. Bearden, Special Counsel on Water Law and Policy at Geological Survey of Alabama.
“The User’s Guide is a very rich document and will be a great source book for water law 
students or water law professionals.” 
Dr. Sokhem Pech, Manager, International Group, Environmental Governance, Hatfield Consultants and Chair 
of M-Power Mekong Research Network.
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Water is a wonderful, vital substance.  But we are 
running out of it.  While the amount of water on Earth 
has been the same for billions of years and will remain 
so for a like amount of time in the future, the human 
population continues to grow.  Not only can humans 
not exist without water, they also need it to realize the 
human right to an adequate standard of living as well as 
for economic development.  When a constant supply 
is combined with a growing demand, the potential for 
conflict over water grows.
     The other important element of this picture is that 
much of the world’s fresh water is shared by two or 
more countries.  Every African state, for example, is said 
to share fresh water with at least one other country, and 
many share it with multiple countries.  Scientists predict 
that the globe’s arid areas will only become drier due to 
climate change.  This is in fact occurring already.
     What does all of this add up to?  The need for a 
governing normative framework within which states 
sharing freshwater can organize their relationships.  
Such a framework is provided by the 1997 Convention 
on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses (UN Watercourses Convention or 
Convention).  It is the purpose of the present volume to 
make the Convention broadly accessible by explaining 
its provisions and terms they employ in language that is 
understandable to lawyers and non-lawyers alike.
     The General Assembly’s adoption of the UN 
Watercourses Convention on 21st May 1997 marked 
the culmination of an extended process of treaty 
drafting and negotiation, which began in 1970.  In that 
year, the UN General Assembly recommended that the 
International Law Commission (ILC) ‘take up the study 
of the law of the non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses with a view to its progressive develop-
ment and codification’ (UN General Assembly 
Foreword
Resolution 2669(XXV)).   
     The Assembly offered a number of reasons for 
its recommendation, including pressures on limited 
water resources due to population growth, as well as 
increasing and multiplying human demands. A brief 
perusal of recent global policy documents, such as the 
Ministerial Declaration of the 6thWorld Water Forum, 
would suggest that many of the challenges cited by 
Resolution 2669(XXV) in 1970 are still with us today. 
     The UN Watercourses Convention is intended to be 
a framework instrument of global applicability.  As such, 
it complements the existing regional and watercourse-
specific legal architecture in three important situations: 
where no treaty regime exists between co-riparian 
states; where not all co-riparians are parties to an 
existing agreement; or where a watercourse is the 
subject of an existing agreement but that agreement 
only partially covers matters addressed by the UN 
Watercourses Convention.  
     Even prior to its entry into force the Convention has 
played an important role, by informing the negotiation, 
adoption and interpretation of watercourse agreements 
at the regional or basin level, and informing the decisions 
of international courts.   Two African instruments, 
the Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and 
the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement, 
closely follow the UN Watercourses Convention.  As 
to international decisions, a mere four months after 
the Convention’s adoption it was referred to by the 
International Court of Justice in support of the Court’s 
judgment in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case.  
The Convention’s basic principles are generally regarded 
as reflecting customary international law.
     Despite the significant influence the UN 
Watercourses Convention already has on state 
| Foreword
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Stephen C. McCaffrey, 
Distinguished Professor and Scholar, McGeorge School of 
Law, University of the Pacific, and former Special Rapporteur 
to the International Law Commission on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Users of International Watercourses 
Winters, California
practice, recent years have seen both an uptake in the 
Convention’s ratification rate and increasing calls for it 
to enter into force.  Such calls have come from diverse 
groups including the UN Secretary General’s Advisory 
Board on Water and Sanitation, Decisions VIII/27 and 
IX/19 of the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
2011 Statement of the InterAction Council.  Moreover, 
significant legal developments are likely to generate 
additional interest in the UN Watercourses Convention, 
most notably the future legal form and status of the 
2008 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary 
Aquifers which will again be considered by the General 
Assembly at its 68th session in 2013, and the initiative 
to amend the 1992 UNECE Convention on the 
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes to allow all UN Member States to 
become parties to it. 
     These developments show why it is important 
that governments as well as other stakeholders 
and interested parties be well-informed on the UN 
Watercourses Convention. The UN Watercourses 
Convention User’s Guide complements such resources 
as the commentary of the ILC on its 1994 draft articles 
by including developments since that year, giving 
examples of how various provisions of the Convention 
might apply, and providing an online interactive and 
multimedia module.  The User’s Guide is thus a 
valuable resource that advances understanding of the 
Convention and expands its accessibility.  In a world of 
shrinking availability of fresh water, this is an important 
service indeed.
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The UN Watercourses Convention is a global framework 
instrument that sets out rules and principles for 
governing international watercourses.  As a global 
framework instrument its primary purpose is to 
supplement existing regional (multi-basin), basin and 
sub-basin agreements.  The Convention can assist in 
this latter role by filling gaps where no basin agreement 
exists, where a basin agreement only partially covers 
aspects covered by the global Convention, and where 
not all states within a particular basin are parties to a 
basin agreement.  The Convention therefore has great 
potential in addressing the existing legal architecture 
for international watercourses, which is often described 
as fragmented. 
     It was for the latter reasons that the UN General 
Assembly, when presented with the ILC’s Draft 
Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
the International Watercourses, decided that it should 
negotiate a framework Convention on the basis of 
those Articles.  However, while the UN Watercourses 
Convention was adopted in 1997, the process for entry 
into force has been slow. Numerous factors must be 
in place for the Convention to realise its full potential. 
Amongst those factors, ensuring that the Convention is 
adopted and ultimately implemented will be contingent 
on the text of this legal instrument being accessible to 
a range of legal and non-legal experts involved in water 
issues.  It is therefore for the latter purpose that this 
User’s Guide was conceived.  The Guide will also be 
supplemented by an online resource that will develop 
the Article-by-Article explanations contained within.  
     A number of individuals and institutions assisted in 
ensuring that the User’s Guide became a reality.  The 
authors are extremely grateful to all the reviewers for 
their invaluable comments: Dr Bennett Bearden, Special 
Counsel on Water Law and Policy, Geological Survey of 
Alabama; Dr Mara Tignino, Senior Research, Platform 
for International Water Law, University of Geneva; 
Mr Sokhem Pech, Senior International Governance 
Specialist, Hatfield Consultants, Vancouver; Ms Raya 
Stephan, Water Law Specialist Consultant; Dr Sarah 
Hendry, Lecturer, and Dr Nicole Archer, Postdoctoral 
Researcher, IHP-HELP Centre for Water Law, Policy and 
Science (under the auspices of UNESCO), University of 
Dundee; and Ms Flavia Loures, Senior Program Officer 
WWF.  The authors are also grateful to a number of 
individuals who assisted in the design and production 
of the Guide, including Ms Samantha McKay, Editor, Ms 
Alice Moynihan, cover design, layout and graphics, Mr 
Liam Crozier Type Editing and Ms Kaya Perez Viera, GIS 
graphics. 
The Guide would not be possible without the generous 
financial support provided by the Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs.  Additionally, without the growing 
activities around and interest in the UN Watercourses 
Convention that have emerged within recent years, the 
Guide would not be justified.  We are therefore thankful 
to the individuals and institutions that have participated 
in the global initiative to see the UN Watercourses 
Convention enter into force, led by Ms. Flavia Loures 
and WWF.   
     Ultimately, the contribution and success of 
international law in helping to address issues around 
international watercourses depends on experts (lawyers 
and non-lawyers) developing a common understanding 
of the applicable rules and principles. If the Guide can 
assist in fostering such understanding we believe it will 
have been of significant value. 
Preface
Alistair Rieu-Clarke, Ruby Moynihan and
Bjørn-Oliver Magsig
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Objectives, Overview, 
Origins & Terminology
The User’s Guide to the UN Watercourses Convention 
was produced as part of the UN Watercourses 
Convention Global Initiative – a collaborative project 
to promote the UN Watercourses Convention with a 
view to securing additional state ratifications1  and the 
instrument’s eventual entry into force. The initiative has 
sought to mobilise governments and other stakeholders 
through efforts to raise awareness and build capacity on 
the use, management, and protection of international 
watercourses generally, and on the relevance of the 
UN Watercourses Convention in particular. The User’s 
Guide is designed to support this effort by providing 
widespread accessibility and enhanced understanding 
of the text of the Convention; so as to ensure that 
when decisions are taken as to the relevance of the 
Convention, such decisions are fully informed. The 
User’s Guide is therefore written for policymakers and 
decision makers, implementation agencies, and bodies 
responsible for transboundary water issues.  It is hoped 
that the document will also be useful for managers and 
stakeholders of other sectors with a direct relevance to 
water, such as health, environment, agriculture, food, 
energy, fisheries and industrial water users.  The guide 
is also intended to be used for educational purposes, 
thus raising awareness and capacity around the UN 
Watercourses Convention and its implementation.  
Moving forward it is intended that the contents of this 
Guide will be supplemented by an online educational 
tool to provide additional resources supporting the 
content and objectives of the Guide. 
1Throughout the guide ‘ratification’ is used as a simplified term but may also include 
‘accession’, ‘approval’ and ‘acceptance’ - for the legal differences between these 
terms see the Glossary of Terms.
A. Introduction to the User’s Guide
A.1 Context and Objectives 
The User’s Guide includes an introduction outlining 
the key challenges in managing transboundary waters 
and current status of international law in the field, as 
well as analysis of the Convention’s origins, evolution 
and purpose.  This is followed by an Article-by-Article 
explanation of each provision, organised in seven 
major parts, mapping the structure of the Convention 
itself: Part I – Introduction and Scope; Part II – General 
Principles; Part III – Planned Measures; Part IV – 
Protection, Preservation and Management; Part V – 
Harmful Conditions and Emergency Situations; Part VI – 
Dispute Settlement, Conflict Management and Security; 
and Part VII – Final Clauses.
     Each provision of the Convention is examined under 
two headings; Commentary and Application. A detailed 
explanation of the nature and extent of the legal rights 
and obligations of each article is provided under the 
Commentary section.  These sections include issues 
likely to emerge in the interpretation and practical 
application of the articles, coupled with examples of 
good state practice where relevant. The commentaries 
are then followed by the Application sections, which 
provide hypothetical scenarios intended for users to 
gain a more extensive understanding of the practical 
application of each article. Finally, each article is 
accompanied by a list of further readings selected for 
those users who wish to gain deeper knowledge and 
understanding of specific issues. 
     Where there are ambiguities in the text, the authors 
have provided guidance on the basis of the principles 
and objectives of the Convention as found in the 
preamble and particularly guided by the fundamental 
principles that states are to use an international 
watercourse in a way that is ‘equitable and reasonable’ 
in relation to other states sharing the watercourse 
(Article 5) and take all ‘appropriate measures’ to prevent 
causing ‘significant harm’ to co-riparian states (Article 7). 
A.2 How to use this Guide
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In early 2006, the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) 
therefore launched a global initiative to promote the UN 
Watercourses Convention and accelerate its ratification 
process (The UNWC Global Initiative).  This initiative 
has mobilised a range of actors including governments, 
international organisations, academics and others in an 
effort to raise awareness, build capacity and support 
countries interested in ratifying the Convention. To date, 
the UN Global Initiative includes partners such as Green 
Cross, UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Water 
and Sanitation, the IHP-HELP Centre for Water Law, 
Policy and Science (under the auspices of UNESCO), 
the Global Nature Fund and many others. Activities 
of the UNWC Global Initiative have largely centred 
around addressing the barriers to ratification noted 
above.  Partners of the UNWC Global Initiative have 
therefore sought to raise awareness of the Convention 
through symposia, presentations and special sessions 
at global, regional and country-specific conferences 
and other meetings.  In order to deepen knowledge 
and understanding of the relevance of the Convention, 
the Initiative has conduct research studies related to 
the relevance of the UN Watercourses Convention in 
various regions, basins and countries, including Central 
America, South America, Europe, West Africa, Congo, 
Southern Africa, East Africa, Aral Sea and South East 
Asia.5   Such research studies have formed a basis for 
conducting consultations and training workshops at the 
country level throughout the world.6   
     Activities of the UNWC Global Initiative have also 
involved developing a wide range of materials, including 
policy briefs, academic journal papers, an edited book, 
research reports, and this User’s Guide.7 
5  See <http://internationalwaterlaw.org/bibliography> accessed 8 December 2011. 
6  See, for example, Addis Abba Workshop 29 May 2011, <http://www.dundee.
ac.uk/water/projects/unwcglobalinitiative> accessed 8 December 2011.
7  For more details see UNWC Global Initiative, <http://www.dundee.ac.uk/water/
projects/unwcglobalinitiative> accessed 8 December 2011.
A.3 The UNWC Global Initiative
Frequent reference is made to the preparatory work of 
the International Law Commission (ILC) under the United 
Nations General Assembly particularly the 1994 Draft 
Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, coupled with interpretation 
from existing state practice, general principles of 
international law, judicial decisions, and leading 
publicists in the field. Naturally, the specific language of 
the Convention will evolve over time.
The authors have chosen an integrated interpretation 
to the Articles of the UN Convention, guided by the 
rules of interpretation of Treaties under Articles 31-33 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention2  and the fundamental 
principles that underlie the UN Convention itself. 
While the UN Watercourses Convention was adopted 
in 1997, by the end of 2005 only 14 states had ratified 
the Convention, 21 short of the number required for 
its entry into force.  A range of reasons have been 
suggested as to why the Convention has been slow 
to enter into force,3 including treaty congestion at the 
time of its adoption, lack of awareness pertaining to the 
content and relevance of the Convention, an absence 
of leadership in promoting ratification, and a number of 
highly vocal - but not necessarily widely representative - 
opponents to this global instrument.4
2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into 
force 27 January 1980) (Vienna Convention) 1155 UNTS.
3  The contracting states in 2005 comprised Finland, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, 
South Africa, Sweden, and the Syrian Arab Republic. 
4 See A Rieu-Clarke and FR Loures, ‘Still Not in Force: Should State Support 
the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention? (2009) 18(2) Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law 185; SMA Salman, ‘The United 
Nations Watercourses Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has its Entry into Force 
Proven Difficult?’ (2007) 22 Water International 1; S Salman, A Rieu-Clarke and F 
Loures, ‘Possible Reasons for Slowing Down the Ratification Process’, in F Loures 
and A Rieu-Clarke, The UN Watercourses Convention in Force – Strengthening 
International Law for Transboundary Water Management (Earthscan 2012). 
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Water links us to our 
neighbour in a way more 
profound and complex than 
any other.’- John Thorson
‘
Several trends and key factors are shaping our future 
at an ever increasing pace giving rise to a myriad of 
challenges the international community is struggling to 
deal with effectively. The water crisis is at the heart of 
this challenge, since a sustainable supply of adequate 
freshwater is the essential foundation of civilization as 
we know it. While water management is primarily a local 
issue, 40 per cent of the world’s population depends 
on international freshwater resources.8  It is this level 
which is heavily influenced by the complex geopolitical 
power games, making international water security even 
more multi-faceted and multi-layered. The increasing 
gap between the demand for quality freshwater and its 
declining supply, the uneven distribution of resources, 
and unilateral development of water projects, are 
becoming frequently disruptive factors in neighbouring 
country relations.9 
Despite the fact that disputes over shared freshwater 
resources have not yet led to fully fledged wars 
8 SE Draper and JE Kundell, ‘Impact of Climate Change on Transboundary Water 
Sharing’ (2007) 133 Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management 405 at 
405.
9 Ibid.
between states, water is now more frequently used as 
a political tool and military target.10  Population growth, 
shifting migration patterns and global environmental 
change have added unprecedented pressure 
and complexity to the task of sustainable water 
management. The evidence is clear – current water 
disputes are already having a severe socio-economic 
and environmental impact on numerous fragile states 
and the reverberating effects threaten local, national, 
regional and international stability and growth.
While the need for strengthening water governance 
across all these levels has been widely acknowledged,11 
internationally the legal response remains a challenge. 
This is partly due to the physical and economic features 
of water which make its sustainable management 
costly and also because of the far reaching political 
implications surrounding water allocation and 
development. Given the global dimension of water 
insecurity and its interweaving with other crises, it is 
obvious that any solution to the water crisis has to 
look beyond the national level. Effective basin wide 
legal frameworks are necessary to develop, implement 
and enforce rules for managing water resources 
sustainably and addressing conflict of uses between 
states. Yet, the perceived threat of losing national 
sovereignty is increasing the political cost of adopting 
10 E.g. during the recent conflict in Libya; see Circle of Blue, ‘Water as a Tool of 
War: Qaddafi Loyalists Turn Off Tap for Half of Libya’ (30 August 2011) <http://www.
circleofblue.org/waternews/2011/world/water-as-a-tool-of-war-qaddafi-loyalists-
turn-off-tap-for-half-of-libya/> accessed 09 September 2011.
11 See United Nations World Water Assessment Programme, The United Nations 
World Water Development Report 3: Water in a Changing World (UNESCO 2009).
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such frameworks, too often resulting in scattered 
international approaches which are only rarely 
implemented at the national level.
     One of the main reasons for such a weak approach 
is the poor comprehension of the linkages between 
the various levels of water governance. In particular, 
the contribution that a global framework agreement, 
such as the UN Watercourses Convention, can make 
in levelling the playing field in transboundary water 
governance has not been fully explored. The evolution 
and current status of the UN Watercourses Convention 
is given further consideration below. 
Loures F and Rieu-Clarke A (eds), The UN Watercourses 
Convention in Force – Strengthening International Law 
for Transboundary Water Management (Earthscan 2012).
Loures F, Rieu-Clarke A and Vercambre, M-L, 
Everything You Need to Know About the UN 
Watercourses Convention (WWF 2009).
McCaffrey S and Sinjela M, ‘The 1997 United Nations 
Convention on International Watercourses’ (1998) 
92 American Journal of International Law 97. 
Rieu-Clarke A, ‘Entry Into Force of the 1997 UN 
Watercourses Convention: Barriers, Benefits 
and Prospects’ (2007) Water 21, 12.
Rieu-Clarke A and Loures FR, ‘Still Not in Force: 
Should State Support the 1997 UN Watercourses 
Convention? (2009) 18(2) Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law 185. 
Salman, SMA ‘The United Nations Watercourses 
Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has its Entry into Force 
Proven Difficult?’ (2007) 22 Water International 1.
Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United Nations Convention 
on the Law of International Watercourses: A Framework 
for Sharing (Kluwer Law International 2001).
Wouters P, ‘The Legal Response to International Water 
Conflicts: The UN Watercourses and Beyond’ (1999) 
42 German Yearbook of International Law 293.
A.4 Additional Reading
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Figure B.1 | World Map of international Basins 
(Source Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD),
 Oregon State University, 1999)
Figure B.2 | Physical and Economic Water Scarcity (Source Comprehensive Assessment of 
Water Management tn Agriculture, 2009)
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Water scarcity exists in many river basins around the 
world and comes in different forms. The map above 
shows different types of scarcity which are important
 for targeting the right solutions to the problems. 
Physical water scarcity (represented in orange) 
affects every continent and approximately one-fifth 
of the world population. 
     Some of the not so obvious issues and solutions 
surrounding water scarcity are virtual water and 
bulk water transfer. Virtual water is importing and 
exporting the virtual water embedded in water 
intensive commodities. Global trade in bulk water is 
also gaining momentum, including the shipping of 
water in tankers across the ocean.  The figure below 
shows the global water footprint – the water footprint 
of a country is defined by the volume of water needed 
for the production of goods and services consumed 
by the inhabitants of that country. The map shows 
that even countries which do not share any significant 
transboundary water resources are still reliant on the 
goods and services produced in transboundary basins. 
For example, Malta does not share any transboundary 
resources, but imports 87% of its water. This scenario 
demonstrates that the sustainable management of 
international watercourses are vital to all nations of 
the world not just transboundary riparian nations. 
     Of course scarcity is only one of the key challenges 
in managing transboundary waters.  States are also 
facing the challenge of mitigating and adapting to 
uncertain climate variability and the resulting impact 
on water management.  Changes in flow patterns, 
affecting the sediment and morphology of upstream 
and downstream rivers, affecting land use productivity 
due to loss of natural sediment depositions, and 
loss of fish productivity due to fish migration and 
habitation destruction are some examples of this 
challenge, which states must address whilst balancing 
ever growing demand for development.
B. Introduction to Key Challenges in Managing 
International Watercourses and International Law
B.1 Key challenges in managing 
transboundary waters
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Figure B.3 | Global Water Footprint (Source US Infrastructure/ 
WWF, 2010)12
12 For more information see WWF ‘Water Footprint’
<http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/about_freshwater/freshwater_
resources/?171861/Water-Footprinting> accessed 11 November 2011.
The  Global Water Footprint
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B.2 The legal architecture for 
transboundary waters
The Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements 
identifies 400 water agreements adopted since 1820.13 
In terms of adoption rates, Conca, Wu and Mei 
observe that a few agreements per year were adopted 
throughout the 1980s, then there was a significant 
increase in treaty adoption activity following the 1992 
UN Conference on Environment and Development, 
followed by a drop off in the number of agreements 
adopted towards the turnof the century.14   
 Despite these legal developments over the past four 
13 United Nations Environment Programme and others, Atlas of International 
Freshwater Agreements.
14 K Conca, F Wu and C Mei, ‘Global Regime Formation or Complex Institution 
Building? The Principled Content of International River Agreements’ (2006) 50 
International Studies Quarterly 263, at 270-271.
decades the international legal architecture regulating 
international watercourses remains fragmented.15  
The majority of basin-specific agreements are found 
in multilateral river basins, however most of these 
agreements are in fact bilateral agreements.16  
Additionally 158 of the world’s 263 international basins 
lack any type of cooperative framework; and of the 106 
basins covered by agreements approximately two-
thirds do not include all basin states.17   
     While such statistics do not account for global 
and regional treaty regimes, rules and principles 
of customary international law, or the quality of the 
agreements, they do demonstrate that governance 
frameworks at the basin level are often lacking or 
inadequate.However, it should be noted that the legal 
architecture within different regions varies. 
15 NA Zawahri and SM Mitchell, ‘Fragmented Governance of International Rivers: 
Negotiating Bilateral Versus Multilateral Treaties’ (2011) 55 International Studies 
Quarterly 835.
16  Ibid at 835.
17 M Giordano and AT Wolf, ‘The World’s International Freshwater Agreements: 
Historical Developments and Future Opportunities’, in UNEP and others, Atlas of 
International Freshwater Agreements, at 7.
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Figure B.4 |
International River Basins of Africa
(Source adapted by Authors (2012) from TFDD, Oregon State
University, 2009)
Throughout Africa there are 59 transboundary river 
basins, which make up 62 percent of the continent’s 
land surface.18  Of these transboundary river basins, 
16 are covered by basin-wide agreements, three are 
partially covered by agreements, and 40 have no 
basin-specific agreements in place.19   Additionally, 
Angola, Botswana, Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have 
ratified the Revised SADC Protocol on Shared 
Watercourses Systems, which is applicable to the 15 
international watercourses across the Southern African 
region and embodies much of the content of the 
UNWC.20
18  Wolf AT, ‘International Rivers of the World’ (1999) 15 International Journal of 
Water Resources Development 387, at 395-399.  For more in-depth analysis of the 
legal architecture for Africa, see chapters 7 and 9 of this book.
19 United Nations Environment Programme and others, Atlas of International 
Freshwater Agreements, at 27-50.
20 Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in the Southern African 
Development Region (adopted 7 August 2000, entered into force 22 September 
2003) (2001) 40 ILM 317.
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Asia is home to 57 transboundary river basins, which 
account for 39 percent of the continent’s land surface.21 
Ten river basins, constituting 3,270,600 km2 of the 
land mass, are covered by basin wide agreements.  15 
river bas-ins, representing 12,584,400 km2, are partially 
covered by basin agreements,22 and 32 river basins 
repres-enting 1,933,060 km2 are not covered 
by any basin agreement.    
21 Wolf, ‘International Rivers of the World’, at 399-403.
22 United Nations Environment Programme and others, Atlas of International 
Freshwater Agreements, at 51-76.
Figure B.5 | 
International River Basins of Asia
(Source adapted by Authors (2012) from TFDD, Oregon State
University, 2009)
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Across Europe there are 64 transboundary river basins 
covering 54 percent of the continent’s land surface.23  
35 rivers are covered by basin-wide agreements, 
whereas ten are partially covered, and 19 have no 
basin-specific agreements in place.24  However, most 
European states are also obligated to implement two 
relatively stringent regional agreements, namely the 
EU Water Framework Directive and the 1992 UN ECE 
Water Convention.25  These two regional instruments 
include commitments that go beyond the requirements 
of the UNWC.26      
23  Wolf, ‘International Rivers of the World’, at 404-408.
24 United Nations Environment Programme and others, Atlas of International 
Freshwater Agreements, at 77-132.
25 See generally, A Rieu-Clarke, ‘Major Trends in Conflict and Cooperation’, in 
United Nations Environment Programme, University of Dundee, and Oregon State 
University, Hydropolitical Vulnerability and Resilience along International Waters 
(UNEP 2009). 
26 The UN ECE Water Convention is to be opened up shortly for global signature 
and the alignment between the UNWC and UN ECE Water Convention is discussed 
in the following article by A Rieu-Clarke, ‘The Role and Relevance of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
to the EU and its Member States’ (2008) 78 British Yearbook of International Law 
389.
Figure B.6 | 
International River Basins of Europe
(Source adapted by Authors (2012) from TFDD, Oregon State
University, 2009)
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In North America, there are 41 transboundary river
 basins that cover 35 percent of the continent’s land 
surface.27  There are 28 basin-wide agreements, and 
a further four river basins are partially covered by 
agreements.28  Only nine river basins therefore have
 no basin-specific agreements in place, representing 
76,000 km2.29
27  Wolf, ‘International Rivers of the World’, at 408-410.
28  United Nations Environment Programme and others, Atlas of International 
Freshwater Agreements, at 133-162.
29  Wolf, ‘International Rivers of the World’, at 410-416.
Figure B.7 |
 International River Basins of North America
(Source adapted by Authors (2012) from TFDD, 
Oregon State University, 2009)
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Last but not least, South America is home to 38 
transboundary river basins, which make up 60 percent 
of the continent’s land surface.30  Of these river basins, 
23 are covered by basin-wide agreements, whereas 15 
basins are not subject to any basin agreements.31 
An analysis of the legal architecture would not be 
complete without recognition that in addition to the 
UNWC there are numerous global conventions that, 
at least in part, relate to transboundary watercourses.  
For instance, the Ramsar Convention was adopted in 
1971, and currently has 158 contracting parties who are 
obliged to promote the wise use of wetlands within their 
territory.32   In relation to international watercourses, the 
Ramsar Convention stipulates that, ‘contracting parties 
shall consult with each other about implementing 
obligations arising from the Convention especially in 
30 Ibid. 
31 UNEP and others, Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements, at 163-170.
32 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl 
Habitat (adopted 2 February 1971, entered into force 21 December 1975), 996 
UNTS 245.
Figure B.8 |
 International River Basins of South America
(Source adapted by Authors (2012) from TFDD, Oregon State
University, 2009)
the case of a wetland extending over the territories 
of more than one contracting party or where a water 
system is shared by contracting parties’.33  Around 30 
percent of Ramsar sites are located in international river 
basins.   Similarly, the Biodiversity Convention, ratified 
by 191 parties, aims to promote the sustainable use 
of the world’s biodiversity.34  In relation to international 
watercourses, states are obliged to notify, exchange 
information and enter into consultations on activities 
in one state’s jurisdiction or control that are likely to 
significantly adversely affect the biodiversity of other 
states.35  Pursuant to the Climate Change Convention, 
ratified by 192 contracting parties, parties are obliged 
to, ‘develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated 
plans for coastal zone management, water resources 
and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation 
33 Ibid, Art. 5.
34 UN Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 
29 December 1992), (1992) 31 ILM 822.
35 Ibid Art. 14.
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of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and 
desertification, as well as floods’.36     
     Drought and desertification is also covered in the 
Desertification Convention, ratified by 193 contracting 
parties.37  In relation to international watercourses, 
contracting parties are obliged to develop, ‘long-term 
integrated strategies that focus simultaneously, in 
affected areas, on improved productivity of land, and
 the rehabilitation, conservation and sustainable 
management of land and water resources’.38 
Burgeoning agricultural production due to greater 
demand for food within an ever increasing globalised 
world will also mean that trade and investment regimes, 
such as GATT 39 will have a growing impact on legal 
arrangements concerning international watercourses.40  
In assessing the current legal architecture for 
transboundary waters, it is also important to reflect 
not only on the number and coverage of international 
agreements related to water, but also the quality of 
those agreements.
     In this regard, UN-Water – a body comprised of 
all UN agencies with a competence in water-related 
activities – observed that: 
‘Existing agreements are sometimes not sufficiently 
effective to promote integrated water resources 
management due to problems at the national and 
local levels such as inadequate water management 
structures and weak capacity in countries to implement  
the agreements as well as shortcomings in the 
36  UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered 
into force 24 march 1994), Art. 4(1) (e).
37  Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious 
Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa (adopted 14 October 1994, 
entered into force 26 December 1996), (1994) 1954 UNTS 3.  
38 Ibid Art. 2(2).
39  Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (adopted 15 April 1994, 
entered into force 1 January 1995) (1994) 33 ILM 1144.
40  E Brown-Weiss, L Boisson de Charzones and N Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Fresh 
Water and International Economic Law (Oxford University Press 2005). 
agreements themselves (for example, inadequate 
integration of aspects such as the environment, the 
lack of enforcement mechanisms, limited – sectoral – 
scope and non-inclusion of important riparian States).’41 
Interestingly, the UN Watercourses Convention was 
first conceived back in 1959 in order to address some 
of these on-going challenges identified almost half a 
century later by UN Water.
41  UN-Water, Transboundary Waters: Sharing Benefits, Sharing Responsibilities (UN 
2008), at 6.
36
In 1959 Bolivia proposed to the UN General 
Assembly that the UN Secretary-General examine 
the legal problems relating to the utilisation and 
use of international rivers.42  Following a report by 
the UN Secretary-General in 1963, the UN General 
Assembly recommended that the ILC, ‘take up the 
study of the law of the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses with a view to its progressive 
development and codification’.43  Following 20 years 
work, and 15 reports by eminent international jurists 
acting as Special Rapporteurs, the Draft Articles on 
the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses (1994 ILC Draft Articles) were adopted.44  
Upon receipt of the 1994 ILC Draft Articles, the UN 
General Assembly took the decision to convene 
a working group to negotiate a Convention on the 
basis of the draft articles.45  The working group met 
on two occasions, in 1996 and 1997, prior to the UN 
Watercourses Convention being adopted on 21st May 
1997 by 103 votes in favour, 26 abstentions, and three 
votes against.46  It is also important to recognise the 
role of two other non-governmental expert bodies - the 
International Law Association (ILA), and the Institute of 
International Law (IIL) - played in the evolution of the law 
of international watercourses. The IIL’s work constituted 
42  E Brown-Weiss, L Boisson de Charzones and N Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Fresh 
Water and International Economic Law (Oxford University Press 2005). 
43  Progressive development and codification of the rules of international law relating 
to international watercourses, UN General Assembly Resolution 2669(XXV), <http://
daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/349/34/IMG/NR034934.
pdf?OpenElement> accessed 21 September 2011).
44  Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, in (1994) Yearbook of the International Law Commission (Vol. II, part 
II), <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l493.pdf> accessed 21 
September 2011).
45  Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/49/52, 17 February 1995, 
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/clnuiw/clnuiw.html> accessed 8 December 2011.
46  Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/51/229, 8 July 1997, 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/res/51/229> accessed 8 
December 2011; and UN General Assembly Official Records, 99th Plenary Meeting, 
21 May 1997, UN Doc. A/51/PV.99, <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol=A/51/PV.99> accessed 8 December 2011.
B.3 Evolution of the UN 
Watercourses Convention
the first attempt by an independent expert group to 
codify rules relating to international watercourses at 
the global level. This work resulted in the Salzburg 
Resolution of 1961, which recognised the concept 
of limited territory sovereignty over international 
watercourses.47  The early work by the ILA culminated 
in the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of 
International Rivers in 1966.48  The Helsinki Rules 
played an important role in shaping subsequent treaty 
practice, particularly in Africa, and many of the rules 
and principles found in the Helsinki Rules are reflected 
in the later UN Watercourses Convention.49  In addition 
to the Helsinki Rules, the ILA has examined treaty 
practice in a number of sub-areas of the law relating 
to international watercourses.50  More recently, the ILA 
has sought to develop its work on the codification and 
progressive development of the law of international 
watercourses through the 2004 Berlin Rules on Water 
Resources.51 However, the degree to which the latter 
instrument accurately reflects customary international 
law is hotly debated.52 
47  S Salman, ‘The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin 
Rules: perspectives on international water law’, (2007) 23(4) Water Resources 
Development 625-640. 
48  The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers, in S 
Bogdanovic, International law of water resources (Kluwer Law International 2001) at 
147—387.
49 S Salman, ‘The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin 
Rules: perspectives on international water law’ at 630.
50 See S Bogdanovic, International Law of Water Resources, 147—387. 
51 Berlin Rules on Water Resources, in Report of the Seventy-first Conference of the 
International Law Association 2004, <http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.
cfm/cid/32> accessed 8 December 2011.
52 ILA Berlin Conference 2004 – Water Resources Committee Report Dissenting 
Opinion, 9 August 2004, <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/
ila_berlin_rules_dissent.html> accessed 21 September 2011. See also Salman, ‘The 
Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin Rules: perspectives 
on international water law’ at 636.
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Finally, the most significant recent development in the 
law of international watercourses has been the work of 
the ILC on transboundary aquifers.53  In 2008 the ILC 
presented draft articles on the law of transboundary 
aquifers to the UN General Assembly with the 
suggestion that it ‘recommend to states concerned to 
make appropriate bilateral or regional arrangements 
for the proper management of their transboundary 
aquifers on the basis of the principles enunciated in 
the articles’;54 and, ‘consider, at a later stage, and in 
view of the importance of the topic, the elaboration of a 
convention on the basis of the draft articles’. 
53  An ‘aquifer’ is defined within the Draft Articles as being, ‘a permeable water 
bearing geological formation underlain by a less permeable layer and the water 
contained in the saturated zone of the formation.’ See generally, C Yamada, 
‘Codification of the Law of Transboundary Aquifers (Groundwater) by the United 
Nations’, (2011) 36(5) Water International 557-565.
54  The law of transboundary aquifers, UN General Assembly Resolution 63/124, 
15 January 2009, available at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N08/478/23/PDF/N0847823.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 21 September 2011.
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The UNECE Water Convention was adopted in 17 
March 1992 and entered into force on the 6 October 
1996.  The Convention requires states to, ‘prevent, 
control and reduce transboundary impact, use 
transboundary waters in a reasonable and equitable 
way, and ensure their sustainable management’.  
Significant analysis has shown that the UNECE Water 
Convention and the UN Watercourses Convention 
do not contradict each other.55However, as would be 
expected from a regional vis-à-vis a global instrument, 
the UNECE Water Convention on the whole provides 
more detail than the UN Water Convention.  In 
particular, the obligation to establish joint agreements 
and related institutional arrangements is more 
pronounced in the UNECE Water Convention.  The 
similarities between the Conventions are explored 
further throughout this User’s Guide. 
     A further difference between the two instruments 
is that the UNECE Water Convention provides for an 
institutional framework to promote its implementation.  
Such a framework includes a secretariat, working 
groups, meeting of the parties, and so forth. Over 
the course of the last twenty years, these institutional 
arrangements have proven highly effective in constantly 
assessing and strengthening the implementation of this 
framework instrument at the basin and national levels.56  
In 2003, an amendment to the UNECE Water 
Convention was proposed to allow states situated 
outside the UNECE region to become parties to the 
55  See for example, Tanzi A, ‘The UN Watercourses Convention and the UNECE 
Water Convention’, Wouters P and Moynihan R ‘International Law and Water 
Security’, In Rieu-Clarke A and  Loures F (eds.), The UN Watercourses Convention 
in Force: Strengthening International Law for Transboundary Water Management 
(Earthscan Publishers 2012). Report of the UN/ECE Task Force on Legal and 
Administrative Aspects, The Relationship between the 1992 UNECE Convention on 
the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and 
the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, February 2000, available at <http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/
env/water/publications/documents/conventiontotal_Eng_final.pdfaccessed 30 April 
2012; A Rieu-Clarke, ‘The Role and Relevance of the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses to the EU and its Member 
States’ (2008) 78 British Yearbook of International Law 389.
56  Wouters P and Vinogradov S, ‘Analysing the ECE Water Convention: What 
Lessons for the Regional Management of Transboundary Water Resources?’ in 
Stokke OS and Thommessen ØB (eds.), Yearbook of International Co-operation on 
Environment and Development 2003/2004 (Earthscan Publications 2003)
Convention.57  This approval requires to be ratified by 
two thirds of the parties to the Convention.58   Given that 
both these framework instruments are complementary, 
there is the prospect of having both Conventions in 
force at the global level within the foreseeable future, 
offers significant opportunities to strengthen the legal 
architecture around international watercourses. 
57 UN ECE, Amendment to Articles 25 and 26 of the Convention, UN Doc. 
UNECE/MP.WAT/14, 12 January 2004, available at <http://www.unece.org/
fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2004/wat/ece.mp.wat.14.e.pdf> accessed 30 April 
2012. See also, UNECE, Opening the Convention Beyond the Region: Why the 
Amendments to Articles 25 and 26 Should Enter Into Force Soon, UN Doc. UNECE/
MP.WAT/2009/1, 11 August 2009, available at <http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/
DAM/env/documents/2009/Wat/mp_wat/ECE_MP_WAT_2009_1_e.pdf> accessed 
30 April 2012.
58 Currently there are 38 parties to the Convention, see <http://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-5&chapter=27&lang=en>, 
and the amendment has been ratified by 21 parties.
B.4 The UNECE Water Convention 
as a global instrument
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B.5 The international legal system
An introduction to the UN Watercourses Convention 
would not be complete without providing an overview 
of the international legal system in which this global 
instrument operates. While more extensive discussion 
of the international legal system can be found 
elsewhere, some key points are worth noting here.  
     Horizontal nature | While the legal structure 
within national legal systems is vertical,59 the 
international system is horizontal, consisting of over 
190 independent states which are all equal in legal 
theory (in that they all possess the characteristics of 
sovereignty) and where no state has authority over 
another.60  There is no supreme law-making or law-
enforcement authority, it is states which create the law 
and can choose whether or not to obey it.
     Subjects of international law | The subjects of 
international law means those ‘persons’ or ‘entities’ 
to which international law applies. International legal 
personality essentially means the right to conclude 
international treaties and to bring international claims.61  
Traditionally the subjects of international law were 
limited to states and the Holy See.62  States remain 
the major subjects of international law. Their legal 
personality derives from the nature and structure of 
the international system and Statehood will arise as a 
result of the satisfaction of a set of legal criteria.63  As 
such the state is said to have an ‘objective’ personality; 
it is subject to a wide range of international rights and 
duties and will be accepted as an international person 
by any other international person in international 
59  In domestic systems, the law is ‘vertical’ which means authority is vertical and 
above individuals who must obey it.  In a domestic system institutions create the law 
not individuals. MN Shaw, International Law (6th edn, Cambridge University Press 
2008) at 6.
60  Ibid.
61  Aust A, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2005)
 at 13. 
62  Shaw, International Law, at 197.
63  For widely used criteria of statehood see Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States,165 LNTS 19. Under this Convention 
a state as an international person should possess the following qualifications: ‘(a) 
a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to 
enter into relations with other states’.  For commentary see Shaw, International Law, 
at 197-211.
relations.64  There are also now an increasing range 
of non-state actors and entities in the international 
legal system, including international organisations, 
natural persons (individuals), and private companies.  
These legal persons are said to have ‘qualified’ 
personality, as subjects possessing qualified rights 
and responsibilities, which are given to them by the 
necessary subjects of international law.65   For example, 
the question of whether an organisation possesses 
personality in international law will depend upon its 
constitutional status, its actual powers and practice, 
its capacity to enter into relations with states and other 
organisations and conclude treaties with them, and the 
status it has been given under domestic law.66   The 
concepts and categorisations above are not absolute 
and there are diverging views from legal scholars as to 
the varying degrees of international legal personality 
attached to different subjects.  
     International law-making | In international law 
there is no one law-making body able to create laws 
which are internationally binding upon everyone, or a 
proper system of courts with compulsory jurisdiction 
to interpret and progress the law.67  Article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice is the most 
authoritative statement of the sources of international 
law and includes: (a) international conventions, whether 
general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognised by the contesting states; (b) international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law; (c) the general principles of law recognised 
by civilised nations; (d) subject to the provisions of 
Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, 
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
64  Shaw, International Law, at 260.
65  Ibid.
66  Ibid.
67  Ibid 70.
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law.68  The first two sources (treaties and international 
custom) are considered primary sources of international 
law whereas generally accepted principles of law, 
judicial and arbitral decisions, and legal doctrine are 
considered to be secondary sources of 
international law.
     Codification and Progressive Development, and 
the ILC | The objective of the ILC, pursuant to its 
founding statute, is the ‘promotion of the progressive 
development of international law and its codification’.69  
The ILC thus supports one of the key requirements of 
the UN General Assembly, pursuant to Article 13 of 
the UN Charter, namely, to initiate studies and make 
recommendations for the purpose of ‘encouraging 
the progressive development of international law 
and its codification’.70 Pursuant to the Statute of the 
ILC, ‘progressive development of international law’ 
is defined as ‘the preparation of draft conventions 
on subjects which have not yet been regulated by 
international law or in regard to which the law has 
not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice 
of states.’71  The ‘codification of international law’ 
is defined within the statute as, ‘the more precise 
formulation and systematization of rules of international 
law in fields where there already has been extensive 
State practice, precedent and doctrine.’72  Generally, 
and as was the case with the law of international 
watercourses, the ILC’s work tends to include elements 
of both codification and progressive development. 
68  Article 38(1) Statute of the International Court of Justice is annexed to the UN 
Charter and is available online at the International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0> accessed 21 December 2011.
69  Statute of the International Law Commission, UN General Assembly Resolution 
174(ii), 21 November 1947, available at <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/statute/statute_e.pdf> accessed 30 April 2012.
70  Article 13 of the UN Charter (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 
October 1945), available at <http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.
pdf> accessed 30 April 2012.
71  Statute of the International Law Commission, Article 15.
72  Ibid
In terms of working arrangements, the ILC is made 
up of 34 experts in international law nominated by 
member states of the UN, operating in their individual 
capacity, and elected by the General Assembly.   The 
ILC may be requested by the UN General Assembly 
to address questions on the codification of principles 
of international law, or as was the case with the law of 
non-navigational uses of international watercourses, 
draft proposals for international conventions. In both 
cases the ILC appoints a Special Rapporteur from 
within its membership and develops a plan of work.  
The rapporteur then writes a report, or series of 
reports on the subject, which must then be approved 
by the Commission, UN Secretary-General and UN 
General Assembly.  
     State responsibility | State responsibility is a 
fundamental principle of international law, providing that 
whenever one state commits an internationally unlawful 
act against another state, international responsibility 
is established between the two.73Article 1 of the ILC’s 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility provides that 
‘every internationally wrongful act of a state entails 
responsibility’.74 Article 2 stipulates that there is an 
internationally wrongful act of a state when: (a) conduct 
consisting of an action or omission is attributable to 
the state under international law; and (b) that conduct 
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of 
the state.75  The state responsible for the internationally 
wrongful act is under an obligation to cease that act 
and to offer a guarantee that it will not be repeated 
(Article 30) and a breach of international obligation 
gives rise to a requirement for reparation (Article 31).76  
There is a substantial body of international case law 
73  Shaw, International Law, at 778.
74  ILC 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful 
acts, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 53rd session 
(2001) UN Doc A/56/10, at 43-365.
75   Ibid.
76   Ibid.
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in line with the ILC Draft Articles, some of which is 
discussed briefly under Part VI of this Guide. 
     Compliance, disputes and enforcement | Why do 
states comply or fail to comply with international law? 
There are numerous internal and external motivations 
for state compliance and contrary to popular belief 
states do observe international law most of the time, 
with violations being comparatively rare.77   It is in a 
nation’s self-interest to obey, if a state is seen to ignore 
international law, other states may do the same and 
the resulting chaos would not be in the interest of any 
state.78  States recognise this necessity because it 
imports an element of stability and predictability into 
international relations.79  Where countries are involved in 
a disagreement or a dispute, international law provides 
a common frame of reference with a common language 
where one state will be aware of how the other state 
will develop its argument.80  Essentially, the need for 
reciprocity encourages compliance.  
     However, where states fail to comply with 
international law, possible reasons include ambiguity 
and indeterminacy of language or lack of capacity 
and less commonly where a state makes a conscious 
decision to violate it on an issue regarded as vital to 
their interests.81 The traditional response to ensuring 
compliance was to invoke state responsibility. New 
approaches to ensure compliance have moved away 
from a pure focus on dispute settlement to dispute 
avoidance and state responsibility towards compliance 
verification and assistance, including utilising positive 
incentives and disincentives for non-compliance. 
What is an international dispute and how do states 
77  Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice at 3.
78  Ibid at 4.
79  Shaw, International Law at 7.
80  Ibid at 8.
81  Black’s Law Dictionary (4th edn West 1951).
resolve their disputes? And a related question – what 
is the distinction between and international justiciable 
dispute and non-justiciable dispute, and why does 
the distinction matter? The term ‘dispute’ has been 
defined as a ‘conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims 
or rights’.82  The Permanent Court of International 
Justice in the Mavrommatis case defines a dispute as 
a, ‘disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict 
of legal views or of interests between two persons’.83  
The distinction is often drawn between legal disputes 
(primarily involving legal issues) and any other kind 
of dispute. Whether a disagreement in international 
law is considered to be a ‘dispute’ or not has legal 
implications for the type of dispute settlement 
response. Only disputes which are ‘justiciable’ are 
suitable for resolution by legal dispute settlement 
methods.  A dispute is justiciable if, ‘first, a specific 
disagreement exists, and secondly, that disagreement 
is of a kind which can be resolved by the application 
of rules of law by judicial (including arbitral) processes’, 
otherwise it is non-justiciable.84  Where disputes are 
non-justiciable they must be resolved through other 
methods of peaceful settlement.  The methods
 of dispute resolution will be discussed in Part VI of 
this Guide.
82  (1924) PCIJ Ser. A, No. 2, 11.
83  J Collier and V Lowe, Settlement of Disputes in International Law: Institutions 
and Procedures (Oxford University Press 1999) at 10.
84  Ibid.
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PART I - INTRODUCTION 
Article 1 - Scope of the present Convention 
1.  The present Convention applies to uses of 
international watercourses and of their waters 
for purposes other than navigation and to 
measures of protection, preservation and 
management related to the uses of those 
watercourses and their waters. 
2.  The uses of international watercourses for 
navigation is not within the scope of the present 
Convention except insofar as other uses affect 
navigation or are affected by navigation. 
Refer to pages 67-74
Article 2 - Use of terms 
For the purposes of the present Convention: 
(a)  “Watercourse” means a system of surface 
waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue 
of their physical relationship a unitary whole 
and normally flowing into a common terminus; 
(b)  “International watercourse” means a 
watercourse, parts of which are situated in 
different States; 
(c)  “Watercourse State” means a State Party to 
the present Convention in whose territory part 
of an international watercourse is situated, or 
a Party that is a regional economic integration 
organization, in the territory of one or more of 
whose Member States part of an international 
watercourse is situated; 
(d)  “Regional economic integration organization” 
means an organization constituted by sovereign 
States of a given region, to which its member 
States have transferred competence in respect 
of matters governed by this Convention and 
which has been duly authorized in accordance 
with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, 
accept, approve or accede to it. 
Refer to pages 75-87
Article 3 - Watercourse agreements 
1.  In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, 
nothing in the present Convention shall affect 
the rights or obligations of a watercourse State 
arising from agreements in force for it on the 
date on which it became a party to the present 
Convention. 
2.  Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, 
parties to agreements referred to in paragraph 
1 may, where necessary, consider harmonizing 
such agreements with the basic principles of 
the present Convention. 
3.  Watercourse States may enter into one or 
more agreements, hereinafter referred to as 
“watercourse agreements”, which apply and 
Text of the 1997 UN 
Watercourses Convention 
C. Convention on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses
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adjust the provisions of the present Convention 
to the characteristics and uses of a particular 
international watercourse or part thereof. 
4.  Where a watercourse agreement is concluded 
between two or more watercourse States, it 
shall define the waters to which it applies. Such 
an agreement may be entered into with respect 
to an entire international watercourse or any 
part thereof or a particular project, programme 
or use except insofar as the agreement 
adversely affects, to a significant extent, the 
use by one or more other watercourse States 
of the waters of the watercourse, without their 
express consent. 
5.  Where a watercourse State considers that 
adjustment and application of the provisions 
of the present Convention is required because 
of the characteristics and uses of a particular 
international watercourse, watercourse States 
shall consult with a view to negotiating in 
good faith for the purpose of concluding a 
watercourse agreement or agreements. 
6.  Where some but not all watercourse States to a 
particular international watercourse are parties 
to an agreement, nothing in such agreement 
shall affect the rights or obligations under the 
present Convention of watercourse States that 
are not parties to such an agreement. 
Refer to pages 88-95
Article 4 - Parties to watercourse agreements 
1.  Every watercourse State is entitled to 
participate in the negotiation of and to become 
a party to any watercourse agreement that 
applies to the entire international watercourse, 
as well as to participate in any relevant 
consultations. 
2.  A watercourse State whose use of an 
international watercourse may be affected 
to a significant extent by the implementation 
of a proposed watercourse agreement that 
applies only to a part of the watercourse or 
to a particular project, programme or use is 
entitled to participate in consultations on such 
an agreement and, where appropriate, in the 
negotiation thereof in good faith with a view to 
becoming a party thereto, to the extent that its 
use is thereby affected. 
Refer to pages 96-99
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PART II - GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Article 5 - Equitable and reasonable utilization 
and participation 
1.  Watercourse States shall in their respective 
territories utilize an international watercourse 
in an equitable and reasonable manner. In 
particular, an international watercourse shall 
be used and developed by watercourse States 
with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable 
utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking 
into account the interests of the watercourse 
States concerned, consistent with adequate 
protection of the watercourse. 
2.  Watercourse States shall participate in the use, 
development and protection of an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable 
manner. Such participation includes both the 
right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to 
cooperate in the protection and development 
thereof, as provided in the present Convention. 
Refer to pages 100-110
Article 6 - Factors relevant to equitable and 
reasonable utilization 
1.  Utilization of an international watercourse in 
an equitable and reasonable manner within 
the meaning of article 5 requires taking into 
account all relevant factors and circumstances, 
including: 
(a)  Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, 
climatic, ecological and other factors of a 
natural character; 
(b)  The social and economic needs of the 
watercourse States concerned; 
(c)  The population dependent on the watercourse 
in each watercourse State; 
(d)  The effects of the use or uses of the 
watercourses in one watercourse State on other 
watercourse States; 
(e)  Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; 
(f)  Conservation, protection, development and 
economy of use of the water resources of the  
watercourse and the costs of measures taken 
to that effect; 
(g)  The availability of alternatives, of comparable 
value, to a particular planned or existing use. 
2.  In the application of article 5 or paragraph 1 of 
this article, watercourse States concerned shall, 
when the need arises, enter into consultations 
in a spirit of cooperation. 
3.  The weight to be given to each factor is to be 
determined by its importance in comparison 
with that of other relevant factors. In 
determining what is a reasonable and equitable 
use, all relevant factors are to be considered 
together and a conclusion reached on the basis 
of the whole. 
Refer to pages 111-116
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Article 7 - Obligation not to cause 
significant harm 
1.  Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an 
international watercourse in their territories, 
take all appropriate measures to prevent 
the causing of significant harm to other 
watercourse States. 
2.  Where significant harm nevertheless is caused 
to another watercourse State, the States whose 
use causes such harm shall, in the absence 
of agreement to such use, take all appropriate 
measures, having due regard for the provisions 
of articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the 
affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such 
harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the 
question of compensation. 
Refer to pages 117-122
Article 8 - General obligation to cooperate 
1.  Watercourse States shall cooperate on the 
basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, 
mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain 
optimal utilization and adequate protection of 
an international watercourse. 
2.  In determining the manner of such 
cooperation, watercourse States may 
consider the establishment of joint  
mechanisms or commissions, as deemed 
necessary by them, to facilitate cooperation  
on relevant measures and procedures in the 
light of experience gained through  
cooperation in existing jointmechanisms  
and commissions in various regions. 
Refer to pages 123-125
Article 9 - Regular exchange of data
and information 
1.  Pursuant to article 8, watercourse States shall 
on a regular basis exchange readily available 
data and information on the condition of the 
watercourse, in particular that of a hydrological, 
meteorological, hydrogeological and ecological 
nature and related to the water quality as well 
as related forecasts. 
2.  If a watercourse State is requested by 
another watercourse State to provide data 
or information that is not readily available, it 
shall employ its best efforts to comply with 
the request but may condition its compliance 
upon payment by the requesting State of 
the reasonable costs of collecting and, 
where appropriate, processing such data or 
information. 
3.  Watercourse States shall employ their best 
efforts to collect and, where appropriate, 
to process data and information in a 
manner which facilitates its utilization by 
the other watercourse States to which it is 
communicated. 
Refer to pages 126-128
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Article 10 - Relationship between different
kinds of uses 
1.  In the absence of agreement or custom to the 
contrary, no use of an international watercourse 
enjoys inherent priority over other uses. 
2.  In the event of a conflict between uses of an 
international watercourse, it shall be resolved 
with reference to articles 5 to 7, with special 
regard being given to the requirements of vital 
human needs.                                                                                 
Refer to pages 129-133
PART III - PLANNED MEASURES 
Article 11 - Information concerning 
planned measures 
Watercourse States shall exchange information and 
consult each other and, if necessary, negotiate on the 
possible effects of planned measures on the condition 
of an international watercourse. 
Refer to pages 134-138
Article 12 - Notification concerning planned 
measures with possible adverse effects 
Before a watercourse State implements or permits 
the implementation of planned measures which 
may have a significant adverse effect upon other 
watercourse States, it shall provide those States with 
timely notification thereof. Such notification shall 
be accompanied by available technical data and 
information, including the results of any environmental 
impact assessment, in order to enable the notified 
States to evaluate the possible effects of the planned 
measures. 
Refer to pages 139-143
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Article 13 - Period for reply to notification 
Unless otherwise agreed: 
(a)  A watercourse State providing a notification 
under article 12 shall allow the notified States a 
period of six months within which to study and 
evaluate the possible effects of the planned 
measures and to communicate the findings to 
it; 
(b)  This period shall, at the request of a notified 
State for which the evaluation of the planned 
measures poses special difficulty, be extended 
for a period of six months. 
Refer to pages 144-145
Article 14 - Obligations of the notifying State 
during the period for reply 
During the period referred to in article 13, 
the notifying State: 
(a) Shall cooperate with the notified States by 
providing them, on request, with any additional 
data and information that is available and 
necessary for an accurate evaluation; and 
(b)  Shall not implement or permit the 
implementation of the planned measures 
without the consent of the notified States. 
Refer to pages 146-147
Article 15 - Reply to notification 
The notified States shall communicate their findings 
to the notifying State as early as possible within the 
period applicable pursuant to article 13. If a notified 
State finds that implementation of the planned 
measures would be inconsistent with the provisions 
of articles 5 or 7, it shall attach to its finding a 
documented explanation setting forth the reasons for 
the finding. 
Refer to pages 148-149
Article 16 - Absence of reply to notification 
1.  If, within the period applicable pursuant to 
article 13, the notifying State receives no 
communication under article 15, it may, subject 
to its obligations under articles 5 and 7, 
proceed with the implementation of the planned 
measures, in accordance with the notification 
and any other data and information provided to 
the notified States. 
2.  Any claim to compensation by a notified State 
which has failed to reply within the period 
applicable pursuant to article 13 may be offset 
by the costs incurred by the notifying State for 
action undertaken after the expiration of the 
time for a reply which would not have been 
undertaken if the notified State had objected 
within that period. 
Refer to pages 150-151
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Article 17 - Consultations and negotiations 
concerning planned measures 
1.  If a communication is made under article 15 
that implementation of the planned measures 
would be inconsistent with the provisions of 
articles 5 or 7, the notifying State and the State 
making the communication shall enter into 
consultations and, if necessary, negotiations 
with a view to arriving at an equitable resolution 
of the situation. 
2.  The consultations and negotiations shall be 
conducted on the basis that each State must in 
good faith pay reasonable regard to the rights 
and legitimate interests of the other State. 
3.  During the course of the consultations and 
negotiations, the notifying State shall, if so 
requested by the notified State at the time 
it makes the communication, refrain from 
implementing or permitting the implementation 
of the planned measures for a period of six 
months unless otherwise agreed. 
Refer to pages 152-154
Article 18 - Procedures in the absence 
of notification 
1.  If a watercourse State has reasonable grounds 
to believe that another watercourse State is 
planning measures that may have a significant 
adverse effect upon it, the former State may 
request the latter to apply the provisions of 
article 12. The request shall be accompanied 
by a documented explanation setting forth its 
grounds. 
2.  In the event that the State planning the 
measures nevertheless finds that it is not 
under an obligation to provide a notification 
under article 12, it shall so inform the other 
State, providing a documented explanation 
setting forth the reasons for such finding. If 
this finding does not satisfy the other State, 
the two States shall, at the request of that 
other State, promptly enter into consultations 
and negotiations in the manner indicated in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 17. 
3.  During the course of the consultations and 
negotiations, the State planning the measures 
shall, if so requested by the other State at the 
time it requests the initiation of consultations 
and negotiations, refrain from implementing 
or permitting the implementation of those 
measures for a period of six months unless  
otherwise agreed. 
Refer to pages 155-160
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Article 19 - Urgent implementation of 
planned measures 
1.  In the event that the implementation of planned 
measures is of the utmost urgency in order to 
protect public health, public safety or other 
equally important interests, the State planning 
the measures may, subject to articles 5 and 
7, immediately proceed to implementation, 
notwithstanding the provisions of article 14 and 
paragraph 3 of article 17. 
2.  In such case, a formal declaration of 
the urgency of the measures shall be 
communicated without delay to the other 
watercourse States referred to in article 12 
together with the relevant data and information. 
3.  The State planning the measures shall, at 
the request of any of the States referred to in 
paragraph 2, promptly enter into consultations 
and negotiations with it in the manner indicated 
in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 17. 
Refer to pages 161-163
PART IV - PROTECTION, 
PRESERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 
Article 20 - Protection and preservation of 
ecosystems 
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where 
appropriate, jointly, protect and preserve the 
ecosystems of international watercourses. 
Refer to pages 164-172
Article 21 - Prevention, reduction and control
of pollution    
    
                               
1. For the purpose of this article, “pollution of 
an international watercourse” means any 
detrimental alteration in the composition 
or quality of the waters of an international 
watercourse which results directly or indirectly 
from human conduct. 
2. Watercourse States shall, individually and, where 
appropriate, jointly, prevent, reduce and control 
the pollution of an international watercourse 
that may cause significant harm to other 
watercourse States or to their environment, 
including harm to human health or safety, to 
the use of the waters for any beneficial purpose 
or to the living resources of the watercourse. 
Watercourse States shall take steps to 
harmonize their policies in this connection. 
3. Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of 
them, consult with a view to arriving at mutually 
agreeable measures and methods to prevent, 
reduce and control pollution of an international 
watercourse, such as: 
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(a) Setting joint water quality objectives and criteria; 
(b) Establishing techniques and practices to address 
pollution from point and non-point sources; 
(c) Establishing lists of substances the introduction 
of which into the waters of an international 
watercourse is to be prohibited, limited, 
investigated or monitored. 
Refer to pages 173-180
Article 22 - Introduction of alien or new 
species 
Watercourse States shall take all measures necessary 
to prevent the introduction of species, alien or 
new, into an international watercourse which may 
have effects detrimental to the ecosystem of the 
watercourse resulting in significant harm to other 
watercourse States. 
Refer to pages 181-184
Article 23 - Protection and preservation of the 
marine environment 
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where 
appropriate, in cooperation with other States, take all 
measures with respect to an international watercourse 
that are necessary to protect and preserve the marine 
environment, including estuaries, taking into account 
generally accepted international rules and standards. 
Refer to pages 185-190
Article 24 - Management 
1.  Watercourse States shall, at the request of any 
of them, enter into consultations concerning the 
management of an international watercourse, 
which may include the establishment 
of a joint management mechanism.                                                            
2. For the purposes of this article, 
“management” refers, in particular, to: 
(a)    Planning the sustainable development of an 
international watercourse and providing for the 
implementation of any plans adopted; and 
(b)  Otherwise promoting the rational and optimal 
utilization, protection and control of the 
watercourse. 
Refer to pages 191-195
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Article 25 - Regulation 
1.  Watercourse States shall cooperate, 
where appropriate, to respond to needs or 
opportunities for regulation of the flow of the 
waters of an international watercourse. 
2.  Unless otherwise agreed, watercourse States 
shall participate on an equitable basis in the 
construction and maintenance or defrayal of 
the costs of such regulation works as they may 
have agreed to undertake. 
3.  For the purposes of this article, “regulation” 
means the use of hydraulic works or any other 
continuing measure to alter, vary or otherwise 
control the flow of the waters of an international 
watercourse. 
Refer to pages 196-198
Article 26 - Installations  
1.  Watercourse States shall, within their respective 
territories, employ their best efforts to maintain 
and protect installations, facilities and other 
works related to an international watercourse. 
2.  Watercourse States shall, at the request of 
any of them which has reasonable grounds to 
believe that it may suffer significant adverse 
effects, enter into consultations with regard to: 
(a)  The safe operation and maintenance of 
installations, facilities or other works related to 
an international watercourse; and 
(b)  The protection of installations, facilities or other 
works from wilful or negligent acts or the forces 
of nature. 
Refer to pages 199-200
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PART V - HARMFUL CONDITIONS AND 
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 
Article 27 - Prevention and mitigation of
harmful conditions 
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where 
appropriate, jointly, take all appropriate measures 
to prevent or mitigate conditions related to an 
international watercourse that may be harmful to other 
watercourse States, whether resulting from natural 
causes or human conduct, such as flood or ice 
conditions, water- borne diseases, siltation, erosion, 
salt-water intrusion, drought or desertification. 
Refer to pages 201-209
Article 28 - Emergency situations 
1.  For the purposes of this article, “emergency” 
means a situation that causes, or poses an 
imminent threat of causing, serious harm to 
watercourse States or other States and that 
results suddenly from natural causes, such as 
floods, the breaking up of ice, landslides or 
earthquakes, or from human conduct, such as 
industrial accidents. 
2.  A watercourse State shall, without delay and 
by the most expeditious means available, notify 
other potentially affected States and competent 
international organizations of any emergency 
originating within its territory. 
3.  A watercourse State within whose territory 
an emergency originates shall, in cooperation 
with potentially affected States and, where 
appropriate, competent international 
organizations, immediately take all practicable 
measures necessitated by the circumstances to 
prevent, mitigate and eliminate harmful effects 
of the emergency. 
4.  When necessary, watercourse States 
shall jointly develop contingency plans for 
responding to emergencies, in cooperation, 
where appropriate, with other potentially 
affected States and competent international 
organizations. 
Refer to pages 210-215
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Article 29 - International watercourses and 
installations in time of armed conflict 
International watercourses and related installations, 
facilities and other works shall enjoy the protection 
accorded by the principles and rules of international 
law applicable in international and non-international 
armed conflict and shall not be used in violation of 
those principles and rules. 
Refer to pages 216-220
Article 30 - Indirect procedures 
In cases where there are serious obstacles to direct 
contacts between watercourse States, the States 
concerned shall fulfil their obligations of cooperation 
provided for in the present Convention, including 
exchange of data and information, notification, 
communication, consultations and negotiations, 
through any indirect procedure accepted by them. 
Refer to pages 221-223
Article 31 - Data and information vital to 
national defence or security 
             
 
Nothing in the present Convention obliges a 
watercourse State to provide data or information vital 
to its national defence or security. Nevertheless, that 
State shall cooperate in good faith with the other 
watercourse States with a view to providing as much 
information as possible under the circumstances. 
Refer to pages 221-223
Article 32 - Non-discrimination 
Unless the watercourse States concerned have 
agreed otherwise for the protection of the interests 
of persons, natural or juridical, who have suffered 
or are under a serious threat of suffering significant 
transboundary harm as a result of activities related 
to an international watercourse, a watercourse State 
shall not discriminate on the basis of nationality 
or residence or place where the injury occurred, in 
granting to such persons, in accordance with its legal 
system, access to judicial or other procedures, or a 
right to claim compensation or other relief in respect 
of significant harm caused by such activities carried 
on in its territory. 
Refer to pages 224-227
PART VI - MISCELLANEOUS 
PROVISIONS 
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Article 33 - Settlement of disputes 
1.  In the event of a dispute between two or 
more Parties concerning the interpretation 
or application of the present Convention, the 
Parties concerned shall, in the absence of an 
applicable agreement between them, seek a 
settlement of the dispute by peaceful means in 
accordance with the following provisions. 
2.  If the Parties concerned cannot reach 
agreement by negotiation requested by one of 
them, they may jointly seek the good offices 
of, or request mediation or conciliation by, a 
third party, or make use, as appropriate, of any 
joint watercourse institutions that may have 
been established by them or agree to submit 
the dispute to arbitration or to the International 
Court of Justice. 
3.  Subject to the operation of paragraph 10, if 
after six months from the time of the request 
for negotiations referred to in paragraph 2, the 
Parties concerned have not been able to settle 
their dispute through negotiation or any other 
means referred to in paragraph 2, the dispute 
shall be submitted, at the request of any of the 
parties to the dispute, to impartial fact-finding 
in accordance with paragraphs 4 to 9, unless 
the Parties otherwise agree. 
4.  A Fact-finding Commission shall be 
established, composed of one member 
nominated by each Party concerned and in 
addition a member not having the nationality 
of any of the Parties concerned chosen by 
the nominated members who shall serve as 
Chairman. 
5.  If the members nominated by the Parties are 
unable to agree on a Chairman within three 
months of the request for the establishment 
of the Commission, any Party concerned may 
request the Secretary- General of the United 
Nations to appoint the Chairman who shall 
not have the nationality of any of the parties 
to the dispute or of any riparian State of the 
watercourse concerned. If one of the Parties 
fails to nominate a member within three months 
of the initial request pursuant to paragraph 
3, any other Party concerned may request 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
to appoint a person who shall not have the 
nationality of any of the parties to the dispute 
or of any riparian State of the watercourse 
concerned. The person so appointed shall 
constitute a single-member Commission. 
6.  The Commission shall determine its own 
procedure. 
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7.  The Parties concerned have the obligation to 
provide the Commission with such information 
as it may require and, on request, to permit the 
Commission to have access to their respective 
territory and to inspect any facilities, plant, 
equipment, construction or natural feature 
relevant for the purpose of its inquiry. 
8.  The Commission shall adopt its report by a 
majority vote, unless it is a single-member 
Commission, and shall submit that report 
to the Parties concerned setting forth its 
findings and the reasons therefor and such 
recommendations as it deems appropriate for 
an equitable solution of the dispute, which the  
Parties concerned shall consider in good faith. 
9.  The expenses of the Commission shall be 
borne equally by the Parties concerned. 
10.  When ratifying, accepting, approving or 
acceding to the present Convention, or at 
any time thereafter, a Party which is not a 
regional economic integration organization may 
declare in a written instrument submitted to 
the Depositary that, in respect of any dispute 
not resolved in accordance with paragraph 2, 
it recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and 
without special agreement in relation to any 
Party accepting the same obligation: 
(a)  Submission of the dispute to the International 
Court of Justice; and/or 
(b)  Arbitration by an arbitral tribunal established 
and operating, unless the parties to the dispute 
otherwise agreed, in accordance with the 
procedure laid down in the annex to the present 
Convention. 
A Party which is a regional economic integration 
organization may make a declaration with like 
effect in relation to arbitration in accordance with 
subparagraph (b). 
Refer to pages 228-233
PART VII - FINAL CLAUSES 
Article 34 - Signature 
The present Convention shall be open for signature 
by all States and by regional economic integration 
organizations from ...until ... at United Nations 
Headquarters in New York. 
Refer to pages 234-250
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Article 35 - Ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession 
1.  The present Convention is subject to 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
by States and by regional economic integration 
organizations. The instruments of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. 
2.  Any regional economic integration organization 
which becomes a Party to this Convention 
without any of its member States being a Party 
shall be bound by all the obligations under the 
Convention. In the case of such organizations, 
one or more of whose member States is a Party 
to this Convention, the organization and its 
member States shall decide on their respective 
responsibilities for the performance of their 
obligations under the Convention. In such 
cases, the organization and the member States 
shall not be entitled to exercise rights under the 
Convention concurrently. 
3.  In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, the regional economic 
integration organizations shall declare the 
extent of their competence with respect to the 
matters governed by the Convention. These 
organizations shall also inform the Secretary-
General of the United Nations of any substantial 
modification in the extent of their competence. 
Refer to pages 263-266
Article 36 - Entry into force 
1.  The present Convention shall enter into force on 
the ninetieth day following the date of deposit 
of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
2.  For each State or regional economic integration 
organization that ratifies, accepts or approves 
the Convention or accedes thereto after 
the deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, 
the Convention shall enter into force on the 
ninetieth day after the deposit by such State or 
regional economic integration organization of its 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession. 
3.  For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, any 
instrument deposited by a regional economic 
integration organization shall not be counted as 
additional to those deposited by States. 
Refer to pages 267-268
Article 37 – Authentic texts 
The original of the present Convention, of which 
the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian 
and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.
Refer to pages 269-270
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Annex – Arbitration 
Article 1 
Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the 
arbitration pursuant to article 33 of the Convention 
shall take place in accordance with articles 2 to 14 of 
the present annex. 
Article 2 
The claimant party shall notify the respondent party 
that it is referring a dispute to arbitration pursuant 
to article 33 of the Convention. The notification shall 
state the subject matter of arbitration and include, 
in particular, the articles of the Convention, the 
interpretation or application of which are at issue. 
If the parties do not agree on the subject matter of 
the dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the 
subject matter. 
Article 3 
1.  In disputes between two parties, the arbitral 
tribunal shall consist of three members. Each 
of the parties to the dispute shall appoint an 
arbitrator and the two arbitrators so appointed 
shall designate by common agreement the third 
arbitrator, who shall be the Chairman of the 
tribunal. The latter shall not be a national of one 
of the parties to the dispute or of any riparian 
State of the watercourse concerned, nor 
have his or her usual place of residence in the 
territory of one of these parties or such riparian 
State, nor have dealt with the case in any other 
capacity. 
2.  In disputes between more than two parties, 
parties in the same interest shall appoint one 
arbitrator jointly by agreement. 
3.  Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner 
prescribed for the initial appointment. 
Article 4 
1.  If the Chairman of the arbitral tribunal has 
not been designated within two months of 
the appointment of the second arbitrator, the 
President of the International Court of Justice 
shall, at the request of a party, designate the 
Chairman within a further two-month period. 
2.  If one of the parties to the dispute does not 
appoint an arbitrator within two months of 
receipt of the request, the other party may 
inform the President of the International Court 
of Justice, who shall make the designation 
within a further two-month period. 
Article 5 
The arbitral tribunal shall render its decisions in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention 
and international law. 
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Article 6 
Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, 
the arbitral tribunal shall determine its own rules of 
procedure.
 
Article 7 
The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of one of the 
Parties, recommend essential interim measures of 
protection. 
Article 8 
1.  The parties to the dispute shall facilitate the 
work of the arbitral tribunal and, in particular, 
using all means at their disposal, shall: 
(a)  Provide it with all relevant documents, 
information and facilities; and 
(b)  Enable it, when necessary, to call witnesses or 
experts and receive their evidence. 
2.  The parties and the arbitrators are under an 
obligation to protect the confidentiality of any 
information they receive in confidence during 
the proceedings of the arbitral tribunal.  
Article 9 
Unless the arbitral tribunal determines otherwise 
because of the particular circumstances of the case, 
the costs of the tribunal shall be borne by the parties 
to the dispute in equal shares. The tribunal shall 
keep a record of all its costs, and shall furnish a final 
statement thereof to the parties. 
Article 10 
Any Party that has an interest of a legal nature in the 
subject matter of the dispute which may be affected 
by the decision in the case, may intervene in the 
proceedings with the consent of the tribunal. 
Article 11 
The tribunal may hear and determine counterclaims 
arising directly out of the subject matter of the 
dispute. 
Article 12 
Decisions both on procedure and substance of the 
arbitral tribunal shall be taken by a majority vote of 
its members. 
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Article 13 
If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear 
before the arbitral tribunal or fails to defend its case, 
the other party may request the tribunal to continue 
the proceedings and to make its award. Absence of a 
party or a failure of a party to defend its case shall not 
constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before rendering 
its final decision, the arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself 
that the claim is well founded in fact and law. 
1.  The tribunal shall render its final decision 
within five months of the date on which it is 
fully constituted unless it finds it necessary to 
extend the time limit for a period which should 
not exceed five more months. 
2.  The final decision of the arbitral tribunal shall 
be confined to the subject matter of the dispute 
and shall state the reasons on which it is based. 
It shall contain the names of the members 
who have participated and the date of the 
final decision. Any member of the tribunal may 
attach a separate or dissenting opinion to the 
final decision. 
3.  The award shall be binding on the parties to the 
dispute. It shall be without appeal unless the 
parties to the dispute have agreed in advance 
to an appellate procedure. 
4.  Any controversy which may arise between 
the parties to the dispute as regards the 
interpretation or manner of implementation of 
the final decision may be submitted by either 
party for decision to the arbitral tribunal which 
rendered it.
Statements of Understanding Pertaining to 
Certain Articles of the Convention
 
8.  During the elaboration of the draft Convention 
on the Law of the Non- navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, the Chairman of 
the  Working Group of the Whole took note 
of the following statements of understanding 
pertaining to the texts of the draft Convention: 
As regards article 1: 
(a)  The concept of “preservation” referred to in this  
article and the Convention includes also the 
concept of “conservation”; 
(b)  The present Convention does not apply 
to the use of living resources that occur in 
international watercourses, except to the extent 
provided for in part IV and except insofar as 
other uses affect such resources. 
As regards article 2 (c): 
 The term “watercourse State” is used in this 
Convention as a term of art. Although this 
provision provides that States and regional 
economic integration organizations can both 
fall within this definition, it was recognized 
that nothing in this paragraph could be taken 
to imply that regional economic integration 
organizations have the status of States in 
international law. As regards article 3: 
(a)  The present Convention will serve as a 
guideline for future watercourse agreements 
and, once such agreements are concluded, it 
will not alter the rights and obligations provided 
therein, unless such agreements provide 
otherwise; 
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(b)  The term “significant” is not used in this article 
or elsewhere in the present Convention in the 
sense of “substantial”. What is to be avoided 
are  localized agreements, or agreements 
concerning a particular project, programme or 
use, which have a significant adverse effect 
upon third watercourse States. While such an 
effect must be capable of being established by 
objective evidence and not be trivial in nature, it 
need not rise to the level of being substantial. 
As regards article 6 (1) (e): 
In order to determine whether a particular use is  
equitable and reasonable, the benefits as well as 
the negative consequences of a particular use 
should be taken into account. 
As regards article 7 (2): 
In the event such steps as are required by article 
7 (2) do not eliminate the harm, such steps as 
are required by article 7 (2) shall then be taken to 
mitigate the harm. 
As regards article 10: 
In determining “vital human needs”, special 
attention is to be paid to providing sufficient water 
to sustain human life, including both drinking water 
and water required for production of food in order 
to prevent starvation. 
As regards articles 21, 22 and 23:
 
As reflected in the commentary of the International 
Law Commission, these articles impose a due 
diligence standard on watercourse States. As 
regards article 28: 
The specific reference to “international 
organizations” is by no means intended to 
undermine the importance of cooperation, 
where appropriate, with competent international 
organizations on matters dealt with in other articles 
and, in particular, dealt with in the articles in part IV. 
As regards article 29: 
This article serves as a reminder that the 
principles and rules of international law applicable 
in international and non-international armed 
conflict contain important provisions concerning 
international watercourses and related works. The 
principles and rules of international law that are 
applicable in a particular case are those that are 
binding on the States concerned. Just as article 
29 does not alter or amend existing law, it also 
does not purport to extend the applicability of any 
instrument to States not parties to that instrument. 
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Key points
•	 The	Convention	adopts	a	wide	definition	of	the	
‘uses’ of international watercourses, designed 
to capture multiple economic, social and 
environmental uses of water (Article (1)).
•	 The	Convention	applies	to	navigational	uses	but	
only to the extent that other water users may 
affect navigation or vice-versa, e.g. pollution from 
vessels.
•	 The	Convention	applies	to	international	
‘watercourses and their waters’, and emphasises 
that both the water channel itself, and interrelated 
components, as well as the waters contained 
therein are subject to its provisions’ (Article 2 (a)). 
‘Watercourse’ is specifically defined as ‘a system 
of surface waters and groundwaters constituting 
by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary 
whole and normally flowing into a common 
terminus’ (Article 2 (a)).
•	 The	Convention	applies	to	an	‘International	
Watercourse’ defined as ‘a watercourse, 
parts of which are situated in different states’ 
which covers ‘watercourse systems’ that 
cross international boundaries, including major 
and minor watercourses and their tributaries, 
and connected lakes and aquifers, glaciers, 
reservoirs, canals, wetlands and floodplains 
(Articles 2(a) and 2(b)).
•	 The	Convention	applies	to	groundwater	systems	
but only to the extent that an aquifer85  is 
connected hydrologically to a system of surface 
waters, parts of which are situated in different 
85   The word ‘aquifer’ refers to a ‘permeable water-bearing geological formation 
underlain by a less permeable layer and the water contained in the saturated 
zone of the formation’. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers (21 February 2008) UN Doc. A/CN.4/591 Art. 2. 
states, which therefore excludes confined 
aquifers 86 (Articles 2 (a) (b)).
•	 The	definition	of	a	‘watercourse	state’	(Article	2	
(c)), implies that the rights and duties established 
by the Convention apply exclusively among 
contracting parties and only to ‘other states’ 
(riparian non-contracting states) when they are 
vulnerable to transboundary harm through an 
international watercourse. Although, the rules of 
customary law as codified by the Convention still 
apply to non-contracting states (see section 4.1 
below).
•	 In	terms	of	existing	and	new	agreements,	
Articles 3 and 4 require watercourse states to 
consult with each other on the adjustment and 
application of the provisions of the Convention, 
and where necessary harmonise the Convention’s 
principles with the specific watercourse 
agreements.
•	 Articles	3(3)	and	4(2)	of	the	Convention	provide	
that all watercourse states may become a party 
to any agreement that only refers to a portion 
of the basin or to a specific project or use if 
they may be affected by such an agreement.  If 
riparian parties choose not to become a party to 
such an agreement, the agreement still cannot 
adversely affect, to a significant extent, the use 
of the resource by non-participating riparians 
without their express consent (Article 3(4)).
86  See section 2.1 below for commentary on the nuances and meanings of these 
terms as they have developed through the work of the ILC on groundwater.
Part I | Scope 
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1.  The present Convention applies to uses of 
international watercourses and of their waters for 
purposes other than navigation and to measures 
of protection, preservation and management 
related to the uses of those watercourses and 
their waters.
2.  The uses of international watercourses for 
navigation is not within the scope of the present 
Convention except insofar as other uses affect 
navigation or are affected by navigation.
1.1 Commentary
1.1.1 Scope overview
From a legal perspective, the issue of scope is linked 
directly to the laws that define the legal coverage of 
a treaty.87 Applied to the sharing of an international 
watercourse, the scope of a treaty normally defines 
the parameters of the watercourse regime including 
(but not limited to) the geographical and hydrological 
boundaries; the types of water uses and activities; the 
substantive measures guiding such water use; and the 
state parties to which the treaty applies.88 Articles 1-4 
of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention determines 
these scoping issues as well as clarifying the 
relationship between the Convention and other existing 
or future watercourse agreements and their legal effect 
on contracting parties and non-parties.  
87  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into 
force 27 January1980) UN Doc A/Conf.39/27, 1155 UNTS 331 (Vienna Convention) 
Art. 29 Territorial scope of treaties provides, ‘Unless a different intention appears 
from the treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in 
respect of its entire territory’.
88  For examination of state practice defining ‘scope’ as it relates to international 
watercourses see Wouters P, ‘The International Law of Watercourses : New 
Dimensions’  3 Collected Courses of the Xiamen Academy of International Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2011) at 377.
Article 1 | Scope of 
the present Convention
Convention text
68
1.1.2 Geographical boundaries 
and water use 
Article 1 (1) of the UN Watercourses Convention 
adopts a broad definition of both geographical and 
hydrological scope and the scope of water ‘uses’ 
of international watercourses, and is designed to 
capture multiple economic, social and environmental 
dimensions of water – other than navigation.89  In 
using the term ‘watercourses and their waters’, the 
Convention emphasises that both the water channel 
itself, and interrelated components, as well as the 
waters contained therein are subject to its provisions.  
In addition, by specifically mentioning the waters of 
a watercourse, the Convention would apply in the 
case that such waters are diverted away from their 
watercourse.90   An example of the latter might be 
where water is diverted out of the main channel into 
a canal for the purpose of hydropower (diversionary 
dam), for irrigation, or where it is diverted into a canal 
and carried to a reservoir for municipal or industrial 
use.  The geographical and hydrological scope of the 
Convention is elaborated upon further under Article 
2 and Figure 1.1 below. For a summary of how the 
world’s water resources are distributed see Figure 1.2.
89  For examination of the multiple use dimensions of water see R Lenton and M 
Muller (eds.), Integrated Water Resources Management in Practice - Better Water 
Management for Development (Earthscan 2009).
90  Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses in UNGA ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of 
its Forty-Sixth Session’ (2 May-22 July 1994) UNGAOR, 49th Session Supp No 10 
UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) at 89 (Hereafter 1994 Draft Articles).
1.1.3 Functional scope
Pursuant to Article 1(1), measures of ‘protection, 
preservation and management’ fall under the scope of 
the Convention. The inclusion of the terms ‘protection’ 
and ‘preservation’ constituted a departure from the 
1994 Draft Articles as the latter instrument instead used 
the term ‘conservation’. The Working Group of the Sixth 
Committee felt that the use of the terms ‘protection’ 
and ‘preservation’ would broaden the scope of the 
Convention.91  The intention is therefore to emphasis 
the broad scope of the Convention thus covering both 
quantitative and qualitative aspects and, in addition to 
conservation, measures of ‘control’ such as regulating 
flow, floods, pollution and erosion, saline intrusion, and 
mitigating drought.92  The terms protection, preservation 
and management are elaborated on in Article 5 and 
Part IV (Articles 20-26) of the Convention, and will 
therefore be further discussed in Part IV of
this Guide.
91  UNGA Sixth Committee (51st Session) ‘Summary Record of the 12th Meeting 
of the Working Group on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses’ (7 October 1996) UN Doc A/C.6/51/SR.12 at 4-12.
92  1994 Draft Articles at 97.
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1.1.4 Living resources
The Convention does not explicitly apply to the use of 
living resources that occur in international watercourses 
(for example the regulation of fishing and harvesting 
of other aquatic animals) except insofar as other uses 
are affected by such activities.93 The interpretation 
of the Convention is therefore intended to avoid the 
application of the general principles of the Convention 
to fishing rights, unless such rights have an impact 
on other uses.94   Additionally, it can be inferred that 
Article 20 prohibits fishing when it is at variance with 
the general obligation of protection and preservation of 
the ecosystem of the international watercourse.95 Also, 
Article 22 relates to the protection of fish and other 
aquatic animals in respect to the duty of prevention 
against ‘the introduction of species, alien or new, into 
an international watercourse which may have effects 
detrimental to the ecosystem of the watercourse’.
93  UNWC Annex.  See also UNGA Sixth Committee (51st Session) ‘Report of Sixth 
Committee Convening as the Working Group of the Whole’ (11 April 1997) UN Doc 
A/51/869 at 4.
94  UN Doc A/51/869 at 4. For commentary see Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for 
Sharing (Kluwer Law International 2001).
95  Ibid at 53.
1.1.5 Navigation
Along similar lines to living resources, the Convention 
applies to navigational uses but only in a very limited 
way. Article 1 clearly demonstrates that the main 
focus of the Convention is on water uses other 
than navigation. However, because the Convention 
addresses management and conservation of 
transboundary watersheds and their ecosystems, 
Article 1(2) provides that where navigational uses 
impact on other water uses – either in terms of water 
quantity or quality – then they fall under the substantive 
norms of the Convention. Most notable is the obligation 
to utilise international watercourses in an equitable and 
reasonable manner pursuant to Articles 5 and 6.  
     Navigation activities that would fall under the 
Convention because of their potential impact on 
other water uses may include pollution from vessels, 
adverse environmental effects or conflicts of use from 
navigational activities which require that certain levels
 of water be maintained or require passages through 
and around barriers in the watercourse.96  Any 
conflict of interest should be solved according to the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation of an 
international watercourse.
     Article 1 (2) of the Convention represents a 
departure from the ILA Helsinki Rules on the Uses 
of the Water of International Rivers, in that the latter 
instrument included a chapter on navigation.  The ILA 
provision covered issues such as the right to ‘free’ 
navigation, policing the navigation of international rivers, 
the loading of vessels, and the maintenance of 
navigation routes.97
96  UN Doc A/49/10 (1994 Draft Articles) at 89.
97  Committee on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers , ‘Helsinki Rules 
on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers’ in International Law Association 
Report of the at the fifty-second conference (Helsinki 1966) (International Law 
Association, London 1967) Chapter 4.
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Figure 1.1 | Scope Defines 
the Legal Coverage of   
a Treaty – Waters and Water 
Use (Source Authors)
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1.2 Application
1.2.1 Legal and physical scope – 
watercourse system components and use
The ‘watercourse scope’ diagram below shows the 
differ-ent components of an international watercourse 
system including which physical components and water 
uses are covered by the UN Convention.  
     It is not intended to be a comprehensive inventory, 
but should provide a summary of how the core uses 
of an international watercourse in one state can impact 
upon another state and whether or not these waters 
and water uses will be covered under the scope of 
the Convention. 
     The watercourse scope diagram is explained as 
follows: The transboundary watercourse system above 
begins with natural precipitation in the mountainous 
headwaters of state A. The system of tributaries 
flows downstream, often collecting in one main river 
channel which may be dammed and the water stored 
in reservoirs.  The dammed water can be used to 
generate hydropower for state A and potentially state 
B, but the presence of the dam can reduce water 
flow and increase the loss of stored water through 
evaporation, which could ultimately result in less water 
for downstream state B.
     The water continues to flow downstream where it 
may again be dammed, stored and diverted to supply 
domestic, municipal, agricultural, energy or industrial 
uses. Some of the diverted water may be lost from 
irrigated fields and canals through evapo-transpiration98  
which could result in less water returns to the stream 
for downstream state B, or return flows may become 
polluted. The return flows from the various uses will 
continue to flow downstream as surface water and may 
98  Evapotranspiration is a term used to describe the loss of water to the 
atmosphere from the earth’s surface by evaporation and by transpiration through 
plants. US Geological Survey, (USGS 2008) <http://wa.water.usgs.gov/projects/
evapo/> accessed 1 October 2011.
enter the groundwater depending on the groundwater 
table. Groundwater can flow both ways – replenishing 
or receiving surface water flows.    
If the groundwater table is below the bed of the stream, 
the water in the river bed feeds the groundwater and 
is an influent stream; such rivers can easily dry up if 
their flow is reduced (e.g. an irrigation channel or an 
ephemeral river). When the groundwater table is above 
the surface elevation in the river, the groundwater 
feeds the river, creating an effluent river which flows 
all year round.
     An aquifer containing confined groundwater99  exists 
in state A, fed (very slowly) through precipitation from 
a recharge zone located in state A, but this aquifer 
replenishes at such a slow rate that it is considered 
non-renewable and it is not related to any immediate 
transboundary surface water stream.  State A may 
decide to drill a well into the aquifer to supply irrigation 
water for nearby agriculture. 
     A significant gap may exist in scientific 
understanding surrounding the recharge relationship 
between surface water and groundwater and the 
impact of different land uses on this relationship, and 
despite the fact that this aquifer has been classified as 
‘confined’, it is possible that the confined aquifer may 
also be remotely connected to a distant transboundary 
wetland situated across the border between states A 
and B.  The withdrawal of water for agriculture may 
therefore seriously threaten this eco-system by lowering 
the groundwater table, causing the wetland to dry out, 
and could even cause subterranean peat fires. This is 
99  Confined groundwater was understood by the ILC during the drafting of the 
Convention to mean ‘groundwater which is unrelated to surface water’.  See UNGA 
‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session’ 
(2 May-22 July 1994) UNGAOR, 49th Session Supp No 10 UN Doc A/49/10 
(1994) at 135. The words ‘confined aquifer’ and ‘fossil aquifer’ are often (mis) used 
interchangeably.  A confined aquifer can sometimes be a fossil aquifer but not 
always.  Whether an aquifer is confined or not is a matter of pressure and not of the 
age of the water,  whereas fossil aquifer refers to age of the groundwater e.g. an 
aquifer which is very old. See section 2.1.4 below for further explanation.
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of course just one scenario and it may also be that the 
confined aquifer has no significant connection to the 
transboundary wetland and therefore state A’s water 
withdrawal would not have this transboundary impact.  
The use of this confined or unrelated groundwater is 
not covered by the UN Watercourses Convention.
State A may also choose to utilise groundwater from 
a second aquifer for irrigation which is recharged and 
recharges the nearby surface water. If the aquifer is 
unconfined and connected to surface waters, some 
return flow - for example from irrigation - will occur but 
the water may be contaminated and affect plant and 
aquatic life downstream in state B, and some water will 
be lost to evapotranspiration.  Groundwater from the 
second aquifer also supplies the springs in state B and 
excessive pumping in state A may affect spring flows to 
the point where they cannot reach ground surface and 
feed rivers and lakes. 
     If state A decides to cut down native forests the 
groundwater level rises towards the ground surface. At 
a certain depth high soil evaporation causes the soluble 
salts in the local geology to migrate to the soil surface 
causing problems of high soil salinity. This has caused 
major problems to agriculture, and these problems 
worsen when there is an increased pumping/overuse of 
local groundwater.
     Floodplains are flat areas of land adjacent to rivers 
that can stretch from the banks of rivers to the base of 
valley slopes. As a river travels to the sea, the floodplain 
becomes an estuary which connects the river to the 
sea. Damming rivers and overuse of water can cause 
a river to lose its connectivity with the sea; this has 
devastating ecological effects and also destroys local 
coastal economies and communities. Floodplains 
also need to receive sediments transported by the 
river to provide fertile soil for agriculture and nutrients 
for ecosystems. Dams can reduce sediment loads 
downstream causing eutrophication in reservoirs. 
Eutrophication can decrease oxygen in the water 
resulting in loss of fish and diversity of macrophytes.
In coastal areas, if freshwater aquifers near the 
coast are over pumped, saltwater intrusion can 
occur in the aquifer. Generally aquifers near the 
coast have a layer or lens of freshwater near the surface 
and then denser seawater under the freshwater. If the 
ground-water near the coast is pumped too much, 
saltwater can intrude into the freshwater aquifer and 
cause contamination of potable freshwater supplies.  
An interesting point here is that some aquifers situated 
near coastal areas which have been classified as 
confined can become unconfined by this over pumping. 
     The legal scope of the UN Convention covers all 
the above mentioned interactions, where they occur 
across state borders and where the components of the 
watercourses system are related to the international 
watercourse.  One major exception to this legal 
coverage is the utilisation of confined groundwater 
which is not covered by the UN Convention. 
     To understand how much water is available on earth 
and in what form, see Figure 1.2 on the right.
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Figure 1.2 |
Status of World Water (Source UNESCO)
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For the purposes of the present Convention:
 
(a) ‘Watercourse’ means a system of surface waters 
and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their 
physical relationship a unitary whole and normally 
flowing into a common terminus; 
(b)  ‘International watercourse’ means a watercourse, 
parts of which are situated in different States; 
(c)  ‘Watercourse State’ means a State Party to 
the present Convention in whose territory part 
of an international watercourse is situated, or 
a Party that is a regional economic integration 
organisation, in the territory of one or more of 
whose member states part of an international 
watercourse is situated; 
(d)  ‘Regional economic integration organisation’ 
means an organisation constituted by sovereign 
states of a given region, to which its member 
states have transferred competence in respect of 
matters governed by this Convention and which 
has been duly authorised in accordance with 
its internal procedures to sign, ratify, accept or 
accede to it. 
Article 2 | Use of Terms 
2.1 Commentary
2.1.1 Watercourse 
Article 2 (a) includes the term ‘watercourse’, which 
defines the type of waters to which the Convention 
applies and means both the system of surface and 
groundwater channels, tributaries, and the water that 
they contain. This definition highlights the need for 
an integrated approach to systems of surface and 
underground waters.  
     The phrase ‘normally flowing into a common 
terminus’ has the effect of putting a limit on the 
geographical scope, for example where two different 
drainage basins were altered and connected by a 
canal – this would not make them part of a single 
‘watercourse’ for the purpose of the present Article 
2 (a). This Article is modified by the word ‘normally’ 
reflecting the seasonal variability and complexity of 
hydrological systems – e.g. many watercourses will flow 
into the sea, in whole or in part via groundwater, or a 
series of tributaries which may be as much as 300 km 
apart, or only empty at certain times of the year into 
a common terminus such as an ephemeral river, with 
temporary surface flow that varies between seasons 
and years and which will sometimes end its journey 
terminating into an inland lake or delta (endorheic), or at 
other times into the ocean (exorheic).100 
100  1994 Draft Articles at 90.  For explanation of ephemeral and endorheic rivers 
see A Turton, P Ashton and E Cloete, As Transboundary rivers, sovereignty and 
development: Hydro-political drivers in the Okavango River basin (African Water 
Issues Research Unit African Water Issues Research Unit (AWIRU) and Green Cross 
International (GCI) 2003) at 188.
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Figure 1.3 | 
An Ephemeral River 
(Source adapted by Authors 
(2012) from Figure 1.5 below)
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2.1.2 International watercourse
The concept of an ‘international watercourse’,as 
derived from Articles 2(a) and 2(b), means the Conve-
ntion applies to ‘watercourse systems’ that cross 
international boundaries, including major and minor 
watercourses, their tributaries,101 and connected 
lakes and groundwater, even when these individual 
components are entirely located within a single state. 
Generally, components of freshwater systems that 
may fall under this concept, when connected to 
one another, include rivers, lakes, aquifers, glaciers, 
reservoirs, and canals, wetlands and floodplains.102   
The test to establish whether a watercourse is 
‘international’ depends on physical factors, the 
existence of which can be established by simple factual 
and geographical observation in the vast majority of 
cases, and the word ‘situated’ is not intended to imply 
that the water is static.103   
     Related to this test is the question of what waters 
of an international watercourse are situated in the 
‘territory’ of a state and how is the location of the 
boundary to be determined especially when an 
international river changes its course? The Convention 
does not answer these questions; the answers are 
found elsewhere in international law. The determination 
of boundaries depends on whether a watercourse is 
successive or contiguous (meaning whether it traverses 
or forms boundaries between states respectively).  If 
it is succ-essive and there is no existing agreement to 
the contrary, then the border is said ‘to cross the river 
along the shortest line connecting the points at which 
the borders of the opposite states intersect the banks 
101 The inclusion of ‘tributaries’ is important because analysis of several significant 
watercourse agreements shows that tributaries are often excluded. See B Bearden, 
Following the Proper Channels: Tributaries in the Mekong Legal Regime (unpublished 
JSD dissertation 2011), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. For a 
summary see http://auei.auburn.edu/conference/pdf/Bearden_1.pdf accessed 12 
April 2012.
102 1994 Draft Articles at 90. 
103  Ibid.
of the river’.104 
If the watercourse is contiguous the most common 
treaty approach is to locate the boundary along the 
thalweg105 if the river is navigable, and along the median 
line if not. 
     If the international watercourse changes its course 
and this change occurs over a long period of time 
(by accretion and erosion) then the general rule is the 
territorial boundary of a state changes with the river.106  
 If this change occurs suddenly (by avulsion), then the 
general rule is the boundary would remain in the 
original location.107  It is also important to note that 
even if it is acknowledged that a state enjoys exclusive 
competence over utilisation of the waters of an intern-
ational watercourse in its territory, given that water is 
constantly in motion, it is very difficult to determine 
which waters are located within the territory of a state 
and thus applying concepts of territorial sovereignty    
to watercourses is very problematic – as is discussed 
in Part II.108  
     During the drafting of the Convention, the ILC’s 
efforts to deal with the geographic scope of an 
international watercourse generated a rich record of 
discussion within the ILC and sixth Committee.109  
104  McCaffery, The Law of International Watercourses at 70.
105  The median line of the navigation channel. McCaffrey, The Law of International 
Watercourses at 70. 
106  See JW Donaldson, ‘Paradox of the Moving Boundary: Legal heredity of River 
Accretion and Avulsion’ (2011) 4(2) Water Alternatives 155. 
107  McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses at 72. 
108  Ibid at 74. 
109  There are a number of key milestones in the deliberation of scope within the 
ILC and UN General Assembly:  1970 -The initial UN resolution; 1976-The ILC 
survey of country views; 1980 Formulation of the ‘watercourse system’ concept; 
1984-Rejection of the ‘system’ concept; 1986-Return to the ‘watercourse [system]’; 
1991 - Synthesis: the ‘watercourse as a system of surface and underground waters’; 
the 1994 Draft Articles; and the final 1997 UN Watercourses Convention. Access to 
these documents is available at the Online Audio Visual Library of the International 
Law Association:  Convention on the Law of Non-navigational uses of International 
Watercourses, available at <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/clnuiw/clnuiw.html> 
accessed 30 April 2012. See JL Wescoat, ‘Beyond the River Basin: The Changing 
Geography of International Water Problems and International Watercourse Law’ 
(1992) 3 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 301. See 
also McCaffrey The Law of International Watercourses at 36-54. 
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The ILC gathered state opinion on whether the concept 
of an ‘international drainage basin’ should be the 
appropriate basis for their study. Some states objected 
to the concept arguing that it could result in regulation 
not only of the use of the water but also of the land 
territory. 110 Ultimately, the expression ‘international 
watercourse’ was chosen by the ILC and supported 
by states. However, leading academics refute the 
argument that the concept ‘international watercourse’ 
is less expansive than ‘international drainage basin’, 
stating that Article 1(1) of the Convention ‘applies to 
uses of international watercourses and of their waters 
for purposes other than navigation and to measures 
of protection, preservation and management related 
to the uses of those watercourses and their waters’.111  
This means that the Convention indirectly applies to 
land-based activities taking place within a river basin to 
the extent that such activities might be relevant for the 
use, protection, and management of an international 
watercourse.112 See Application 2.2.2 below for an 
example of where an activity carried out within the 
drainage basin pollutes the international watercourse.
110  For differing state views on geographical scope see the Replies of 
Governments to the International Law Commission’s questionnaire,  UN Doc 
A/CN.4/294 and Add.1, 1 April 1976, available <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
documentation/english/a_cn4_294.pdf> accessed 22 November 2011.   For further 
commentary see also Tanzi and Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the Law 
of International Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing at 51-53.
111  McCaffrey The Law of International Watercourses, at 37, provides that the 
concept of drainage basin is functionally equivalent – at least hydrologically to that of 
the watercourse system. 
112  Tanzi and Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the Law of International 
Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing at 59
2.1.3 Ecosystem approach
Further support for the contention that the entire 
basin is covered by the Convention can be found in 
the use of the concept of ‘ecosystems’.  It can there
fore be maintained that the geographical scope of 
application of the Convention applying to watercourse 
systems ‘comprises all its ecosystems, including those 
in land areas, whose concrete identification depends 
on their interdependence’.113   
     The conclusion that the Convention follows an 
ecosystems approach in based primarily on the 
wording of Article 20 and will be discussed further in 
Part IV.
113  Ibid at 61. 
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2.1.4 Groundwater
The Convention applies to groundwater systems but 
only to the extent that groundwater is connected 
hydrologically to a system of surface waters, parts 
of which are situated in different states (Articles 2 
(a) (b)) and also see Figure 1.6 below. According to 
the ILC commentary, ’groundwaters’ refers to the 
hydrologic system composed of a number of different 
components through which water flows, both on and 
under the surface of the land. These components 
include rivers, lakes, aquifers, glaciers, reservoirs and 
canals. So long as these components are interrelated 
with one another, they form part of the watercourse.114  
The definition does not mean that a particular aquifer 
containing groundwater has to be situated across 
a boundary to be covered by the Convention; it is 
sufficient for such groundwater to be located in one 
state but connected to transboundary surface water.115  
In the preparatory work of the ILC leading up to the 
adoption of the Convention, agreement could not be 
reached on whether aquifers containing ‘confined 
groundwater’116 should be included within the scope 
of the Convention.  In 1992 Special Rapporteur Robert 
Rosenstock recommended that confined aquifers 
should be governed by the same rules as those 
114  1994 Draft Articles at 90.
115  McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses at 497.
116  ‘Confined Groundwater’ was defined by ILC as ‘groundwater not related to 
an international watercourse’ in the ILC Resolution on Confined Transboundary 
Groundwater, see UNGA ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work 
of its Forty-Sixth Session’ (2 May-22 July 1994) UNGAOR, 49th Session Supp 
No 10 UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) at 135. See also SC McCaffrey, Comments on the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers 
(2006), 30 March 2008, Available at <SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id =1114988> accessed 16 November 2011. It may not always be 
possible to know if an aquifer is confined or unconfined geologically. In this case 
the storativity can be estimated. This characterises the capacity of the aquifer to 
release groundwater from storage in response to a decline in hydraulic head or water 
pressure. A confined aquifer has very low storativity. 
applicable to international watercourses117  however, the 
final text of the Convention does not apply directly to 
confined aquifers.118   Following this issue, in 1994 the 
ILC adopted a Resolution on Confined Transboundary 
Groundwater which recognised the need for conti-
nuing efforts to create rules regarding confined 
transboundary groundwater and also commended 
that states be guided by the principles contained in 
(what is now) the UN Watercourses Convention, where 
appropriate, when regulating confined trans-
boundary groundwater.119
     The level of inclusion of groundwater systems in 
the Convention is important given that the total volume 
of groundwater represents 97 percent of our planet’s 
freshwater resources (excluding Antarctica) and yearly 
consumption of groundwater worldwide is estimated at 
117  1994 Draft Articles at 135. In 1992 Special Rapporteur Robert Rosenstock 
suggested the inclusion of all groundwater, including confined groundwater, in 
the scope of the draft articles; his proposal was rejected. The ILC did not want to 
broaden the scope of its work to include a resource that it had not considered while 
formulating its articles.  See Rosenstock’s First and Second reports, A/CN.4/451, 
para 11 and A/CN.4/462 para 2-11. 
118  Several commentators argue that confined aquifers were not the only types of 
aquifers excluded by the Convention. The argument here is that the requirement of 
a ‘system of surface waters and groundwaters ‘ ‘normally flowing into a common 
terminus’ renders the Convention inapplicable to aquifers that are recharged solely 
from rain and discharge either into the sea or into another aquifer or where the 
aquifer itself is the end point due to evaporation. K Mechlem, ‘Moving Ahead in 
Protecting Freshwater Resources: The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles 
on Transboundary Aquifers’ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 801 at 
806. See also C Behrmann & R Stephan, ‘The UN Watercourse Convention and 
the Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers: The way ahead’ UNESCO-IAP-UNEP 
Conference, Paris, December 2010, Available at <http://www.siagua.org/archivos_
adjuntos/documentos/cursos_agua.pdf>, accessed 2 April 2012.
119  Resolution on Confined Transboundary Groundwater in Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-sixth Session, [1994] UN 
Doc. A/49/10 at 135. 
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Figure 1.4 |
Legal Coverage of Groundwaters (Source Authors)
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900 cubic kilometres.120  See Figure 1.6 below for global 
groundwater types and sources.121
In response to this remaining issue of confined 
transboundary groundwater, and as part of a wider 
initiative on Shared Natural Resources, in 2002 the 
ILC commenced further study on transboundary 
groundwater initially with a focus on non-renewable 
or fossil groundwater unconnected to surface water.122  
Shortly after, the ILC broadened the topic from 
‘confined’ transboundary groundwater to include all 
transboundary aquifers and aquifer systems containing 
both renewable and non-renewable groundwater.123   
This decision to move the subject of study from the law 
of (confined) transboundary groundwater to the law of 
transboundary aquifers has repercussions in terms of 
the alignment and overlap between the physical and 
legal scope covered by the Draft Articles and the UN 
Convention.124 The word ‘aquifer’ was defined in the 
Draft Articles as a ‘permeable water-bearing geological 
120  UN WWAP Side Publication Series, ‘Freshwater and International Law: The 
Interplay between Universal, Regional and Basin Perspectives’ (2009) at 4, Available 
at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001850/185080e.pdf>, accessed 12 
October 2011.
121  UNESCO IHP-VI Series on Groundwater, ‘Non-renewable groundwater 
resources: A guidebook on socially sustainable management for 
water-policy makers’, 2006, Available at <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0014/001469/146997e.pdf>, accessed 30 April 2012.
122  The word fossil aquifer is sometimes (incorrectly) used interchangeably with 
confined aquifer as discussed elsewhere in this section. Confined is not necessarily 
fossil. Whether an aquifer is confined or not is a matter of pressure, whereas 
the term fossil refers to the age of the water contained in these aquifers, which 
is so old that it has inspired the use of terminology borrowed from paleontology 
‘Fossil Aquifers’, or non-renewable, see UNESCO IHP-VI Series on Groundwater, 
‘Non-renewable groundwater resources: A guidebook on socially sustainable 
management for water-policy makers’, (2006), Available at <http://unesdoc.unesco.
org/images/0014/001469/146997e.pdf> accessed 12 November 2011, preface. 
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on Its Fifty-
Fourth Session, UNGAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/57/10 (2002), at 
243  para. 519.
123   Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on Its 
Fifty-Sixth Session, UN GAOR,56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, 2004, UN Doc. A/59/10, 
126–7, paras. 89–92. K Mechlem, ‘Moving Ahead in Protecting Freshwater 
Resources: The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Transboundary 
Aquifers’ at 804. 
124  For commentary see S McCaffrey ‘The International Law Commission 
Adopts Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers’ (2009) 103 American Journal of 
International Law 272 at 282.
formation underlain by a less permeable layer and 
the water contained in the saturated zone of the 
formation’.125It is argued that this definition prioritises the 
geological formation above the water containedwithin, 
and it is this fact, in combination with the other 
provisions on sovereignty found elsewhere in the Draft 
Articles, that has lead several leading commentators 
to conclude that this change in scope is a potentially 
regressive step in the codification of international water 
law, as discussed further below.126  
In 2008, the ILC Draft Articles on the Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers were adopted and apply 
to single transboundary aquifers and transboundary 
aquifer systems consisting of a series of two or 
more hydraulically connected aquifers (Article 2(b)). 
Unlike the UN Convention, the Draft Articles apply 
to transboundary confined aquifers (Articles 1 (a) 
and 2 (a)).127 
     However they also apply to renewable 
transboundary aquifers, the latter application being an 
overlap with the scope of the UN Convention.128  The 
Draft Articles do not apply however, to an unconfined 
aquifer that is situated entirely in one state but 
contributes water to a river that flows from that state 
into another state.129  
125  International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary 
Aquifers (21 February 2008) UN Doc. A/CN.4/591, Art. 2. 
126  McCaffrey ‘The International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles on 
Transboundary Aquifers’  at 282. O McIntyre ‘International Water Resources Law 
and the International Law Commission Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers: A 
Missed Opportunity for Cross-Fertilisation?’ (2011) 13 International Community Law 
Review at 237. 
127  International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary 
Aquifers’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.724, 29 May 2008, Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, Geneva; United Nations Publications, p.19. UNGA “The law of 
transboundary aquifers”, UN Doc. A/RES/63/124, 15 January 2009.  Available at 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/63/124>, accessed 
11 October 2011. 
128  One of the criticisms of the Draft Articles, is that this overlap with the UN 
Convention will cause confusion over which instrument applies. See McCaffrey, 
Comments on the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers at 4.
129  Mechlem, ‘Moving Ahead in Protecting Freshwater Resources: The 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers’ at 809.
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This is a contrast to the UN Convention – which does 
cover such aquifers.  Neither the UN Convention nor 
the Draft Articles cover a domestically situated confined 
aquifer, even in circumstances where it may be 
remotely connected to a transboundary surface water 
body, or where the aquifer is domestically located, 
recharged solely from rain and discharges either into 
the sea or into a second aquifer, or where the other 
domestically situated aquifer itself is the end point due 
to evaporation. The legal coverage of groundwater is 
shown in Figure 1.4 above.
      The future shape and role of this draft instrument 
is uncertain.130  Although, the 2008 ILC Draft Articles 
build on the 1997 UN Convention and adjust many of 
its principles to the special case of groundwater, the 
ILC turned down the suggestion proposed by Special 
Rapporteur Chusei Yamada to examine the relationship 
and possible coordination between the Draft Articles 
and other treaties including the Convention.131 
     Numerous prominent experts have identified several 
fundamental criticisms of the scope, and substantive 
principles of the 2008 Draft Articles, which arguably 
create irreconcilable difficulties for future coordination 
and alignment of the provisions of these two 
instruments. A first major criticism of the Draft Articles 
rests on the matter of overlap in scope between the 
Draft Articles and the UN Convention as discussed 
above.  A second major criticism rests on the emphasis 
by the Draft Articles on sovereignty132 under Article 3, 
where ‘Each aquifer state has sovereignty over the 
130  The Articles exist currently as an Annex to General Assembly Resolution, 
A/RES/63/124 and the UNGA recommends that states make appropriate 
arrangements bilaterally or regionally for the proper management of transboundary 
aquifers on the basis of the principles enunciated in the draft articles (Preamble, para 
5). The General Assembly was scheduled to consider the elaboration of a convention 
on the basis of the draft articles in its 66th Session in 2011.
131   C Yamada, Fifth Report on Shared Natural Resources: Transboundary 
Aquifers, UN Doc. A/CN.4/591 (2008), at 14–15,  paras. 38–40. 
132  Refer to Part II for a more specific discussion of Sovereignty.
portion of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system 
located within its territory’.  McCaffrey asserts that this 
use of the concept of sovereignty will reinforce the 
historic tendency of states to claim absolute sovereignty 
over the portion of even transboundary surface waters 
within their territories and may also give a state the 
impression that it has absolute discretion over the 
water contained in a transboundary aquifer when 
in fact - and in law - it does not.133 McIntyre argues 
that ‘the emphasis on State sovereignty over shared 
water resources appears to represent something 
of a retreat from the distributive equity inherent in 
the firmly established principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilisation and from the intense procedural 
and institutional cooperation required to achieve the 
community of interests approach necessary to give 
meaning to this principle’.134   It remains to be seen how 
these instruments will be reconciled.135  
133  McCaffrey, Comments on the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on 
the Law of Transboundary Aquifers at 6-7.  Also see S McCaffrey ‘The International 
Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers’ (2009) 103 
American Journal of International Law at 272-293
134  O McIntyre ‘International Water Resources Law and the International Law 
Commission Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers: A Missed Opportunity for 
Cross-Fertilisation?’ (2011) 13 International Community Law Review at 237.
135  For another point of view on this alignment see C Behrmann & R Stephan, 
‘The UN Watercourse Convention and the Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers: 
The way ahead’ UNESCO-IAP-UNEP Conference, Paris, December 2010, Available 
at <http://www.siagua.org/archivos_adjuntos/documentos/cursos_agua.pdf>, 
accessed 2 April
| Article 2
83
Figure 1.5 | 
Illustration of Transboundary Aquifer (Source Puri and 
others, 2001)136 
136  Image adapted from S Puri and others, ‘Internationally shared aquifer 
resources management, their significance and sustainable management: A 
framework document’ IHP-VI International Hydrological Programme Non-Serial 
Publications in Hydrology SC-2001/WS/40 (UNESCO 2001).
Figure 1.6 | 
Groundwater Resources of the World (Source WHYMAP and 
Margat, 2008)137
137 UNESCO, ‘Transboundary Aquifers: Managing a vital resource – The UNILC 
Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers’ (UNESCO 2009), available at <http://
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001824/182431e.pdf> accessed 21 November 
2011 
WHYMAP  and Margat, ‘Groundwater Resources of the World’ (2008)
available at http://www.whymap.org/EN/Downloads/Global_whymap
_largeaquifers_pdf. accessed 21 november 2011
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2.1.5 Scope of parties – 
watercourse state and others
In order to understand the practical meaning of 
‘watercourse state’ in Article 2 (c), the term must be 
differentiated from other types of actors mentioned 
within the text of the Convention. ‘Watercourse state’ 
technically means two things: a state party to the 
Convention in whose territory part of an international 
watercourse is situated; and/or a party that is a regional 
economic integration organisation, with at least one 
member state in whose territory part of an international 
watercourse is situated (Article 2 (c)). In practice, the 
primary legal relationships which the Convention 
governs are between state parties that are riparians 
of the same international watercourse(s).138  This is 
evident in the numerous references to ‘watercourse 
states’ which are applied throughout the Convention’s 
text to establish various rights and duties. For example 
Article 4 stipulates that it is ‘watercourse states’ which 
have the right to take part in the consultations and 
negotiations for the conclusion of specific international 
agreements relating to a part or to the whole of an 
international watercourse. 
      There are two categories of ‘other states’ – non-
contracting riparian states and contracting non-
riparian states.  Non-contracting riparian states (other 
watercourse states) are those states situated on an 
international watercourse which do not become a party
to the Convention. The Convention does not directly 
apply to these parties.  However, where ‘other states’ 
are vulnerable to events taking place within an 
international watercourse, the Convention makes the 
exception in its scope by referring to ‘other states’.139  
For example, the provisions in Article 23 would require 
watercourse states to protect the marine environment 
of ‘other states’.   Provisions under Article 28 related to 
‘emergency situations’ apply to ‘watercourse states or 
138  Tanzi and Arcari. The United Nations Convention on the Law of International 
Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing at 72. 
139  See Part IV.
other states’, thus recognising that situations such as 
floods, landslides, earthquakes and industrial accidents 
may have significant impacts outside a particular 
international watercourse.140  
     Outside of these exceptional circumstances and in 
light of the definition of a ‘watercourse state’ (Article 2 
(c)) the rights and duties established by the Convention 
apply exclusively among parties and only to those 
‘other states’ sharing an international watercourse 
when they are vulnerable to transboundary harm 
through an international watercourse.  However, the 
rules of customary law as codified by the Convention 
will still apply to non-contracting states.
     A final possible type of contracting party which the 
Convention could apply to is states which sign and 
ratify or accede to the Convention that are not a riparian 
to any international watercourse -  this could include 
island nations. Non-riparian contracting parties do not 
inherit the same rights and duties to an international 
watercourse as ‘watercourse states’.  Although, there is 
an absence of decisive guidance in the Convention as 
to what types of limited rights and duties non-riparian 
contracting parties receive. Clearly, a non-riparian 
party does not have any rights to use or develop an 
international watercourse pursuant to the Convention.  
Nevertheless, there are indirect benefits of these parties 
signing the Convention in terms of strengthening 
international law in this area, and given the fact that 
many states rely on the goods and services produced 
from transboundary water resources.141   
140   See Part V.
141  See Introduction.
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2.1.6 Regional economic organisations
Article 2 (d) provides that regional economic integration 
organisations can become a contracting state to the 
Convention. Therefore organisations such as the 
European Union, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR), could become contracting 
parties to the Convention. However, regional economic 
organisations can only become contracting parties to 
the Convention if competence is transferred from the 
members of that organisation in respect of matters 
governed by the Convention. Moreover, such bodies 
would have to be authorised to ratify or accede thereto 
by their members. To date, no regional economic 
organisation has requested permission to become a 
party to the Convention.
     While regional organisations have been included 
in the Convention’s definition of a ‘watercourse 
state’, nothing in the Convention implies that regional 
organisations have the status of states in international 
law.142  Likewise, it is wrong to assume that a member 
of those bodies that is not a riparian state could acquire 
any rights and duties regarding a given international 
watercourse simply because the regional organisation 
of which that state is a member acceded to 
the Convention.143 
142  Report of the Sixth Committee convening as the Working Group of the Whole 
(prepared by Chusei YAMADA), UN Doc. A/51/869 (11 April 1997) at 5.  Available at 
<http://www.un.org/law/cod/watere.htm>, accessed 10 September 2011.
143  SMA Salman, ‘The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten Years Later: 
Why Has its Entry into Force Proven Difficult?’ (2007) 32(1) Water International 1, at 
11.
2.1.7 Natural and legal persons
Natural and legal persons, which include individuals 
and private companies, are also covered by the 
Convention in so far as they have rights not to be 
discriminated against when seeking redress and 
remedy for significant harm caused, or the threat 
thereof.144
144 See Part IV.
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2.2 Application
2.2.1 Scope scenario – Which land based 
water use activities are covered by the 
Convention?
The Convention applies to land-based activities taking 
place within the river basin but only to the extent that 
such activities might be relevant for the use, protection, 
and management of an international watercourse.  For 
example, where state A builds a tannery plant located 
a distance from an international watercourse, but 
toxic waste and chemical pollution from the plant are 
discharged onto the surrounding land which then filters 
through soil into a connected aquifer or is carried by 
surface runoff into an international watercourse. These 
activities may cause significant harm to riparian state B 
and will thus fall under the scope of the Convention.  
Acid Rain – An example of a pollution scenario which 
is not covered by the Convention is where non-riparian 
State C has an industrial plant which emits nitrogen 
and sulphur gases into the Earth’s atmosphere – the 
gases then react with water vapour to produce ‘acid 
rain’ which then falls onto riparian state D polluting 
the watercourse of state D.  This type of activity will 
not be covered by the Convention because the origin 
of pollution is not continuously traceable through the 
land based watercourse system or drainage basin 
and is instead traceable through the atmospheric 
water system where the origin could be from a State in 
another continent.145
     Cloud Seeding – A further potential pollution 
scenario which is caused by anthropogenic allocation 
of atmospheric water is pollution from cloud seeding.  
This is not covered by the Convention, although it 
is provided for to a very limited extent in other legal 
frameworks at national and international level.146
145  Acid Rain pollution is however regulated by various national and international 
laws see J Brunnee, Acid Rain and Ozone Layer Depletion: International Law and 
Regulation (Transnational Publishers
146  Arguably, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use 
of Environmental Modification Techniques adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 
December 10, 1976, and entered into force on October 5, 1978, is the result of the 
cloud seeding operations led by the American Army during the 
Vietnam War.
Green Water – Green water is the water stored in 
soil as soil moisture. Upstream State A changes the 
landscape within a section of an international river ba-
sin from natural vegetation to arable farming and cattle 
grazing.  Removal of the natural vegetation increases 
the evaporation from the soil surface, and increases 
the level of soil erosion, which reduces the degree of 
infiltration capacity of the land and leads to greater 
overland flow.  Downstream state B is affected by the 
changing land use practices through increased surface 
water run-off leading to greater risk and magnitude 
of floods, and also from rising sedimentation loads – 
which in turn reduces the storage capacity of its dam 
reservoirs.  The latter scenario potentially falls within 
the scope of the Convention, particular in relation to 
the requirement to utilise international watercourses 
in an equitable and reasonable manner, taking into 
account all relevant factors and circumstances, and the 
obligation to protect the ecosystems of an 
international watercourse. 
| Article 2
87
2.3 Additional reading
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses 
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Article 3 | Watercourse 
Agreements
1.  In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, 
nothing in the present Convention shall affect 
the rights or obligations of a watercourse state 
arising from agreements in force for it on the 
date on which it became a party to the present 
Convention.
2.  Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, 
parties to agreements referred to in paragraph 
1 may, where necessary, consider harmonising 
such agreements with the basic principles of the 
present Convention,
3.  Watercourse states may enter into one or 
more agreements, hereinafter referred to as 
watercourse agreements, which apply and 
adjust the provisions of the present Convention 
to the characteristics and uses of a particular 
international watercourse or part thereof.
4.  Where a watercourse agreement is concluded 
between two or more watercourse states, it shall 
define the waters to which it applies.  Such an 
agreement may be entered into with respect to 
an entire international watercourse or any part 
thereof or a particular project, programme or 
use except insofar as the agreement adversely 
affects, to a significant extent, the use by one or 
more other watercourse states of the waters of 
the watercourse, without their express consent.
5. Where a watercourse state considers that  
adjustment and application of the provisions 
of the present Convention is required because 
of the characteristics and uses of a particular 
international watercourse, watercourse states 
shall consult with a view to negotiating in good 
faith for the purpose of concluding a watercourse 
agreement or agreements.
6.  Where some but not all watercourse states to a 
particular international watercourse are parties to 
an agreement, nothing in such agreement shall 
affect the rights or obligations under the present 
Convention of watercourse states which are not 
parties to such an agreement.
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3.1 Commentary
3.1.1 Contractual relationship between 
the Convention and pre-existing or future 
watercourse agreements
Article 3 (1) of the Convention preserves the contractual 
freedom of watercourse states. In this sense, the 
Convention does not affect the rights and duties of 
states that become parties to it arising from existing 
freshwater-related agreements. Neither does the 
Convention impose a duty on states to adopt future 
basin-specific treaties compatible with its provisions 
where none exist. The Convention rather encourages 
states to consider harmonising existing agreements 
with its basic provisions, as well as to adopt new 
agreements that apply and adjust the general principles 
of the Convention to the characteristics and uses of a 
particular watercourse (Articles 3(2)(3)).
     Whilst parties are negotiating new agreements 
the Convention performs a ‘guideline function’.  The 
Convention is therefore mostly drafted in general terms 
so it can be applied to a range of different river basins. 
However some of its provisions are more precise 
and specific than the provisions of many existing 
sub-regional agreements and parties do have the 
freedom to adjust these more specific provisions to 
the characteristics of a particular watercourse.  At the 
conclusion of any new agreement,147 the Convention will 
not alter the rights and obligations contained in the new 
agreement. This means, for example, that an existing 
agreement between states A and B is not affected 
mandatorily by the Convention unless the states agree 
otherwise. If, however, both states were party to the 
Convention and it was in force, the Convention would 
likely have a significant influence on the negotiation of 
subsequent water agreements between the countries.
     A large number of states have adjusted their existing 
multilateral or bilateral agreements to better reflect the 
basic provisions of the Convention, as well as adopting 
new agreements that apply the general principles of 
147  UNGA Sixth Committee (51st Session) ‘Report of Sixth Committee Convening 
as the Working Group of the Whole’ (11 April 1997) UN Doc A/51/869 at 5.
the Convention to the characteristics and uses of a 
particular watercourse. The original SADC Protocol 
on Shared Watercourse Systems was replaced 
by a second agreement closely modelled on the 
Convention’s final text.148  The recent Nile River Basin 
Cooperative Framework Agreement (NRBCFA) contains 
general principles and rules which clearly draw from 
the Convention.149 
     Comprehensive regional and basin assessments 
have been conducted as part of the 1997 UN 
Watercourses Global Initiative which examines how 
the Convention can play a supplementary role to 
existing agreements in specific existing regional and 
basin legal frameworks which do not comprehensively 
define the rights and obligations of the parties they are 
applicable to. Results from these studies demonstrates 
that in specific river basins including the Congo 
and Amazon, as well as a multitude of basin and 
regional agreements across Central Asia, Southern 
Africa, West Africa, East Africa, Central America 
and South-east Asia, agreements could individually 
and collectively be strengthened by applying and 
adjusting particular provisions of the Convention to 
their existing frameworks.150  For example, in Central 
Asia the legal architecture of transboundary water 
cooperation in the Aral Sea Basin (ASB) is composed 
of numerous agreements at bilateral, sub-regional, 
regional and global levels, many of which have been 
148  The Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), 7 August 2000, reprinted in ILM, Vol. 40, at 
321. For an overview and analysis of the Protocol, see S Salman, ‘Legal Regime 
for Use and Protection of International Watercourses in the Southern African 
Region: Evolution and Context’ (2001) 41 Natural Resources Journal at 981. The 
original Protocol was concluded in 1995. The Revised Protocol replaces the 1995 
Protocol. See also, A Earle and D Malzbender, ‘Southern Africa’, in F Loures and 
A Rieu-Clarke (eds.), The UN Watercourses Convention in Force – Strengthening 
International Law for Transboundary Water Management (Earthscan 2012
149   For analysis see M Abseno, ‘The Concepts of Equitable Utilisation, No 
Significant Harm and Benefit Sharing under the Nile River Basin Cooperative 
Framework Agreement: Some Highlights on Theory and Practice’ (2009) 20 Journal 
of Water Law 86. 
150  Summaries of regional and basin case studies are found in Loures and Rieu-
Clarke, The UN Watercourses Convention in Force.
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adopted without consideration of the relationships 
between each other and also which do not always 
incorporate the principles of the law of international 
watercourses or best water management practice.151  In 
this context, the Convention can make a contribution to 
improving the legal framework for transboundary water 
cooperation in the ASB and assist countries in building 
and maintaining effective and peaceful management 
systems for their shared resources. Some of the 
gaps that the Convention can fill relate to issues of 
scope, substantive rules, procedural rules, institutional 
mechanisms and dispute settlement. For example 
the agreements in the ASB region contain no explicit 
provisions on equitable and reasonable use (the central 
substantive rule of international water law) and dispute 
settlement mechanisms are lacking.152  The contribution 
that the Convention can make to strengthen the legal 
frameworks in other basins, regions or sub-regions 
is discussed throughout this guide as each Article is 
examined in depth.
151  D Ziganshina, ‘Legal framework governing transboundary waters in the Aral 
Sea Basin: What is a role for the UNWC?’ in F Loures and A Rieu-Clarke (eds.), 
The UN Watercourses Convention in Force – Strengthening International Law for 
Transboundary Water Management (Earthscan 2012).
152  Ibid.
3.1.2 Relationship of the Convention to 
part of shared watercourse or specific 
projects and rights of third parties.
Articles 3 (3) and 4 (2) of the Convention allow 
all watercourse states to become a party to any 
agreement that only refers to a portion of the basin or to 
a specific project or use if they may be affected by such 
an agreement. In addition, these agreements cannot 
adversely affect, to a significant extent,153  the use of the 
resource by non-participating riparians without their 
express consent (Article 3(4)). Furthermore, nothing in 
such an agreement will affect the rights or obligations 
of non-contracting parties under the Convention. In 
other words, these provisions safeguard the rights of 
states that are not parties to partial agreements, but 
are parties to the Convention (Article 3 (6)).   Article 3 (6) 
therefore upholds Article 34 of the Vienna Convention 
containing the general rule regarding third states – that 
a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a 
third state without its consent.154 
153  See Section 3.1.3 for explanation of significant adverse effects.
154  Vienna Convention, UN Doc A/Conf.39/27 Art 34.
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3.1.3 Significant adverse effects to other 
watercourse states – Objective test 
Two watercourse states are free to enter into an 
agreement which covers the whole or part of a 
watercourse, provided third watercourse states are 
not adversely affected ‘to a significant extent’.  This 
test of what is to a ‘significant extent’ is an objective 
test which requires that the effect is one which can 
be established by objective evidence.  Additionally, 
it must be shown that there is a real impairment of 
use.155    Additionally the term ‘significant’ is not used 
in the sense of ‘substantial’. What are to be avoided 
are localised agreements, or agreements concerning 
a particular project or use, which have a significant 
adverse effect upon third watercourse states - such an 
effect need not rise to the level of being substantial.156  
The Arbitral Tribunal in Lake Lanoux, in which Spain 
insisted upon delivery of Lake Lanoux water through 
the original system, found that:
‘[…] thanks to the restitution effected by the devices 
described above, none of the guaranteed users 
will suffer in his enjoyment of the waters […]; at the 
lowest water level, the volume of the surplus waters 
of the Carol, at the boundary, will at no time suffer 
a diminution; In the absence of any assertion that 
Spanish interests were significantly affected in a 
tangible way, the tribunal held that Spain could not 
require maintenance of the natural flow of the waters’.157
     The term ‘significant’ is a term that pervades many 
of the provisions of the Convention and as such is 
discussed further throughout this Guide as it applies to 
specific Articles and contexts.
155  1994 Draft Articles at 94.
156  UNWC, Annex ‘Statement of Understanding’.
157  Lake Lanoux para  ILR, 7957, at 123, para 6 (first subparagraph) of the arbitral 
(draft articles).
3.1.4 Negotiating watercourse agreements 
in good faith
What is meant by negotiating in good faith for the 
purpose of concluding a watercourse agreement 
(Articles 3 (5) and 4 (2)?  The answer is found by first 
looking at the meaning of the principle of good faith 
as it exists as a general principle of international law. 
In international law, to act in good faith is to carry out 
an act with honest intent, fairness and sincerity, and 
with no intention of deceit.158 This principle governs 
the relationships between nations and is fundamental 
to maintaining international peace and security, as 
per Article 2 (2) of the Charter of the United Nations.159 
States must abide by the principle of good faith in the 
performance and interpretation of treaties as set out in 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.160  The 
principle also extends beyond the law of treaties and 
informs and shapes the observance of existing rules of 
international law, and in addition constrains the manner 
in which those rules may be legitimately exercised.161
158  See `good faith’ in J Law, E A Martin (eds.) A Dictionary of Law (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 2009) <http://www.oxfordreference.com> accessed 21 
November 2011.
159  Article 2 (2) of the UN Charter states that ‘‘all members, in order to ensure to 
all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith 
the obligations assumed bythem in accordance with the present Charter’.
160  Articles 26 and 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 
May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) (Vienna Convention) 1155 UNTS
161 MN Shaw, International Law (6th edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) at 
104.
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The application of the principle is particularly 
fundamental to the negotiation process.162  Parties 
are under the obligation to conduct negotiations in 
good faith and in a manner that ‘the negotiations 
are meaningful, which will not be the case when 
either of them insists upon its own position without 
contemplating modification of it’ as stipulated by the 
ICJ in Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros and the North Sea 
Continental Shelf case163  and most recently in the Pulp 
Mills case.164  Negotiating in good faith ‘implies honesty, 
fairness, tolerance, lack of prejudice, consideration 
for the position, interests and needs of others, 
flexibility, willingness to seek a solution and, above all, 
cooperation’.165  This interpretation applies equally to the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith for the purpose of 
concluding an agreement under Articles 3 (5) and 4 (2) 
of the Convention.
162  The ICJ affirmed the important role of good faith in the negotiation process in 
cases including North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark/
Netherlands) Judgment of 20 February 1969 ICJ Reports 1969 at 3; Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland) Decision of July 251974 ICJ Reports 1974 
at 3; Case concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) 
Judgment of 25 September 1997 ICJ Reports 1997 at 7; and Case Concerning Pulp 
Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010, paras 
143-150.
163 Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros para 14, quoting from North Sea Continental Shelf case 
at para 85.
164   Pulp Mills Case, para 146.
165  E J Shafer `Good Faith Negotiation, the Nuclear Disarmament Obligation 
of Article VI of the NPT, and Return to the International Court of Justice’ (paper 
presented at International Seminar `Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, War and 
Armed Forces’ sponsored by the University of Costa Rica Faculty of Law and the 
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms San Jose Costa Rica 26 
January 2008) http://lcnp.org/wcourt/goodfaith-shafer.pdf accessed 21 November 
2011;  T Liguori, ‘The Principle of Good Faith in the Argentina-Uruguay Pulp Mills 
Dispute’ (2009) 20 Journal of Water Law 70 at 70.
3.2 Application
3.2.1 Scenario – Do the rights and 
duties established by the Convention 
apply exclusively among parties to the 
Convention?
What happens when an international watercourse 
is shared by three riparians but only states A and B 
become parties to the UN Watercourses Convention 
and state C does not? The Convention will only apply 
to contracting parties, that is states A and B, not to 
all riparians of an international watercourse (state C) 
because the definition of  ‘watercourse state’, which is 
applied throughout the Convention’s text to establish 
various rights and duties, includes only those countries 
that have ratified the Convention (Article  2(c)). In other 
words, the Convention confirms that reciprocity is a 
condition for its applicability, and that the rights and 
duties established by the Convention apply exclusively 
among parties. This is standard practice in
international law.
     Yet, established principles of customary international 
law, many of which are codified by the Convention, still 
apply to all watercourse states, regardless of whether 
they ratify the Convention or not, in the absence of 
watercourse agreements determining otherwise. For 
further discussion of these customary law principles, 
see section 4.1.2 below, the Introduction and Part II of 
this Guide. This is particularly relevant in the context of 
over 889 out of 1084 watercourse agreements signed 
between 1945 and 2007. Although they may not include 
all riparians, the missing riparians will still be subject 
to the rules of customary international law. Figure 1.7 
below shows that of the 1,084 watercourse agreements 
signed among sovereign countries between 1945 and 
2007 only 195 are basin-wide accords which include all 
riparians - the remaining treaties are mostly bilateral.166 
166  N Zawahri, A Dinar, and G Nigatu (2010) Governing International Freshwater 
Resources: An Analysis of Treaty Design. Paper presented at the ISA Congress, New 
Orleans, February, 2010.
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Figure 1.7 | 
Treaty Inclusivity167
Figure 1.8 | 
Primary Focus of Transboundary Water Agreements 
Adopted During the 20th Century (Source - Jägerskog 
and Phillips 2006)168
167  Data is from N Zawahri, A Dinar, and G Nigatu (2010) Governing International 
Freshwater Resources: An Analysis of Treaty Design. Paper presented at the ISA 
Congress, New Orleans, February 2010.
168 D Phillips and others, Trans-Boundary Water Cooperation as a Tool for Conflict 
Prevention and for Broader Benefit-Sharing (EGDI, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
2006).  
3.2.2 Scenario – What scoping gaps
can the Convention fill?
The Convention is sufficiently broad in scope that 
where existing agreements have gaps in their coverage 
which may pose a serious obstacle to cooperation, the 
Convention will support and supplement them (Article 
3). A number of important elements of the hydrologic 
cycle are often missing from transboundary agreements. 
Also many transboundary agreements identifying water 
use types and water allocations fail to include any 
standards for the quality of that water.  
Figure 1.8 shows the primary focus of transboundary 
water agreements adopted during the 20th Century, 
which suggests there are many gaps which could be 
filled by the Convention to provide more integrated 
water management within the respective agreements.169
169 See also the discussion on gaps the Convention can fill under Section 3.1.1.
Riparian(s) missing
All Riparian(s) 
889 195
Hydroelectricity
Water allocation
Flood Control
Industrial uses
Navigation
Pollution
Fishing
39%
37%
9%
6%
4%
4%
1%
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3.2.3 Scenario – Application of the 
Convention to existing agreements where 
countries party to an existing agreement 
are also party to the Convention
If states A and B are parties to an existing Agreement 
X and decide to negotiate a Protocol Y to Agreement 
X on a specific aspect, such as procedures for 
emergencies including flooding or drought. Would the 
Convention bind the negotiations? If the protocol is not 
a separate international agreement which countries 
must join for it to come into effect, the answer is no – 
however Parties should consider harmonising Protocol 
Y with Part IV of the Convention (Article 3 (2)). However, 
if the protocol is treated as a separate new agreement 
which countries must ratify, rather than a protocol to an 
existing agreement, then arguably parties are under a 
stronger obligation to apply and adjust the provisions 
of the Convention, even though it could not affect the 
obligations in the original agreement.170  
170  E Brown Weiss, ‘The Evolution of International Water Law’ in Hague Academy 
of International Law (ed), Recueil Des Cours, Collected Courses, Tome 331, vol 331 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) at 260.
3.2.4 Scenario – Does the Convention 
require watercourse states to conclude 
a specific agreement before using an 
international watercourse? 
No, watercourse states are not under an obligation to 
conclude an agreement before using the waters of the 
international watercourse.  This is not supported by the 
terms or the intent of Article 3171  and nor is it supported 
by state practice or international judicial decisions. 
However, it is advisable that the riparian countries 
enter into such specific agreements for ensuring the 
more effective management and development of their 
transboundary river basin.
171  1994 Draft Articles at 94.
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1. Every watercourse state is entitled to participate 
in the negotiation of and to become a party to 
any watercourse agreement which applies to the 
entire international watercourse, as well as to 
participate in any relevant consultations.
2.  A watercourse state whose use of an international 
watercourse may be affected to a significant 
extent by the implementation of a proposed 
watercourse agreement which applies only to a 
part of the watercourse or to a particular project, 
programme or use is entitled to participate in 
consultations on such an agreement and, where 
appropriate, in the negotiation thereof in good 
faith with a view to becoming a party thereto, to 
the extent that its use is thereby affected.
4.1 Commentary
4.1.1 Right to participation 
for watercourse states
When an agreement deals with an entire international 
watercourse, there is no reasonable basis for excluding 
a watercourse State from participation in its negotiation, 
and from becoming a party to the agreement, or 
from participating in any relevant consultations.172  
As explained in Section 2.2.5 the primary legal 
relationships which the Convention governs are 
between state parties which are riparians of the same 
international watercourse and Article 4 stipulates 
that only riparians have the right to take part in the 
consultations and negotiations. However, this 
exclusion of non-riparians may be challenged in 
particular circumstances as elaborated upon in 
Section 4.1.2 below.
     When an agreement deals with only part of an 
international watercourse only watercourse states 
whose use of the watercourse may be significantly 
affected by the implementation of an agreement are 
entitled to participate in consultations and negotiations 
relating to such a proposed agreement, with a view 
to becoming a party to the agreement, to the extent 
that its use is thereby affected – See the Application 
Scenario 4.2.1 below.
172  1994 Draft Articles at 95.
Article 4 | Parties to 
watercourse agreements 
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4.1.2 The relationship of the Convention to 
customary law – and value added  
The Convention codifies numerous principles of 
customary international law related to the non-
navigational use of international watercourses and 
these principles served as the conceptual framework 
for the Convention.  These exact principles will be 
explored in more depth throughout the relevant parts 
of this Guide – although the most fundamental 
principle to understand is that of equitable and 
reasonable utilisation (which will be explored in Part II 
and elsewhere).
     At this stage it is important to mention that the 
Convention actually goes beyond simply codifying 
customary law, and also clarifies the content and scope 
of specific rules and principles, providing minimum 
standards for interpretation. For example although 
countries may accept the customary legal status of the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation and 
the no-harm rule, this does not mean that all states 
share the same interpretation of these norms including 
their scope, meaning, how they relate to each other, 
and, ultimately, how they should be implemented 
in a harmonious manner. The Convention’s role 
in this instance is to provide common ground for 
interpretation, arrived at after discussions amongst 
relevant parties. The existence of a minimum standard 
to be followed by all countries would make them a priori 
aware of their general rights and obligations. A clearer 
status of the applicable law through codification is 
crucial to prevent disputes and thus promotes stability 
and consistency among riparians. 
     Furthermore, the role of the ILC in drafting the 
Convention was not only the codification of existing 
customary international law, but also its progressive 
development and the crystallisation of emerging 
norms (e.g. ecosystem protection). In addition, the 
Convention incorporates the rights and obligations 
which support substantive rules and principles - i.e. 
procedural rules covering issues like the exchange of 
data and information, consultations and negotiations, 
and dispute settlement. Finally, since states have to 
implement its provisions in their entirety, the Convention 
serves as an overarching umbrella addressing the 
multitude of issues arising out of present and future 
conflicts over water, and preventing the parties 
from following a ‘selective’ approach regarding the 
management of international watercourses – that is 
selectively picking which customary principles they 
choose to follow.
     Furthermore, the ambiguities and abstractness 
of customary law make it harder for the international 
community or affected individuals to question joint 
governmental decisions. This becomes relevant where 
all co-riparians agree on the implementation of a certain 
project by one state based on tradeoffs regarding 
future river development elsewhere or on the sharing 
of benefits deriving from such a project. In such a case, 
the Convention, more than custom, would inform 
an analysis of whether the decision conforms to 
minimum duties related to environmental protection 
and human rights.173
173 See FR Loures and others ‘Possible Effects From Entry and Non-entry Into 
Force’, FR Loures and A Rieu-Clarke, The UN Watercourses Convention In Force.
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4.2 Application
4.2.1 Scenario - Rights of third parties to 
consultation and participation174 
States A and B, whose common border is the River X, 
agree that each may divert 50 per cent of the river flow 
for domestic consumption, manufacturing and irrigation 
purposes at a point 25 miles upstream from state C, 
through which River X flows upon leaving states A and 
B. The total amount of water available to state C from 
the river, including return flow in states A and B, will 
be reduced as a result of the diversion, by 25 percent 
from what would have been available without diversion. 
Downstream state C relies extensively on aquaculture 
especially salmon farming on the section of the River 
X which flows through its territory and is concerned 
that the reduced flow will have an impact upon salmon 
migration upstream to breeding grounds.
     Does state C have the right to join in consultations 
and negotiations, as a prospective party to any 
agreement, with regard to the proposed action by 
states A and B?
     The answer is yes, state C has the right to join 
consultation and negotiation but the right is qualified 
to the extent that it must appear that the proposed 
water use by State A and B will have a significant effect 
on state C. What constitutes ‘a significant effect’ is 
something greater than an ‘adverse effect’.  State C 
must be likely to suffer from a real impairment of  use, 
with a detrimental impact of the proposed diversion by 
states A and B, upon the environment or the socio-
economic development of the harmed state (e.g. public 
health, industry, property, and agriculture). If state C 
can prove objectively that the diversion will create a real 
impairment of use to its salmon industry, then it will be 
entitled to participate in consultations and negotiations 
relating to the agreement, and potentially to become 
a party thereto. If state C is not significantly affected 
by the proposed agreement between states A and B, 
regarding diversion of part of the River X, the physical 
174  Adopted from 1994 Draft Articles at 96.
unity of the river does not of itself require that state C 
have these rights.  In these circumstances states A and 
B are legally entitled to enter into such an agreement 
without state C.
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99
4.3 Additional reading
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses in UNGA ‘Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth 
Session’ (2 May-22 July 1994) UNGAOR, 49th Session Supp 
No 10 UN Doc A/49/10 (1994).
Arevalo, L, ‘The Work of the International Law Commission in 
the Field of International Environmental Law’ Boston College 
Environmental Affairs Law Review 32 (2005) at 498-501
Dellapenna JW, ‘The Customary International Law of 
Transboundary Fresh Waters’ (2001) 1 International Journal of 
Global Environmental Issues 264.
McIntyre O, ‘The Proceduralisation and Growing Maturity of 
International Water Law’ (2010) 22 Journal of Environmental 
Law 475.
Rieu-Clarke A and Loures FR, ‘Still Not in Force: Should 
States Support the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention?’ 
(2009) 18 Review of European Community & International 
Environmental Law at 185-97.
Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing 
(Kluwer Law International 2001).
 
100
1.  Watercourse states shall in their respective 
territories utilise an international watercourse in 
an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, 
an international watercourse shall be used and 
developed by watercourse states with a view 
to attaining optimal and sustainable utilisation 
thereof and benefits therefrom taking into 
account the interests of the watercourse states 
concerned, consistent with adequate protection 
of the watercourse.
2.   Watercourse states shall participate in the use, 
development and protection of an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable 
manner. Such participation includes both the 
right to utilise the watercourse and the duty to 
cooperate in the protection and development 
thereof, as provided in the present Convention.
Key points
•	 The	principle	of	‘equitable	and	reasonable	
utilisation’ is the cornerstone of international law 
related to transboundary watercourses.
•	 It	entitles	a	watercourse	state	to	an	equitable	and	
reasonable share of the uses or benefits of the 
particular watercourse and creates the correlative 
obligation not to deprive other states of their 
respective rights.
•	 It	is	based	on	the	allocation	theory	of	‘limited	
territorial sovereignty’ which stipulates that 
watercourse states enjoy equal rights to the 
utilisation of an international watercourse.
•	 Article	6	provides	an	indicative	list	of	factors	and	
circumstances to be taken into account when 
determining what constitutes an equitable and 
reasonable use.
•	 The	Legal	Assessment	Model	developed	by	the	
IHP-HELP Centre for Water Law, Policy and 
Science provides a useful tool for identifying, 
measuring and evaluating the relevant factors 
and circumstances applicable to equitable and 
reasonable use.
•	 States	are	obliged	to	take	all	appropriate	
measures not to cause significant harm to 
other watercourse states, however, some 
significant harm may be tolerated – in very limited 
circumstances – where it can be established to 
be equitable and reasonable. 
•	 While	no	use	of	a	transboundary	watercourse	
has inherent priority over others, special regard 
has to be given to vital human needs and the 
ecosystems of international watercourses must 
be protected. 
Part II | General Principles 
(Articles 5-10)
Article 5 | Equitable and 
reasonable utilisation and 
participation
| Article 5
Convention text
101
5.1 Commentary
5.1.1 Theories of allocation
Article 5 defines the fundamental rights and duties 
of states regarding their utilisation of international 
watercourses by laying down the well-established 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation in 
paragraph 1 and its complementary principle of 
equitable participation in paragraph 2.
     Despite the fact that the prosperity of societies has 
always been linked with the development of shared 
freshwater resources, it was not until the 1950s that 
customary international law governing international 
watercourses emerged.175 Before then, two conflicting 
approaches reflected the claims and counterclaims of 
states over their share of the resource – the theories of 
‘absolute territorial sovereignty’ (also referred to as the 
Harmon Doctrine)176 and ‘absolute territorial integrity.’ 
While the former favours upstream riparians, allowing 
the unlimited use of the waters of a transboundary 
watercourse located within national borders 
(regardless of any consequences that may occur 
downstream in other countries), the latter approach 
favours downstream states wishing to prohibit any 
development in an upstream state that would interfere 
with the natural flow of such a watercourse.177 
     It was the dispute between the USA and Mexico 
over the Rio Grande in 1895 which gave rise to the 
theory of ‘absolute territorial sovereignty.’ In this case, 
Mexico claimed that diversions in the USA (Colorado 
and New Mexico) significantly reduced the supply 
of water to Mexican communities. In protest at the 
diversion, Mexico declared that its legal right to use the 
175  CB Bourne, ‘The Primacy of the Principle of Equitable Utilisation in the 1997 
Watercourses Convention’ (1997) 35 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 215 
at 215.
176  Named after the opinion delivered by the American Attorney General Judson 
Harmon in 1896 concerning a water dispute between the United States and Mexico 
over the use of the Rio Grande.
177  SC McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2007) at 117; A Rieu-Clarke, International Law and Sustainable 
Development : Lessons from the Law of International Watercourses (IWA Publishing 
2005) at 147.
water of the Rio Grande is ‘incontestable, being prior 
to that of the inhabitants of Colorado by hundreds of 
years.’178  The US Secretary of State requested a legal 
opinion of the US Attorney General, Judson Harmon, 
as to whether the United States violated Mexico’s rights 
under international law. In the section of his opinion 
Harmon denied that the general rules of international 
law imposed any obligation on the United States to 
restrict its own use of the portion of the Rio Grande 
within its own territory, even if this use might cause 
adverse effects downstream in Mexico.
‘The fundamental principle of international law is the 
absolute sovereignty of every nation, as against all 
others, within its own territory.’
‘All exceptions […] to the full and complete power of a 
nation within its own territories must be traced up to the 
consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other 
legitimate source.’
‘The immediate as well as the possible consequences 
of the right asserted by Mexico show that its recog-
nition is entirely inconsistent with the sovereignty of the 
United States over its national domain.’
‘[T]he rules, principles, and precedents of international 
law impose no liability or obligation upon the United 
States.’179
Attorney-General Harmon therefore advised the 
Department of State that the USA had no responsibility 
towards Mexico for the significant reductions to the 
Rio Grande. His opinion is commonly referenced by 
those who claim an upstream state has a right under 
178 See Minister Romero to US Secretary of State Richard Olney, 21 Oct. 1895, 
US APPENDIX, at 202; quoted in McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses 
at 113.
179  21 Opinion Attorney General, pp. 281-283 (1898); quoted in ibid at 114. 
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international law to act unilaterally in complete freedom 
regarding an international watercourse within its 
territory, irrespective of any impact this action might 
have in downstream countries. Interestingly, the strong 
position has never been applied by the USA – neither 
in the resolution of the Rio Grande dispute, which was 
based on ‘equitable and acceptable’ use, nor in any 
following controversy.
     The same can be said for general state practice. 
While some states have, at times, argued they possess 
absolute sovereignty over the parts of international 
watercourses located within their own territories; in the 
end these states have usually resolved their disputes by 
entering into agreements which recognised the rights of 
the co-basin states.180 
     The concept of absolute territorial integrity runs 
contrary to that of absolute territorial sovereignty, since 
the former is employed to argue that the upstream 
state has no right to do anything which may affect the 
natural flow of the water into the territory of the state(s) 
downstream. Applying such a theory would most 
likely have a serious impact on upstream states which 
developed their water resources at a much slower pace 
compared to their downstream neighbours, as it would 
ultimately impede any upstream development which 
may adversely affect the natural (even seasonal) flow of 
the watercourse.181 
     Ironically, the country most closely associated with 
the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty is also 
linked with absolute territorial integrity. During the Trail 
Smelter arbitration, a case involving transboundary air 
pollution emanating from a smelter in Canada (Trail) and 
causing harm in the USA, the Legal Adviser of the US 
Department of State shared the view that:
180  E.g., India v Pakistan (1950s); Austria v Germany (1950s); Chile v Bolivia 
(1920s).
181  See McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses at 126.
‘It is a fundamental principle of the law of nations that 
a sovereign state is supreme within its own territorial 
domain and that it and its nationals are entitled to 
use and enjoy their territory and property without 
interference from an outside source.’182
Again, this extreme perspective shows that – like the 
absolute territorial sovereignty theory - the concept 
of absolute territorial integrity may only be useful as 
a diplomatic tool, rather than being reflective of state 
practice. In the case at hand, the tribunal allowed the 
smelter to continue operating subject to a very stringent 
emissions regime meant to avoid unreasonable harm 
in the USA and the payment of compensation for any 
damage caused despite complying with the emissions 
regime. Few other countries have referred to the 
concept in transboundary water disputes.183
     Neither of these two extreme positions therefore 
received universal support – for an obvious reason: 
watercourse states cannot be easily divided into 
upstream or downstream states as some countries 
fit into both categories (some rivers may end in a 
state’s territory, while others may originate from it) 
and other countries may be midstream states (in the 
case an international river flows through three or more 
countries). History has shown that the theories of 
absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial 
integrity have been merely used as strong bargaining 
positions – a negotiation technique known as the ‘zero-
sum game’ – before reaching a compromise agreement 
which is satisfactory to all parties.184 
182   Memorandum in Relation to the Arbitration of the Trail Smelter Case, United 
States and Canada, 10 August 1937, prepared by Green H. Hackworth, Legal 
Adviser, for Swagar Sherley, Agent of the United States; quoted in ibid at 127.  
183  E.g. Egypt v Ethiopia (‘full right to maintain the status quo of the rivers flowing 
on its territory’); Pakistan v India; Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v Spain) (16 
November 1957) 24 ILR 101 (1957).
184  A Nardini, A Goltara and B Chartier, ‘Water Conflicts: An Unavoidable Challenge 
from the Transboundary to the Local Dimension’ in Meire P and others (eds), 
Integrated Water Management Practical Experiences and Case Studies (Springer 
2008) at 97.
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Today, the more balanced concept of ‘limited territorial 
sovereignty’ is widely accepted as the foundation 
upon which the law of international watercourses in 
general, and the UNWC in particular, have evolved.185  
It stipulates that all watercourse states enjoy an equal 
right to the utilisation of a shared water resource, and 
each watercourse state has to respect the sovereignty 
and correlative rights of other watercourse states – i.e. 
not to exceed its own right to equitable utilisation.186  
     Such an approach is exemplified in a dispute 
concerning the River Meuse in 1856. Holland 
protested against a Belgian diversion of water from 
the transboundary river into the Campine Canal as it 
believed this measure caused damage by reducing 
the navigability of the Meuse and increasing the 
vulnerability of flooding.187  According to the Dutch 
government:
‘The Meuse being a river common both to Holland and 
to Belgium, it goes without saying that both parties 
are entitled to make the natural use of the stream, but 
at the same time, following general principles of law, 
each is bound to abstain from any action which might 
cause damage to the other. In other words, they cannot 
be allowed to make themselves masters of the water 
by diverting it to serve their own needs, whether for 
purposes of navigation or of irrigation.’188
185   A Tanzi and M Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the Law of 
International Watercourses : A Framework for Sharing (Kluwer Law International 
2001) at 136.
186  Rieu-Clarke, International Law and Sustainable Development : Lessons from 
the Law of International Watercourses at 148.
187  McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses at 137.
188   As quoted in ibid at 137.
The two states settled their dispute over the Meuse 
with two treaties in 1863 and 1873.189 This is just one 
of numerous cases in which upstream states have 
recognised the legal rights of their lower riparians.190
189 Treaty between the Netherlands and Belgium establishing the regime for 
taking water from the Meuse (12 May 1863); subject to some technical modifications 
introduced in January 1873.
190 See, for example, Art 2(2) (c) of the UNECE Convention on the Protection 
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 17 March 1992 
(entered into force 6 October 1996), reprinted in 31 ILM 1312 (1992); Art 3(7) of 
the SADC Revised Protocol on Shared International Watercourses, 7 August 2000 
(entered into force 22 September 2003), reprinted in 40 ILM 321 (2001).
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The concept of limited territorial sovereignty is strongly 
reflected in the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilisation, which can now be considered as a principle 
of customary international law. It aims to reconcile 
conflicting interests across international borders, so as 
to ‘provide the maximum benefit to each basin state 
from the uses of the waters with the minimum detriment 
to each.’191 
     One of the main advantages of the principle is that it 
simultaneously recognises the rights of both upstream 
and downstream countries. It underpins the theory of 
limited territorial sovereignty by entitling each basin 
state to a reasonable and equitable share of water 
resources for beneficial uses within its own territory 
while at the same time upholding the obligation not to 
deprive other basin states of their own right to equitable 
and reasonable utilisation. 
     The principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation 
performs two functions. Firstly, it establishes the 
objective to be achieved (an equitable and reasonable 
use), which determines the lawfulness of a use of the 
transboundary watercourse; and secondly, it serves as 
an important operational function at the process level, 
requiring that all relevant factors and circumstances 
(natural and socio-economic) are taken into account 
in the process of balancing the needs and proposed 
uses of each riparian state when determining what 
qualifies as a legitimate – i.e. equitable and reasonable 
– use (see Article 6 – Factors relevant to equitable and 
reasonable utilisation).192 
191  Article IV of the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, 
adopted by the International Law Association at the 52nd Conference, Helsinki, 
Finland, August 1966, reprinted in S Bogdanovic, International Law of Water 
Resources : Contribution of the International Law Association (1954-2000) (Kluwer 
Law International 2001) at 89.
192  P Wouters, S Vinogradov and B-O Magsig, ‘Water Security, Hydrosolidarity and 
International Law: A River Runs through It ...’ (2009) 19 Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law 97 at 116.
The idea that all co-riparians enjoy an equal right in 
the use of an international watercourse has been 
affirmed by the judgment of the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Case. 
Here, the court held that the unilateral operation of a 
Slovak project on the Danube (referred to as ‘Variant 
C’), allowing Slovakia (at the time Czechoslovakia) 
to utilise between 80 and 90 per cent of the waters 
of the transboundary river for its exclusive benefit, 
represented an infringement on Hungary’s ‘basic right 
to an equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources 
of an international watercourse.’193
     In order to complete the analyis of the theories of 
allocation it is important to mention the concept of ‘a 
community of interests’.  The concept of a community 
of interests can be seen as a step beyond the theory 
of limited territorial sovereignty.  The Permanent 
International Court of Justice made reference to the 
concept in the 1929 Territorial Jurisdiction of the 
International Commission of the River Oder, where it 
stated that:
‘This community of interest in a navigable river become 
the basis of a common legal right, the essential features 
of which are the perfect equality of all riparian states 
in the use of the whole course of the river and the 
exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian 
state in relation to the others.’194
 
The River Oder case was referred to more recently in 
193  Case Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) 
Judgement of 25 September 1997 (Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Case) [1997] ICJ 
Reports 1997, 7 at 54, para 78. 
194  Judgement no. 16 (10 September 1929), PCIJ Series A, No. 23, at 5-46.
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the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros case where the International 
Court of Justice states that:
‘Modern development of international law has 
strengthened this principle for non-navigational uses 
of international watercourses as well, as evidenced 
by the adoption of the Convention of 21 May 1997 on 
the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses by the United Nations General 
Assembly.’195
The Court therefore went on to conclude that:
‘Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming control of 
a shared resource, and thereby depriving Hungary of 
its right to an equitable and reasonable share of the 
natural resource of the Danube … failed to respect the 
proportionality which is required by international law’.196
In reference to the above statements McCaffrey 
claims that, ‘the concept of community of interest can 
function not only as a theoretical basis of the law of 
international watercourses but also as a principle that 
informs concrete obligations of riparian states, such 
as that of equitable utilisation.’197 However, McCaffrey 
also goes on to claim that the precise legal implications 
of the community of interests concept are less than 
completely clear:
     
‘The legal import of the doctrines of absolute territorial 
sovereignty and integrity is clear enough; that of 
limited territorial sovereignty, while not so stark, is 
also fairly well understood. How, then, is the notion of 
community of interest different from these theories? It 
is one thing to say, as the Permanent Court did in the 
River Oder case, that one state may not prevent other 
195  Case concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), 
available at <http://www3.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7375.pdf?PHPSESSID=756c32
08dcb4692850e8bbf72af34ed6>, accessed 30 April 2012, para 85.
196  Ibid
197  McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses at 150. 
states from navigating on an international watercourse 
because they all enjoy a community of interest in it. 
It is something quite different to maintain that the 
community of interest in an international watercourse 
allows one state to prevent another state from diverting 
water from it, for example. While all riparian states (and 
other states, as well) may have an interest in navigating 
on the whole course of a river can it be said that all 
riparian states have an interest in the whole course of 
a river – i.e. the entire watercourse system – insofar as 
non-navigational uses are concerned?  For example, 
would a state that was not adversely affected by 
a co-riparian state’s diversion have legal grounds 
for protesting the diversion, absent an applicable 
agreement?  There would seem to be little doubt that 
the answer would be in the negative. Such a right is 
supported neither in state practice nor in the writings of 
commentators. Therefore, the concept of community of 
interest must have another meaning in the case of non-
navigational uses.’198 
     
In this regard, some commentators have sought to 
equate the community of interests concept with that 
of ‘common management.’199 Caflisch argues for the 
merits of ‘denationalising’ international watercourses, 
shifting the emphasis from individual states to joint 
organisation.200  However, the latter commentator also 
observes that, ‘while it is clear that a condominium 
could be established by treaty, one cannot maintain 
that, by virtue of the rules of customary law, the whole 
of an international watercourse, including its resources, 
forms a condominium.’201 
198  McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses at 161.  
199  Owen McIntyre, Environmental Protection of International Watercourses under 
International Law (Ashgate 2007), at 33.
200  Lucius Caflish, Regles Generales du Droit des Cours d’Eau Internationau, 219 
Recueil des Court (1989-VII) (1992), at 59-61.
201  Ibid.
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5.1.2 What is meant by ‘equitable’?
Beyond doubt, each riparian state is still entitled to 
make use of the waters of an international watercourse 
– within its own territory – which is a fundamental 
feature of the concept of sovereignty. It is the principle 
of sovereign equality (or ‘equality of right’) which 
stipulates that every riparian state has a right to the 
utilisation of the watercourse which is qualitatively equal 
to the rights of the co-riparians.202  However, this must 
not be mistaken for the right to an equal share of the 
uses and benefits of the watercourse; nor does it imply 
that the water resource itself has to be divided into 
equal shares.203 Since it is based on the notion of equity, 
the concept demands the weighing and balancing of 
the competing (reasonable) interests of states; taking 
into account all relevant factors and circumstances (see 
Article 6 – Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable 
utilisation).
     Equity has many different meanings, and the precise 
nature of the concept is somewhat obscure. As a set 
of legal principles, or found in broader ‘general norms,’ 
it has a long history in both common and civil law 
systems. Equity can be described as a supplement to 
rather strict rules, giving the judge some leeway in their 
application, where it would seem too rigid or harsh 
otherwise. In international law equity is often used as 
a synonym for fairness or justice with both procedural 
and substantive dimensions.204 While the procedural 
part is concerned with reaching decisions through 
‘right process’, the substantive part tries to achieve 
distributive justice.205
202  See Article IV of the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International 
Rivers, adopted by the International Law Association at the 52nd Conference, 
Helsinki, Finland, August 1966, reprinted in Bogdanovic, International Law of Water 
Resources : Contribution of the International Law Association (1954-2000) at 89.
203  Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Forty-Sixth Session, UNGAOR, 49th Sess, Supp (No. 10), UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) 
[hereinafter 1994 ILC Draft Articles] at 98.
204  TM Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Clarendon Press; 
Oxford University Press 1995) at 9.
205 Ibid at 7.
Based on the perspective that fairer proceedings 
lead to fairer outcomes, the two dimensions of equity 
are often seen as being interlinked.206  One example 
here is the concept of environmental justice which 
aims at guaranteeing procedural equity through a 
participatory decision-making process; in turn leading 
to outcomes which treat all affected stakeholders 
fairly. The movement pushing for environmental justice 
emerged as a result of correlations between race and 
poverty; and the allocation of environmental burdens. 
The argument is that greater equity in the allocation of 
both benefits and harm (distributive justice) can only 
be achieved by overcoming the traditional exclusion 
of minority groups in the decision-making process 
(procedural fairness).207
     In the climate change debate the substantive 
dimension of ‘equity’ (distributional justice), is at 
the centre of the discussion – consisting of three 
domains:208 
(1)  Need | Mitigation strategies and emission caps 
should leave room for eradicating poverty 
and achieve a reasonable standard of living – 
basically, they should take into account the right 
to development.
(2)  Capability | The efforts and costs for mitigation 
should be shared in proportion to each 
state’s financial means and to its mitigation 
opportunities.
206  D Shelton, ‘Equity’ in Bodansky D, Brunnée J and Hey E (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2007) at 
640. 
207   Ibid at 641.
208   L Ringius, A Torvanger and A Underdal, ‘Burden Sharing and Fairness 
Principles in International Climate Policy’ (2002) 2 International Environmental 
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 1 at 17.
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(3)  Responsibility | Mitigation efforts should be 
allocated in proportion to a state’s share of 
responsibility for causing climate change.
These basic elements have been translated into several 
approaches introduced to international climate change 
negotiations. The concept of egalitarian equity states 
that every individual has an equal right to pollute and 
to be protected from pollution.209 Thus, each state 
would be allowed to emit greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
in proportion to its population. In contrast, the theory 
of sovereignty demands that all states have an equal 
right to pollute and to be protected from pollution; 
leading to a reduction of global GHG emissions in 
proportion to states’ status quo right by maintaining 
the relative differences in emission levels between 
them.210  Applying a horizontal approach, where states 
with similar economic characteristics have similar rights 
to emit GHGs, would entail equalising net welfare 
changes across nations. Finally, the polluter pays 
principle distributes the economic burden of mitigation 
in accordance with each state’s (historical) emissions. 
     Complicating things further, each of these 
approaches can have different nuances, depending 
on the indicators applied for implementation. One 
prominent example here is the distinction between 
emissions due to secure fundamental basic needs and 
‘luxury’ emissions.
     The ongoing climate change debate points to the 
fact that defining what exactly is meant by ‘equitable’ 
will always remain a challenging and moving target, 
since governments transcribe their individual interests 
into various competing concepts of equity.
209  Ibid at 5.
210  Ibid.
  
5.1.3 What is meant by ‘reasonable’?
Frequently, the principle of ‘equitable and reasonable’ 
utilisation is used synonymously with simply ‘equitable 
utilisation’, raising the question about the actual role 
and meaning of reasonableness.211  In its Commentaries 
to the 1994 Draft Articles, the International Law 
Commission (ILC) took the view that there is a 
distinction to be made in the application of ‘reasonable’ 
and ‘equitable’. The former being applied in the 
judgement on the quality of the use; and the latter 
being employed in the balancing process of the various 
uses between states in case of a ‘conflict of use.’212
     The second sentence of Art 5 (1) elaborates upon 
the concept of equitable and reasonable utilisation, 
providing that watercourse states shall develop an 
international watercourse ‘with a view to attaining 
optimal and sustainable utilisation thereof and benefits 
therefrom’ consistent with adequate protection of the 
watercourse. The term ‘with a view to’ indicates that 
the achievement of optimal utilisation and benefits is 
the objective international watercourse states should 
ultimately aim for. The terms ‘optimal utilisation’ 
and ‘benefits’ do not indicate the goal to achieve 
the ‘maximum,’ the most efficient, or even the most 
(economically) valuable use. Nor do they indicate that 
the state in the position of utilising the watercourse 
most efficiently (e.g. due to economic or technological 
advantages) should have a superior claim to the use of 
the waters. It rather implies attaining maximum possible 
benefits for all riparians and achieving the greatest 
possible satisfaction of all their needs, while minimising 
potential detrimental impact. The term ‘sustainable 
use’ reflects the need to balance economic, social, and 
environmental values in the use of natural resources 
and to take into account the long-term carrying 
211  A Allan, ‘The Role of Reasonableness in Assessing Equitable and Reasonable 
Use’ (2009) 01/2009 Ympäristöjuridiikka 22.
212  1994 Draft Articles, Art 5 at 98, para 9.
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capacity of international watercourses – in line with the 
principle of sustainable development.213 The closing 
phrase of the second sentence stresses that the efforts 
to attain optimal and sustainable utilisation must be in 
line with the ‘adequate protection’ of the watercourse 
– which not only includes the conservation measures 
and activities tackling water-related diseases, but also 
technical and hydrological ‘measures of control.’214
     In determining what constitutes a reasonable 
use, the ‘reasonable man’ test can be applied to 
create an objective standard against which conduct 
can be measured.215  By using this test it becomes 
clear that the requirement of reasonableness does 
not demand the most efficient use available, and 
neither does it call for utilising the most advanced 
technology. Reasonableness differs from the concepts 
of ‘beneficial’ or ‘best possible’ use. It encompasses 
the contemporary conception of rationality and takes 
factors like the stage of development of a state into 
consideration. Yet, even if a use of an international 
watercourse has been identified as reasonable, it 
might still be challenged when compared with other 
uses through the lens of equity. The principle of 
equitable and reasonable use, then, recognises equity 
as a broader umbrella within which the concept of 
reasonableness becomes relative. This means that 
what may be considered to be perfectly reasonable 
by one state can be inequitable when looked at 
within the broader picture of the whole watercourse 
and the various needs and interests of co-riparian 
states. Hence, ‘reasonable’ uses are still subject to an 
‘equitable’ allocation.
213   Agenda 21: A Programme for Action for Sustainable Development, 13 
June 1992, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in Report of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development,Annex II, UN Doc A/Conf.151/26 (Vol II) (1992) at 
para 18.16.
214   E.g., flow regulation, flood control, drought mitigation, prevention of erosion 
and pollution control; see 1994 ILC Draft Articles, Art 5 at 97, para 5. 
215  Allan, ‘The Role of Reasonableness in Assessing Equitable and Reasonable 
Use’.
 
5.1.4 Equitable participation
Article 5 (2) embodies the concept of ‘equitable 
participation,’ which acknowledges the fact that only 
cooperative action by all watercourse states can 
produce the optimal benefits for each of them, while 
supporting the equitable and reasonable utilisation 
and the adequate protection of the international 
watercourse. Hence, the concept of equitable 
participation directly flows from the principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilisation – since the latter 
requires the former. Equitable participation, then, gives 
states the right to the cooperation of co-riparians 
regarding the measures necessary for the ‘adequate 
protection’ of the watercourse; which is linked to the 
general obligation to cooperate contained in Article 8 
of the UNWC.216
216  1994  Draft Articles, Art 5 at 97, para 3.
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5.2 Application
In the case where the quantity or quality of water in 
an international watercourse is insufficient to satisfy 
the needs of all riparian states – i.e. a conflict of uses 
exists – the application of the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilisation follows a two-step approach. 
First, one has to ask whether the relevant uses are 
reasonable; and second, the competing reasonable 
uses have to be reconciled on the basis of equity.
     States A (developing country, upstream) and B 
(downstream) share an international watercourse. State 
A intends to increase the diversion of the flow of the 
river for its irrigation canals and informs state B of its 
plan. In its communication state A assures state B that 
the increase of the withdrawal will be negligible – only 
a very small percentage of the overall flow – but will 
bring huge benefits for state A’s food security. In its 
reply state B argues that instead of wasting even more 
water in its ancient irrigation canals, state A should 
rather invest in drip irrigation systems or just buy the 
required amounts of food from state B. While state B 
acknowledges that the planned increased withdrawal 
of water is only marginal, it fears that ‘giving in’ every 
time A wants to use more water to feed its rapidly 
growing population, could interfere with state B’s plans 
to extend its holiday resorts along the river.
     While B is right in claiming that state A’s plans to 
grow crops in additional areas is not the most efficient 
or beneficial use of the watercourse, the question 
whether the use is reasonable follows a different line of 
argument. The requirement of ‘reasonableness’ does 
not demand for the most economical use (here, using 
the most advanced irrigation technology), but rather 
follows the contemporary conception of rationality 
which takes country specific factors into account – e.g. 
the stage of development. Considering that the planned 
utilisation of the shared waters will most likely also 
be ‘sustainable,’ since state A took into account the 
long-term carrying capacity of the watercourse, the use 
might be deemed to be reasonable.
     After establishing that the utilisation of the 
international watercourse is reasonable, states A and 
B have to debate whether it is also equitable. Here, 
again, the argument of state B does not hold, since it 
is unlikely that using the shared water resource for its 
envisaged upgrade of the tourism activities along the 
river bank will be deemed of higher value than state A’s 
demand for irrigation. It would be advisable, however, 
for states A and B to design a long-term management 
plan for the whole basin where future needs of both 
states will be considered, and potentially win-win 
scenarios could be developed. Only then can further 
frictions between the riparians be avoided.
     When looking at the operational aspects of the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation – 
and especially while trying to reach an equitable (re)
allocation of the water resource – one has to read 
Article 5 with both Articles 6 and 10 in mind (the former 
providing for a non-exhaustive list of factors which 
has to be considered and weighed when deciding 
whether a use is equitable and reasonable; and the 
latter for determining that no use of a transboundary 
watercourse has inherent priority).
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Figure 2.2 | 
The Application of Equitable 
and Reasonable Use 
(Source Authors)
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Article 6 | Factors 
relevant to equitable and 
reasonable utilisation
1.  Utilisation of an international watercourse in an 
equitable and reasonable manner within the 
meaning of Article 5 requires taking into account 
all relevant factors and circumstances, including:
(a)  Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, 
climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural 
character;
(b)  The social and economic needs of the 
watercourse states concerned;
(c)  The population dependent on the watercourse in 
each watercourse state;
(d)  The effects of the use or uses of the 
watercourses in one watercourse State on other 
watercourse states;
(e)  Existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
(f)  Conservation, protection, development and 
economy of use of the water resources of the 
watercourse and the costs of measures taken to 
that effect;
(g)  The availability of alternatives, of comparable 
value, to a particular planned or existing use.
2.  In the application of Article 5 or paragraph 1 of 
this article, watercourse states concerned shall, 
when the need arises, enter into consultations in 
a spirit of cooperation.
3.  The weight to be given to each factor is to be 
determined by its importance in comparison with 
that of other relevant factors. In determining what 
is a reasonable and equitable use, all relevant 
factors are to be considered together and a 
conclusion reached on the basis of the whole.
6.1 Commentary
6.1.1 General
Since the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilisation (see Article 5) is, necessarily, rather general 
and flexible, its implementation depends on the relevant 
factors and circumstances in each case. Article 6 (1) 
of the Convention provides a non-exhaustive list of 
those factors that should be considered in order to 
ensure that a state’s use of an international watercourse 
is in line with the standard of the principle. The 
competing interests of states have to be balanced 
and weighted; taking into account all relevant factors 
and circumstances. Here, the list of Article 6 merely 
tries to help with the implementation of the principle 
of equitable and reasonable utilisation. It is neither 
intended to be exhaustive nor to give priority to any of 
the factors (see paragraph 3), since their respective 
importance may change from case to case.
     Article 6 (2) foresees the possibility that a need 
arises for consultations between the riparian states. 
Several scenarios can trigger such a need – e.g. 
changing natural conditions causing a decrease of 
available high quality freshwater; or socio-economic 
changes causing an increase in demand. The wording 
‘in a spirit of cooperation’ suggests that a request by 
one state to enter into consultations, triggered 
by changing conditions, should not be ignored by 
its co-riparians.217 
217  1994 Draft Articles, Art 6 at 101, para 5. 
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6.1.2 Relevant factors matrix
The list of factors and circumstances to be taken into 
account when determining equitable and reasonable 
use can be divided into three broad categories: 
(1) factors of a natural character (hydrographic, 
hydrological, climatic, ecological, etc.); (2) economic 
and social ones (economic needs, population 
dependent on watercourse, effects of use on co-
riparians, existing and potential uses, conservation 
measures, and availability of alternatives); and (3) 
environmental factors.
     An interdisciplinary team of legal experts, 
economists and hydrologists, in association with the 
IHP-HELP Centre for Water Law, Policy and Science, 
developed the ‘Relevant Factors Matrix’ as the core of 
the ‘Legal Assessment Model’ (LAM).218   Its aim is to 
support the implementation of the principle of equitable 
and reasonable utilisation by providing a methodology 
which can be used for identifying and considering all 
relevant factors in each specific case. The LAM follows 
four basic steps: (1) defining scope, (2) collection 
of data, (3) evaluation and (4) providing options for 
ensuring equitable and reasonable utilisation. It has 
been designed as a flexible tool applicable to both 
upstream and downstream countries and also to 
transboundary groundwater resources. This allows for 
its employment when developing national water plans 
where a state needs to manage its transboundary 
water resources; when legal guidance is required 
for data information and exchange agreements; for 
transboundary river basin studies; as a process for 
negotiating a freshwater agreement between states; or 
for facilitating dispute resolution mechanisms.
218  See P Wouters and others, Sharing Transboundary Waters : An Integrated 
Assessment of Equitable Entitlement: The Legal Assessment Model (UNESCO 
2005).
The Relevant Factors Matrix has been designed and 
developed on the basis of the two principal documents 
related to the law of international watercourses: 
the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of 
International Rivers; and the Convention. However, the 
factors of the Relevant Factors Matrix differ from both 
sources in a number of ways, as they are grouped into 
six categories (See Figure 2.3).
| Article 6
113
Figure 2.3 | 
Relevant Factors Matrix (Source Authors)
1 | What ?
2 | Who ?
3 | What uses ?
4 | What 
     impacts ?
5 | What       
     options ?
6 | Case 
     specific
Natural context, covering the physical 
or natural characteristics of the 
watercourse 
Surface / groundwater
Geographic
Hydrological
Climatic
Environmental services
Details the population in the area dependent 
on the watercourse 
Population (growth)
Migration patterns
Demography
Domestic
Industrial
Agricultural
Recreational
Cultural
Consideration of alternatives with 
comparable feasibility, practicability and 
cost-effectiveness 
Different uses
Different means
Different sources
Reserved for additional factors that might 
be considered to be relevant in a particular 
situation 
Identifies the demands on or the uses of the 
watercourse and the benefits related to such 
uses 
Identifies the consequences of the uses, both 
within a nation and the effects of use in one 
state on others 
Economic gains
Social benefits
Environmental degradation
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needs of its industry and rapidly growing population. 
It contributes 30 km3 to the shared watercourse, 
but uses 70 km3 and needs a further 20 km3 to fill 
its planned reservoir. Around 35 percent of the river 
basin is located in state C. While it has a considerable 
amount of coal plants supplying state C with energy, 
it still relies on (costly) electricity imports. One of state 
C’s main points in any negotiation has always been 
that due to its early development of the river’s water 
resources, it holds a historic right which will be put 
at risk by any development upstream affecting the 
transboundary watercourse.
     It is obvious that the respective development plans 
of the three countries will lead to a conflict of uses. 
The three states now have to enter into consultations 
in a spirit of cooperation (Article 6(2)); and determine 
whether their (planned) uses are both equitable and 
reasonable. In doing so, all relevant factors have to 
be considered together and the watercourse states 
have to come to reach a conclusion on the basis of the 
whole (Article 6(3)).
     Once the states have completed the exercise of 
assessing whether or not their existing or planned uses 
of the transboundary watercourse meet the criteria 
of equitable and reasonable utilisation, they are in a 
position where they can determine how to proceed 
with their respective national water policies and 
plans – including the transboundary water resources. 
The range of these options available to the three 
watercourse states is sufficiently wide; and the choice 
will depend on the particular outcome of the whole 
assessment. The following two scenarios only serve as 
examples, since ‘real life cases’ are most likely more 
complex and demand for more subtle considerations.
6.2 Application
Imagine a scenario where states A (upstream), B 
(midstream) and C (downstream) share a transboundary 
river with an annual inflow of 100 km3.
     State A (population of 30 million) has a significant 
agricultural base, which supports its people, 50% who 
live below the poverty level and who depend upon 
subsistence farming. The average GDP is $50 per 
capita. The new President has just delivered a national 
Strategic Economic Reform Plan based on increasing 
significantly the irrigation across the country. The 
reform package is based on meeting the ‘vital human 
needs’ of the poverty-stricken population, many of 
whom do not have clean water or sanitation. State A 
contributes about 60 km3 to the flow of the river, and 
currently only uses 30 km3 for domestic uses, small 
industries and agriculture. While the return flow is quite 
considerable, the water is of diminished quality due 
to the high content of pesticides and nitrates resulting 
from heavy irrigation. Despite its agricultural base, State 
A is heavily reliant on food imports; which have proven 
to be a costly way of achieving food security. Just 
over 50 percent of the river basin is contained within 
the borders of state A. Under the reform package its 
demand for water will increase to 60 km3. 
     State B (population of 5 million; GDP of $150 
per capita) uses the water of the transboundary 
river primarily for domestic and some highly 
profitable agricultural uses. The country is home to 
a significant area of wetlands which is connected to 
the watercourse and provides important ecological 
services. It contributes 10 km3 to flow of the river, uses 
about 10 km3 and is in dire need of another 10 km3 to 
sustainably support its endangered wetlands.
     State C (population of 15 million; GDP of $400 
per capita) is heavily industrialised and is planning to 
increase its hydropower production to serve the surging 
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Scenario 1: 
The use(s) meet(s) the criteria of equitable 
and reasonable utilisation
In this case the state may continue its use of the water 
resources on a ‘business as usual’ basis. It will not 
be legally obliged to undertake any actions vis-à-vis 
the other watercourse states. However, even in this 
situation it is suggested for the states sharing the 
watercourse to aim for a certain degree of cooperation 
– e.g. through the regular exchange of data and 
information. Existing use may continue provided that 
the co-riparian states agree (explicitly or implicitly) 
with the underlying assumption that it constitutes an 
equitable and reasonable utilisation.
Scenario 2: 
The use(s) does (do) not meet the criteria 
of equitable and reasonable utilisation
If, like in the example at hand, the existing use of the 
water by the state in question is both ‘inequitable’ and 
in conflict with existing uses of co-riparians, the former 
is under a legal obligation to reduce its utilisation of the 
international watercourse. However, it has an option to 
enter into negotiations with the other states in order to 
come to an acceptable arrangement – e.g. payment 
of compensation for the use of water in excess of its 
equitable share. The refusal or unwillingness either 
to amend (i.e. reduce) the existing use or to enter 
into negotiations with a genuine view to achieve an 
equitable result may be interpreted as a breach of its 
international legal obligations.
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1.  Watercourse states shall, in utilising an 
international watercourse in their territories, take 
all appropriate measures to prevent the causing 
of significant harm to other watercourse states.
2.  Where significant harm nevertheless is caused 
to another watercourse state, the states whose 
use causes such harm shall, in the absence 
of agreement to such use, take all appropriate 
measures, having due regard for the provisions of 
Articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected 
state, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, 
where appropriate, to discuss the question of 
compensation.
7.1 Commentary
The obligation ‘not to cause significant harm’ also 
derives from the theory of limited territorial sovereignty. 
According to this principle, no states in an international 
watercourse are allowed to use the watercourses in 
their territory in such a way as to cause significant harm 
to other watercourse states or to their environment, 
including harm to human health or safety, to the use 
of the waters for beneficial purposes, or to the living 
organisms of the watercourse systems. This principle 
is widely recognised and incorporated not only in 
modern transboundary water agreements, but also in 
international environmental law. However, the question 
remains about the definition or extent of the word 
‘significant’ and how to define ‘harm’ as a ‘significant 
harm’. It is also important to note that, contrary to 
popular belief, in some cases ‘harm’ can be caused 
by a downstream state to its upstream riparian – i.e. 
by foreclosing the upstream state’s future water uses 
through the prior utilisation of such water.’219 
219 See SMA Salman, ‘Downstream Riparians Can Also Harm Upstream 
Riparians: The Concept of Foreclosure of Future Uses’ (2010) 35 Water International 
350.
Article 7 | Obligation Not 
to Cause Significant Harm
Convention text
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The evolution of the ‘no significant harm rule’
1938 Trail Smelter Case | ‘Good Neighbourliness’
[N]o state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the 
territory of another […] when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing 
evidence.
1972 Stockholm Convention | Principle 21
States have […] the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer | Article 2(1)
The parties shall take appropriate measures […] to protect human health and the environment against adverse effects 
resulting or likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer.
1992 Biodiversity Convention | Article 3
States have […] the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
1992 Rio Declaration | Principle 2
States have […] the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
1992 UNECE Helsinki Convention | Article 2(1)
The Parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, control and reduce any transboundary impact.
1997 UN Watercourses Convention | Article 7(1)
Watercourse states shall, in utilising an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent 
the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States.
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7.1.1 All appropriate measures
The prevention of significant harm is an obligation of 
conduct. Co-riparian states are under the obligation 
to take ‘all appropriate measures’ to ensure that 
activities conducted under their jurisdiction do not 
cause significant harm to the territory of other riparians. 
States must, for instance, provide prior notification 
and exchange information with regard to any 
planned measure that might significantly harm other 
transboundary watercourse states. This is in contrast 
to an obligation of result, where states have to reach a 
fixed goal – sometimes without specification on how to 
get there. 
     Taking ‘all appropriate measures,’ then, is an 
obligation of due diligence in utilisation: ‘a diligence 
proportioned to the magnitude of the subject and to the 
dignity and strength of the power which is exercising 
it [...] and such care as governments ordinarily employ 
in their domestic concerns’.220  The question which 
has to be answered here is one of duty of care: What 
would be expected of a reasonable government in 
similar circumstances – e.g. enacting necessary 
legislation; enforcing its laws; preventing or terminating 
an illegal activity; punishing the person responsible for 
it. Hence, a state can be deemed to have breached 
the obligation not to cause significant harm not only 
when it has intentionally or negligently caused the 
event itself, but also in case the state did not prevent 
others in its territory from causing it.221  Some examples 
of types of measures that should be in place include: 
establishing water rights; protecting water quality for 
human and ecosystem uses; setting up a participatory 
220 1994  Draft Articles, Art 7 at 103, para 4; referring to the The Geneva Arbitration 
(The Alabama Case) reported in Moore JB, History and Digest of the International 
Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party, Vol I (1898) at 572-573, 
612.
221 Ibid.
  
water management structure; establishing a legal 
system which is coherent at all levels (local, national, 
international); and setting up the institutional machinery 
needed to enforce these laws.222
222  See A Iza and R Stein (eds), Rule : Reforming Water Governance (IUCN 2009).
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7.1.2 Significant harm
The level of harm in order to qualify as ‘significant’ has 
to be higher than merely perceptible or trivial (which 
would be considered insignificant); but could be less 
than severe or substantial.223 What constitutes ‘harm’ 
has to be more than just an ‘adverse effect’ – a real 
impairment of a use, with a detrimental impact of some 
consequence upon the environment or the socio-
economic development of the harmed state (e.g. public 
health, industry, property, agriculture). Significant harm, 
then, has to be established by objective evidence and 
determined on a case by case basis.224
     Since the allocation approach of ‘limited territorial 
sovereignty’ serves as the framework for the two main 
substantive principles of present international water 
law – ‘equitable and reasonable utilisation’ (Article 5) 
and ‘significant (transboundary) harm’ (Article 7) – the 
relationship between these rules has been the cause 
of extensive debates and the question which takes 
precedent is probably the most crucial one in the 
application of both Articles 5 and 7. Downstream states 
tend to favour the no harm rule, as it protects their 
existing uses from adverse effects caused by upstream 
developments; while upstream states tend to favour 
the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation, 
as it allows for a broader use of the shared resource 
for developments that may impact co-riparians. 225 The 
UN Convention tries to avoid the potential difficulties 
between those two rules by affording the principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilisation priority (Article 5) 
while giving the no significant harm rule special status 
(Article 7 (1)). Pursuant to the Convention, and only 
in certain limited circumstances, taking measures to 
223  See, for example,  Art 1 of the 2000 SADC Revised Protocol on Shared 
Watercourses
224  Wouters and others, Sharing Transboundary Waters : An Integrated 
Assessment of Equitable Entitlement: The Legal Assessment Model at 56.
225  D Freestone and SMA Salman, ‘Ocean and Freshwater Resources’ in 
Bodansky D, Brunnée J and Hey E (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2007) at 351. 
prevent significant harm may be inappropriate, or lead 
to an inequitable result, and some level of harm may 
therefore be tolerated (Article 7 (2)). The reference to 
Articles 5 and 6 support the UN Convention, states 
are therefore not legally responsible for causing 
significant harm if they can show that they have taken 
all appropriate measures to prevent such harm, and 
their use of an international watercourse is equitable 
and reasonable. Thus, the scope for a state to cause 
significant harm becomes limited. See also Article 20 
with regard to the protection of ecosystems, and Article 
10 relating to vital human needs, where the principle of 
preventing significant harm to other watercourse states 
is further limited.
     The burden of proof for establishing that a particular 
use of an international watercourse is still equitable 
and reasonable lies with the state whose use of the 
watercourse is causing significant harm.226  According to 
the ILC, ‘[t]he plaintiff state starts with the presumptive 
rule in its favour that every state is bound to use the 
waters of rivers flowing within its territory in such a 
manner as will not cause substantial injury to a co-
riparian state. Having proved such substantial injury, 
the burden then will be upon the defendant state to 
establish an appropriate defence, except in those cases 
where damage results from extra-hazardous pollution 
and liability is strict. This burden falls on the defendant 
state by implication from its exclusive sovereign 
jurisdiction over waters flowing within its territory’.227
226  Ibid.
227  1994 Draft Articles, Art 7 at 104, para 14.
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7.2 Application
States A and B share a river forming the border 
between the two countries. While state A is 
considerably less economically developed than state 
B, the government of the former is pushing for new 
industrial projects along the river in order to catch up.
     State A does not intend to limit pollutant discharges 
into the river to the sophisticated extent state B has 
been doing for decades. State B is therefore concerned 
that the planned expansion of the industrial activity 
will significantly harm the international watercourse. 
Without applying ‘best available technologies’ (BATs), 
the ecosystem will suffer unnecessary harm and the 
tourism industry in state B, which depends on the 
watercourses flora and fauna, will incur heavy losses. 
Hence, state B claims that state A is not taking all 
appropriate measures to prevent the significant harm.
     Since state A still has to be considered a ‘developing 
country,’ state B cannot demand imposing the same 
level of environmental regulation on state A’s industry. 
However, instead of simply demanding payment of 
compensation, which would be possible according to 
Article 7(2), a more promising way forward here would 
be to enter into an agreement regarding sharing of 
information and technological know-how in order to 
achieve a coherent management of the river in the best 
possible way for both states.
Figure 2.4 | Significant Harm
(Source Authors)
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1.  Watercourse states shall cooperate on the 
basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, 
mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain 
optimal utilisation and adequate protection of an 
international watercourse.
2.  In determining the manner of such cooperation, 
watercourse states may consider the 
establishment of joint mechanisms or 
commissions, as deemed necessary by them, 
to facilitate cooperation on relevant measures 
and procedures in the light of experience gained 
through cooperation in existing joint mechanisms 
and commissions in various regions.
8.1 Commentary
8.1.1 General
International lawyers have been at odds over the 
issue of whether cooperation is indeed a binding legal 
obligation rather than a mere goal or a guideline for 
conduct. The questions arising are: Can one assert 
that states must (rather than should) cooperate; and 
can this obligation actually be imposed on states and 
legally enforced?228  This is why the precise status of 
the duty to cooperate under customary international 
law has been questioned. While it links the principle 
of ‘sovereignty over natural resources’ and the ‘no 
significant harm’ rule – due to the need in practice to 
achieve a ‘balance’ of the two –  and thus plays a vital 
role in international law, cooperation is too broad to 
qualify as a rule. It is, however, a logical extension of 
the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation; and 
most states have concluded that cooperating with their 
co-riparians is ultimately more in their self-interest than 
proceeding unilaterally.
     However, despite the general status of the duty to 
cooperate in international law, Article 8 of the UNWC 
presents cooperation as a legal obligation. Such a duty 
takes on meaning in specific contexts – e.g. working 
together with co-riparians to achieve an equitable 
allocation of the uses and benefits; entering into consul-
tations and negotiations in good faith.229  Failure to 
cooperate through the means set forth in the 
Convention could constitute an internationally 
wrongful act drawing the state’s responsibility as a 
legal consequence. The importance of cooperation 
with regard to the equitable and reasonable 
utilisation of international watercourses has been 
repeatedly stressed in various studies, conventions 
and agreements.230 
228 Wouters and others, Sharing Transboundary Waters : An Integrated 
Assessment of Equitable Entitlement: The Legal Assessment Model at 23.
229  See Part I, at 91-92.
230   See, e.g., 1944 USA-Mexico Water Treaty; 1964 Columbia Treaty between 
USA and Canada; 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (Articles VI–VIII); 1961 IDI Salzbug 
Resolution (Preamble); 1977 Mar del Plata Action Plan (Recommendation 90); 1979 
IDI 1982 ILA Montreal Rules on Water Pollution in an International Drainage Basin 
(Article 5); 1995 Mekong River basin agreement (Articles 24 and 30); 2000 Revised 
SADC Protocol; 2002 Framework Agreement of the Sava River basin (Articles 3 and 
4).
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8.1.3 Territorial integrity
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter requires all member states 
to ‘refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.’ 
While the Charter does not define what it actually means 
by ‘territorial integrity’, it is now well recognised and 
reflects the fundamental international objective in the 
stability of boundaries.232  In 1986, a chamber of the ICJ 
considered the principle as one of general international 
law.233  This view was confirmed by the ‘Badinter 
Commission’ regarding the former Yugoslav republics, 
stating that ‘whatever the circumstances, the right of 
self-determination must not involve changes to existing 
frontiers at the time of independence.’ 234
8.1.4 Mutual benefit
The principle of mutual benefit implies that cooperation 
should lead to ‘win-win’ outcomes whereby all 
states involved in cooperative activities gain from the 
interaction.  
232  A Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005) at 
41. 
233  Burkino Faso v Republic of Mali, ICJ Reports (1986), at 554; 80 ILR 459.
234  Opinion No. 2; ILM (1992) 1497; 92 ILR 167; referring to the internal boundaries 
of the former Republic of Yugoslavia.
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8.1.2 Sovereign equality
The Peace of Westphalia is generally regarded as 
the historical milestone paving the way for a new era 
of international relations based on the principles of 
sovereign independence and equality. This was made 
possible by the rise of the nation state in Europe which 
ultimately created a novel kind of society among equal 
(state) communities. 231 
     Sovereign equality is one of the tenets of the 
international legal order, since it has to be regarded 
as the cornerstone of the rights and duties of states. It 
consists of two basic premises: (1) Jurisdiction over a 
territory and a permanent population living there; and 
(2) Non-intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction 
of another state.
     From the concept of sovereign equality flows 
several other important principles (e.g. the right to 
independence and the ban on the use of force).  It 
should also be noted that sovereign equality – as 
a legal concept – does not guarantee political and 
economic equality, since international law operates in 
an environment that is influenced by hegemonic power. 
However, sovereign equality can be described as 
‘equality of chances’ of all states.
231  See J Kokott, ‘States, Sovereign Equality’ in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of 
Public International Law.
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8.1.5 The normative content 
of the duty to cooperate
The duty to cooperate contains the procedural duties 
of prior information and of prior consultation. It could be 
said that these procedural duties of cooperation seek 
to ‘operationalise’ Article 5 – 7 of the UN Watercourses 
Convention (equitable and reasonable utilisation and 
no significant harm).  Article 8(1) therefore provides the 
basis for many of the procedural rights and obligations 
contained primarily in parts III-VI of the UN Watercourse 
Convention.
8.1.6 Joint institutions
Article 8 (2) suggests that the employment of joint 
mechanisms and institutions among the states of 
an international watercourse offer an important 
mechanism by which to facilitate cooperation amongst 
states.235 Joint institutions are discussed further in 
part IV.236 
235  I Kaya, Equitable Utilization : The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses (Ashgate 2003) at 126.
236  Pages 164-200.
8.2 Application
See case study under Section 18.3.
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McIntyre O, ‘The Proceduralisation and Growing Maturity of 
International Water Law’ (2010) 22 Journal of Environmental 
Law 475.
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1.  Pursuant to Article 8, watercourse states shall 
on a regular basis exchange readily available 
data and information on the condition of the 
watercourse, in particular that of a hydrological, 
meteorological, hydrogeological and ecological 
nature and related to the water quality as well as 
related forecasts.
2.  If a watercourse state is requested by another 
watercourse state to provide data or information 
that is not readily available, it shall employ its 
best efforts to comply with the request but may 
condition its compliance upon payment by the 
requesting state of the reasonable costs of 
collecting and, where appropriate, processing 
such data or information.
3.  Watercourse states shall employ their best efforts 
to collect and, where appropriate, to process 
data and information in a manner which facilitates 
its utilisation by the other watercourse states to 
which it is communicated.
9.1 Commentary
The obligation to regularly exchange data and 
information directly flows from the general obligation 
to cooperate in Article 8 of the Convention. The 
need for information exchange on the conditions of a 
transboundary watercourse is obvious, since, in most 
cases, it constitutes the first step in the process of 
cooperation between co-riparians in general, and in the 
determination of the relevant factors and circumstances 
pursuant to Article 6.237  Thus, it is designed to ensure 
that all riparian states possess the facts necessary to 
enable them to utilise the transboundary watercourse 
in an equitable and reasonable manner. It is also 
necessary in order to enable co-riparians to take 
all appropriate actions for the fulfilment of the due 
diligence obligation not to cause significant harm (see 
Article 7). Furthermore, the collection and sharing of 
fundamental data is a precondition for the realisation 
of higher degrees of cooperation – especially where 
no joint body is in charge of this task. The obligation 
laid out here is also closely linked to Articles 11 
and 12 on information and notification concerning 
planned measures.
     In demanding a ‘regular’ exchange of data and 
information, this Article requires a continuous process 
following systematic procedures; which differs from the 
ad hoc provision of information concerning planned 
measures contained in Article 11 of the Convention.238  
The use of the term ‘readily available’ indicates that the 
legal obligation of a state is limited to the kind of data 
and information which is already at its disposal (e.g. has 
been collected for its own use) or is easily accessible.239  
Determining whether data is ‘readily available’ depends 
on evaluating the effort and cost its provision would 
entail taking into account the specific factors and 
circumstances of each case.
237  See above at 111
238  1994 ILC Draft Articles, Art 9 at 108, para 4.
239  See also the commentary to Article XXIX of the 1966 Helsinki Rules. 
Article 9 | Regular 
Exchange of Data 
and Information
| Article 9
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The data and information that have to be transmitted 
concern the ‘condition of the watercourse.’ The 
list of conditions in paragraph 1 – hydrological, 
meteorological, hydrogeological and ecological – is 
by no means exhaustive, as it rather serves as an 
illustration of potentially important kinds of data for 
achieving an equitable and reasonable utilisation.240  
Furthermore, data and information should not only 
relate to the current conditions, but could also include 
forecasts – e.g. changing weather patterns with long-
term effect on present uses. 
     Article 9 (2) determines that a state which has been 
asked to provide data or information which is not readily 
available has to employ its ‘best efforts to comply with 
the request’ – i.e. act in good faith and in the spirit of 
the general obligation to cooperate. This implies, for 
example, not stalling for time with the transmission of 
the information; and not to overwhelm the requesting 
state with data which is not linked to the request.
     While transboundary watercourse states are under 
no obligation to process the data and information 
they exchange, Article 9 (3) requires them to employ 
their best efforts to ‘facilitate[s] its utilisation by the 
other watercourse state’ – i.e. provide the data and 
information in a form which is usable for the receiving 
states.
240  1994  Draft Articles, Art 9 at 108, para 8.
9.2 Application
State A (upstream) and state B (downstream) share a 
transboundary river. Since they are in friendly relations 
with each other, both states have a long history of 
exchanging information regarding the management of 
the watercourse.
     In an attempt to upgrade its system of dams, state 
B is demanding more detailed data on the flow of 
the river. So far, state A has only shared this kind of 
data by the quarter. State B has secured a loan from 
a development bank to upgrade its system of dams. 
Due to requirements determined by its lenders, state B 
needs flow data on a monthly basis.
     State A argues that from its point of view the 
information currently shared is more than sufficient, as 
it satisfies the requirements for running its own dams. 
Furthermore, owing to financial constraints, it simply 
cannot increase the frequency of measures.
     In its reply state B acknowledges that the 
information it seeks is not readily available to A, but 
claims that, according to Article 9(2) of the UNWC, state 
A has to do its utmost to comply with the request of 
exchanging more detailed data.
     In the case at hand, the two states will have to come 
to an agreement where state B likely pays a reasonable 
amount of compensation for receiving the information 
requested, as state A will have to bear extra costs for 
the collection and processing of the data.
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Article 10 | Relationship 
Between Different Kinds
of Uses
  
1.  In the absence of agreement or custom to the 
contrary, no use of an international watercourse 
enjoys inherent priority over other uses.
2.  In the event of a conflict between uses of an 
international watercourse, it shall be resolved with 
reference to Articles 5 to 7, with special regard 
being given to the requirements of vital human 
needs.
10.1 Commentary
10.1.1 Vital human needs
Although, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, 
no use of an international watercourse has inherent 
priority over others, where a conflict over competing 
uses between riparians occurs, the terms of Articles 
5-7 are to be applied, with ‘special regard being 
given to the requirements of vital human needs.’ The 
fundamental question arising with regard to Article 10 
is: are minimum individual water requirements therefore 
protected under the Convention?
     The UN Watercourses Convention was the first 
water-related agreement introducing the term ‘vital 
human needs,’ which has been defined as ‘sufficient 
water to sustain human life, including both drinking 
water and water required for the production of food in 
order to prevent starvation.’  Thus, it seems reasonable 
to assume that what is intended by using the term 
‘vital human needs’ is to give special attention only 
to the most essential needs in order to prevent death 
from dehydration or starvation.241 This represents a 
much narrower approach than the 2002 General 
Comment on the Right to Water attached to the 1966 
UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which uses the term ‘personal and 
domestic uses’ comprising drinking water, personal 
sanitation, washing of cloths, food preparations, and 
personal and household hygiene.242
241  1994  Draft Articles, Art 10 at 110, para 4.
242   UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment 
No. 15, The Right to Water, International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ (29th Session, 26 Nov 2002) UN Doc E/C 12/2002/11. The General 
Comment is an interpretive statement adopted by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural rights, an independent body of experts, which monitors the 
implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. While general comments can therefore be described as ‘non-legally binding’, 
they may have significant influence in the interpretation of the provisions of existing 
legal agreements (see C Blake ‘Normative Instruments in International Human Rights 
Law: Locating the General Comment’, Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice 
Working Paper, 17 Nov 2008, available at <http://www.chrgj.org/publications/docs/
wp/blake.pdf>, accessed 30 April 2012.
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By using the term ‘special regard’ in Article 10 (2) it has 
to be presumed that water to meet vital human needs 
will almost certainly take precedence over other uses. 
While a contrary argument seems highly unlikely, the 
issue of quantifying the actual amount of water required 
per person per day is still contested and figures range 
between 50 and 100 litres per person per day as 
a minimum threshold for drinking water, sanitation and/
or hygiene.243
     The comparison with Article 14 of the 2004 ILA 
Berlin Rules is worthy of note. In the latter instrument 
the priority for vital human needs has been determined
much stronger, as states, in determining an equitable 
and reasonable use, are under an obligation to ‘first 
allocate waters to satisfy vital human needs.’244  This 
wording leaves much less room for debate than the 
UN Watercourses Convention. However, in any case it 
will be difficult to see how some uses will be deemed 
‘equitable’ if they impede the satisfaction of vital human 
needs. Possibly the only scenario where vital human 
needs may not take precedence within a particular 
watercourse is where it could be argued that those 
vital human needs could be satisfied by alternative 
supplies of water. Pursuant to the need to account for 
‘the availability of alternative’ under Article 6 of the UN 
Watercourses Convention, a scenario may therefore 
exist where a state could satisfy vital human needs 
from a domestic water source, which was in close 
proximity to the international watercourse in question.
243  Gleick suggests 50 l/p/d; Falkenmark and Widstrand 100 l/p/d. See M 
Falkenmark and C Widstrand, ‘Population and Water Resources: A Delicate 
Balance’ (1992) 47 Population Bulletin 1; PH Gleick, ‘Basic Water Requirements for 
Human Activities : Meeting Basic Needs’ (1996) 21 Water International 83.
244  Art 14 (1) of the 2004 ILA Berlin Rules.  
10.1.2 The human right to water
There are a number of global instruments related to 
human rights, including the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights;245  the 1966 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights;246  the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR);247 the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women;248  and the 
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child; 249  There 
are also regional human rights instruments which 
contain similar provisions. With regard to freshwater, 
two provisions of the ICESCR (Article 11 on the right 
to an adequate standard of living and Article 12 on the 
right to the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health) are the most relevant – recognising the 
right to water ‘implicitly’; there are explicit references to 
water in Article 14 of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the 
Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
245  UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 
1948, 217 A (III), available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.
html>,accessed 30 April 2012.
246  UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 
December 1966 (entered into force 23 March 1976) UNTS Vol 999, at 171, available 
at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm> accessed 30 April 2012.
247  UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 16 December 1966 (entered into force 3 January 1976) UNTS Vol 993, at 3, 
available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36c0.html> accessed 30 
April 2012. 
248  UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, 18 December 1979 (entered into force 3 September 
1981), available at <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.
htm#intro> accessed 30 April 2012.
249  UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 
1989 (entered into force 2 September 1990), available at <http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/law/crc.htm> accessed 30 April 2012.
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In 2002, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights adopted the General Comment on the 
Right to Water in order to provide greater interpretative 
clarity as to the intent, meaning and content of the 
Covenant.250  According to the General Comment the 
right to water ‘entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, 
acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water 
for personal and domestic uses. 
     An adequate amount of safe water is necessary to 
prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of 
water-related disease and to provide for consumption, 
cooking, personal and domestic hygienic 
requirements.’ 251 What is envisaged in the definition 
contained in the General Comment is arguably 
much broader than the interpretation of ‘vital human 
needs’ under Article 10 of the UN Watercourses 
Convention. This therefore begs the question whether 
the entitlement to water under the General Comment 
takes precedence in the context of international 
watercourses.  Or in other words, is sufficient, safe, 
acceptable, physically accessible and affordable 
water for personal and domestic uses always afforded 
priority when determining what is equitable and 
reasonable?  In this regard, the General Comment 
observes that ‘international cooperation requires states 
parties to refrain from actions that interfere with the 
enjoyment of the right to water in other countries’.252  
Additionally the General Comment explains that, 
‘any activities undertaken within the state party’s 
jurisdiction should not deprive another country of 
the ability to realise the right to water for persons in 
250  CESCR, General Comment No. 15, 2002, para 2, available at <http://www.
unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/a5458d1d1bbd713fc1256cc400389e94?Opendocument> 
accessed 30 April 2012. 
251 Ibid.
252 Ibid, para 31.  
its jurisdiction’.253  Regardless of the nuances here, it 
would appear consistent with the principle of equitable 
and reasonable utilisation under Article 5 of the UN 
Watercourses Convention that water for personal and 
domestic uses takes priority over other uses, unless it 
can be argued that these needs can be satisfied from 
an alternative water source.
     The legal recognition of a human right to water 
must be distinguished from the global effort to promote 
this recognition and develop the definition of the right 
to water under international law. This is due to the 
fact that no legal obligations derive from a political 
acknowledgement like, for instance, UN General 
Assembly resolutions. However, their resulting political 
pressure should not be underestimated. In 2006, a first 
step was taken in this process by the former United 
Nations Sub-commission on Human Rights, whose 
guidelines led to the United Nations Human Rights 
Council establishing an independent expert on the 
issue.254   Eventually, 122 states formally acknowledged 
the ‘right to water’ in the UN General Assembly on 
28 July 2010.255  In September of the same year, the 
UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution 
which recognises the human right to water and 
sanitation as being part of the right to an adequate 
standard of living.256
253  Ibid, para 57.
254  UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Sub-
commission guidelines on the realisation of the right to drinking water and sanitation, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur El Hadji Guissé, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/25, 
2006, available at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/water/docs/SUb_Com_
Guisse_guidelines.pdf> accessed 30 April 2012.
255  UNGA resolution (Ref. A/64/L.63/Rev.1) available at <http://ods-dds-ny.
un.org>, accessed 30 April 2012.
256  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
‘UN united to make the right to water and sanitation legally binding’ (1 October 
2010) available at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=10403&LangID=E> accessed 30 April 2012.
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10.2 Application
10.2.1 Unsustainable scenario
State A (upstream) and state B (downstream) share 
an international watercourse which is heavily polluted 
due to the exploitation of the water resources for the 
industrial needs of both countries. In a push to achieve 
food self-sufficiency, state A is planning to extract 
a considerable amount of the (less polluted) river’s 
headwater for agricultural use outside the basin.
     State B immediately complains about the planned 
withdrawal and water transfer, arguing that this will 
cause increased pollution of the river, leading to a 
complete collapse of the river system. This in turn 
would make the little remaining biodiversity along the 
watercourse disappear. State A argues that all uses 
have to be regarded as equal – and that the already 
highly modified river is only good enough for economic 
exploitation. The maintenance of environmental 
services would be too costly, since both states have 
chosen the path of maximising the economic benefit 
of the river.
     While state A is right in arguing that according to 
the Convention no use enjoys inherent priority, the 
sustainability of a watercourse will always be protected. 
The tipping point where the river’s ecosystem will be 
irreversibly destroyed has to be avoided at all costs. 
Rather than focusing on short term benefits states A 
and B have to think about how to collaborate in order 
to manage the watercourse more sustainably - i.e. 
imposing higher environmental standards on their 
industries utilising the river’s water. See also Part IV 
of the Convention – Protection, Preservation 
and Management.
10.2.2 Protection vital human needs 
scenario
State A (upstream) wishes to develop its hydropower 
potential by constructing a series of dams in the 
upper reaches of an international river it shares with 
its downstream neighbour, state B. Out of all the 
dam sites along the course of the river, the proposed 
sites in the upper reaches of state A are considered 
the most efficient and effective for maximising the 
benefits of hydropower while minimising the impact.
State B claims that such uses are inequitable as a 
number of downstream communities will be affected 
by the change in use of the river. These communities 
rely on the river for their basic human needs, 
including drinking water and significant fisheries. 
However, the communities in State B have alternative 
sources of domestic groundwater that are situated 
exclusively within the territory of State B and are easily 
accessible. In such a scenario it might be argued 
that the development of hydropower in state A takes 
precedence as the vital human needs can be satisfied 
from an alternative source.
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Key points
•	 The	procedural	requirements	of	this	section	are	of	
particular importance with regard to the effective 
implementation of the substantive requirements of 
the Convention, and Articles 5 – 7 in particular.
•	 Each	riparian	state	to	an	international	
watercourse  is entitled to prior notification, 
consultation and (in some cases) negotiation 
where the proposed use by a co-riparian may 
cause serious harm to its rights or interest.
•	 Many	of	the	rights	and	obligations	stated	in	this	
section can be considered as a manifestation 
of the general right to cooperate (see Article 
8) with regard to planned measures affecting 
international watercourses.
•	 While	some	of	these	principles	are	generally	
accepted as customary international law, their 
interpretation as to when and how exactly to 
notify is often the centre of the debate in a 
dispute. 
•	 The	exchange	of	information	and	data	on	all	
affairs relating to an international watercourse is 
essential for solid planning of the development 
of any area of the basin; knowing all the relevant 
facts; and also learning about any planned 
measures which may affect them as early as 
possible.
•	 The	following	procedural	rules	foster,	and	in	some	
cases even kick-start, cooperation between 
states; since the notifying state often benefits as 
much as the notified state from the exchange of 
data and information.
•	 The	legal	effect	of	a	breach	of	the	duty	to	notify	
can be deduced from general principles of 
international law, e.g. a state might be liable 
under the principles of international tort law for 
the damage caused to co-riparians by its failure 
to transmit relevant data and information.
•	 Failure	to	inform	the	other	watercourse	state(s)	of	
planned measures presents a factor to be taken 
into account in future debates about the rights of 
co-basin states under the principle of equitable 
and reasonable utilisation.
Part III | Planned 
Measures (Articles 11-19)
| Article 11
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Watercourse states shall exchange information and 
consult each other and, if necessary, negotiate on the 
possible effects of planned measures on the condition 
of an international watercourse.
Article 11 |
Information Concerning 
Planned Measures
11.1 Commentary
Article 11 of the UN Watercourses Convention serves 
as a bridge to the more general substantive norms, 
such as those rights and obligations described above in 
Part II, and the procedural aspects of Part III which deal 
with the provision of information and the consultation 
process regarding planned measures. Part III 
postulates a general obligation of watercourse states to 
provide their co-riparians with information concerning 
the possible effects that planned measures might 
have on the condition of an international watercourse. 
Furthermore, the article requires watercourse states to 
consult with each other, and if necessary to negotiate, 
on the effects of such measures. 
     The general rule of prior notification has reached 
the status of a customary international legal obligation; 
being applicable regardless of whether a special 
agreement between the initiating and the potentially 
affected states exists.257  This explains the use of 
the word ‘shall’ – being mandatory – rather than 
following the mere recommendatory approach of the 
1966 Helsinki Rules.258  However, it should be noted 
that, subject to compliance with the procedural and 
substantive obligations of the Convention, states do not 
necessarily have a veto right over the development of 
an international watercourse.259 
257  Wouters and others, Sharing Transboundary Waters : An Integrated 
Assessment of Equitable Entitlement: The Legal Assessment Model at 24.
258 Article XXIX (1) of the 1966 Helsinki Rules: ‘With a view to preventing disputes 
from arising between basin States as to their legal rights or other interests, it is 
recommended that each basin State furnish relevant and reasonably available 
information to the other basin states concerning the waters of a drainage basin 
within its territory and its use of, and activities with respect to such waters.’
259  S Vinogradov, P Wouters and P Jones, Transforming Potential Conflict into 
Cooperation Potential: The Role of International Water Law (UNESCO 2003) at 19.
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11.1.1 Possible effects
According to the commentary to the 1994 ILC Draft 
Articles, the expression ‘possible effects’ comprises all 
potential effects of planned measures – both positive 
and negative.260  Hence, Article 11 goes further than the 
subsequent articles of Part III, which concern planned 
measures that may have a ‘significant adverse effect’ 
upon other watercourse states. Here, the more general 
wording takes into account that watercourse states 
have an interest in being informed of both potential 
adverse or beneficial effects of planned measures; 
leading to a reduction of risks and an increased 
planning security for the whole basin. Moreover, the 
requirement for the exchange of information and 
consultation with regard to all possible effects avoids 
the issues involved in the unilateral assessment of 
the actual nature of the potential impacts. This 
approach has been followed by other international 
legal instruments, e.g. Article 7 of the 1933 Declaration 
of Montevideo.261 
260  1994 Draft Articles, Art 11 at 111, para 3.
261  Declaration of the Seventh Pan-American Conference on the Industrial and 
Agricultural Use of International Rivers adopted at Montevideo, 24 December 1933, 
in (1934) 28 American Journal of International Law, supplement at 59-60.
 
11.1.2 Planned measures
The term ‘measures’ has to be interpreted rather 
broadly and includes any new (major or minor) projects 
or programmes, as well as changes in existing uses of 
an international watercourse.262  Such measures might 
therefore include hydropower developments, river 
regulation, deforestation adjacent to an international 
watercourse, establishment of industrial plants likely to 
affect the quality or quantity of a river, and so forth.
262  1994  Draft Articles, Art 11 at 111, para 4.
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11.1.3 The necessity to negotiate
In cases where the notification confirms the existence 
of a conflict of interest(s) between the riparian countries, 
or if a state potentially affected by a planned measure 
files a request, consultation and negotiation are 
consequential (See Articles 17 and 33).
     It has to be remembered, though, that international 
law does not require reaching an agreement between 
the parties regarding a planned measure. However, the 
negotiation process demands that all interests which 
may be affected by the measure have to be considered 
by the parties, even if they do not constitute a legal 
right. This follows the rules of ‘good faith,’ demanding 
the planning state to seek to give all the interests in play 
‘every satisfaction compatible with the pursuit of its 
own interests and to show that it has, in this matter, a 
real desire to reconcile the interests of the other riparian 
with its own.’263 
263 Paragraph 22(3) of the Lac Lanoux Award; see Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France 
v Spain), 1957, 24 International Law Reports 101 (1957).
11.2 Application
States A (upstream), B (midstream) and C (downstream) 
share a transboundary watercourse which is prone to 
flooding. In recent years, the socio-economic damage 
caused by the floods has increased dramatically – 
mainly due to the swelling of the urban areas close to 
the river banks. While both states B and C experience 
these large scale natural disasters, state B is being hit 
the hardest, since its population is growing much faster.
     After trying to minimise the flood risk by means of 
planting vegetation to retain water and the construction 
of smaller floodways, state B decides to construct a 
reservoir which can hold the extra water during times of 
flooding. In addition, the dam is supposed to produce 
hydropower to quench the ever-growing thirst for 
energy in state B.
     State C has only learned about the planned project 
from the media, and now claims state B should have 
provided information regarding the dam and entered 
into consultation with states A and C according to Art 
11 of the UNWC. State B rejects the claim, stating that 
the dam will not have any impact on state A; and would 
only positively affect state C, since it drastically reduces 
the risk of damages from floods for both countries by 
storing water in the rainy season while it also increases 
the flow in the dry period.
     In this case, the line of argument of state B does 
not hold. While it is true that the planned measure 
will (almost certainly) only have positive impacts for 
the downstream state C, state B still has to exchange 
information with the other watercourse states. This is 
due to the fact that Article 11 has been drafted as a 
general obligation which comes into play even if the 
effects are solely beneficial. The idea is to provide for 
basin wide risk reduction and planning security.
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11.3 Additional reading
1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses, 17 March 1992 (entered into 
force 6 October 1996) Arts 9-19.
2000 SADC Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourse 
Systems, Aug. 7, 2000, Arts 4, 5.
2004 ILA Berlin Rules on Water Resources, Chapter XI.
Bourne CB, ‘Procedure in the Development of International 
Drainage Basins: Notice and Exchange of Information’ in 
Wouters P (ed), International Water Law: Selected Writings of 
Professor Charles B Bourne (Kluwer Law International 1997).
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International 
Rivers (including commentaries), International Law 
Association, adopted at 52nd Conference, Helsinki, 1966, Art 
XXIX.
Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v Spain) (16 November 1957) 
24 International Law Reports 101 (1957).
Projects on International Waterways, World Bank Operational 
Manual OP 7.5, June 2001.
Projects on International Waterways, World Bank Operational 
Manual BP 7.5, June 2001.
Vinogradov S, Wouters P and Jones P, Transforming Potential 
Conflict into Cooperation Potential: The Role of International 
Water Law (UNESCO 2003) at 54-61.
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Article 12 | Notification 
Concerning Planned 
Measures with Possible 
Adverse Effects
Before a watercourse state implements or permits 
the implementation of planned measures which 
may have a significant adverse effect upon other 
watercourse states, it shall provide those states with 
timely notification thereof. Such notification shall 
be accompanied by available technical data and 
information, including the results of any environmental 
impact assessment, in order to enable the notified 
states to evaluate the possible effects of the planned 
measures.
12.1 Commentary
The requirement of notifying on planned measures is 
embodied in numerous international agreements,264  
declarations and resolutions,265   decisions of courts 
and tribunals,266  and studies by intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organisations. The widespread 
support of the principle reveals the importance that 
states and expert institutions attach to the issues of 
prior notification on planned measures.
264  Examples of treaties include: Art XI of the Additional Act of 26 May 1866 to the 
Boundary Treaties of 2 December 1856, 14 April 1862 and 26 May 1866 (ratified 
on 12 July 1866) reprinted in 24 International Law Reports (1961) 102-105; Art 4 of 
the Convention of 25 May 1954 between Yugoslavia and Austria concerning water 
economy questions relating to the Drava (entered into force on 15 January 1955) 
UNTS, vol. 227, p. 111; Art VII (2) of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty; Art XXIX of the 
1966 ILA Helsinki Rules; Art 4 of the 1972 Convention relating to the status of the 
Senegal River; Arts 7-12 of the 1975 Statute of the Uruguay River, reprinted in Actos 
Internacionales, Uruguay-Argentina, 1830-1980 (1981) at 593.
265  See, for example, Recommendation 51 of the Action Plan for the Human 
Environment adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
in 1972: “Nations agree that when major water resource activities are contemplated 
that may have a significant environmental effect on another country, the other 
country should be notified well in advance of the activity envisaged.” Reprinted in 
United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 and corrigendum, part one, chap. 
II.B; Declaration of Montevideo, adopted by the Seventh International Conference 
of American States, First Supplement 1933-1940 (1940) at 109; Recommendation 
C(74)224 adopted by the Council of OECD on 14 November 1974 (OECD, OECD 
and the Environment (Paris, 1986)), p. 142; Report of the United Nations Water 
Conference, Mar del Plata, 14-25 March 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.77.II.A.12), part one, chap. I., pp. 51-52, especially Recommendation 86 
(g); Principles 6, 7 of the Draft principles of conduct in the field of the environment 
for the guidance of States in the conservation and harmonious utilisation of natural 
resources shared by two or more states (adopted by the Governing Council of UNEP 
in 1978) available at <http://www.unep.org/training/programmes/Instructor%20
Version/Part_2/Activities/Interest_Groups/Decision-Making/Supplemental/Enviro_
Law_Guidelines_Principles_rev2.pdf> accessed 30 April 2012.
266 See 1957 Lac Lanoux Arbitration; 1997 Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Case; 2010 
Pulp Mills Case.
Convention text
140
12.1.1 Significant adverse effect
Article 12 of the UN Watercourses Convention is the 
first in a series of articles on planned measures which 
may have a significant adverse effect upon other 
watercourse states. The threshold which triggers 
this procedural framework provided for in Articles 
12 to 19(see Figure 3.1) – the possibility of having a 
‘significant adverse effect’ upon other watercourse 
states – is lower than that of ‘significant harm’ laid out 
in Article 7. The reason for setting a lower standard 
than the one of ‘significant harm’ was to avoid the 
situation where a notifying watercourse state would 
automatically be put in the position of admitting that 
a planned measure may cause significant harm to its 
co-riparians.
12.1.2 Implements or permits 
the implementation
The choice of the expression ‘implements or permits 
the implementation,’ clarifies that Article 12 covers 
both measures planned by the state and by private 
entities.267  ‘Permit’ has to be defined rather broadly – 
encompassing allowances and authorisations. Hence, 
when a private entity is planning a measure, the 
watercourse state where the measure is to be carried 
out is under an obligation to withhold authorisation 
before notifying its co-riparians.268  The same 
interpretation has to be applied in subsequent articles 
regarding the ‘implementation’ of planned measures.269 
267  1994 Draft Articles, Art 12 at 111, para 3.
268  Ibid.
269  See Arts 15 (2); 16 (1); and 19 (1).
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12.1.3 Timely
The requirement of ‘timely’ notification is intended 
to allow for a thorough evaluation of the possible 
effects by the co-riparian states at an early stage in 
the planning process; and thus provide the basis for 
meaningful consultations and negotiations in case 
they are deemed necessary (see Article 17). This view 
has recently been shared by the ICJ in the Pulp Mills 
Case, where the Court stated in its judgement that 
notification should have taken place at a very early 
stage prior to the authorisation of the project on the 
Uruguay River.270  Arguing in line with the due diligence 
requirements of the obligation not to cause significant 
(transboundary) harm, the Court rejected Uruguay’s 
reasoning that ‘the requirement to inform […] cannot 
occur in the very early stages of planning, because 
there would not be sufficient information available to 
the Commission for it to determine whether or not 
the plan might cause significant damage to the other 
state’ and also denied that the point in time when the 
required information would be available ‘may even 
be after the state concerned has granted an initial 
environmental authorisation’.271 In its judgement the 
ICJ also distinguished between the duty to inform 
and a subsequent (and more extensive) duty to notify 
– as required by the treaty relevant in the case 272 – 
and concluded that Uruguay had to ‘inform CARU 
[Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay] as 
soon as it is in possession of a plan which is sufficiently 
developed to enable CARU to make the preliminary 
assessment’, even though ‘the information provided 
will not necessarily consist of a full assessment of the 
environmental impact of the project’.273 
270  Pulp Mills Case Judgement, para 99.
271  Ibid para 100.
272  Ibid para 104.
273  Ibid para 105 referring to Art 7 of the 1975 Statute. 
12.1.4 Available technical 
data and information
The reference to ‘available’ technical data and 
information indicates that the state planning a measure 
is under no general obligation to conduct additional 
research at the request of a potentially affected 
watercourse state. It has to provide only the relevant 
data and information which has been gathered 
with regard to the planned measures and is readily 
accessible (see also Article 9 – Regular exchange 
of data and information). In case a state which has 
been notified requests data or information that is not 
readily available, but is accessible only to the notifying 
state, it is deemed appropriate for the former to cover 
the expenses incurred in producing the additional 
material.274  However, as laid out in Article 31, the 
notifying state is not required to submit any data 
or information which is vital to its national defence 
or security.
274 1994 Draft Articles, Art 12 at 112, para 5.    
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12.1.5 Environmental impact assessment
Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is an 
important element of the planning process by which 
environmental considerations are integrated into 
decision-making procedures for measures that may 
have adverse (environmental) effects.275  The overall 
aim of an EIA is to provide a basis by which to come 
to an informed decision through a thorough analysis 
of anticipated environmental impacts – revealing the 
main risks of the project and providing pathways 
for modifications of the plan to mitigate adverse 
(environmental) effects. The development of an EIA 
has been encouraged or demanded by various 
international instruments.276  While the UN Watercourses 
Convention does not directly require the planning 
state to carry out an EIA, it nevertheless suggests 
that if a state which might be affected by the planned 
measure asks the planning state to provide an EIA, 
the latter would have to comply with this request if 
the former bears the costs.277  Additionally, it could 
be maintained that the assessment and evaluation of 
possible environmental impacts of a new project on a 
transboundary watercourse is an inherent prerequisite 
for complying with the customary obligation not to 
cause significant transboundary harm278 (see Article 7). 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) supports this 
view in its judgement of the Pulp Mills Case by linking 
the interstate notification of planned measures to the 
satisfaction of the due diligence obligation to prevent 
275  DA Wirth, ‘Hazardous Substances and Activities’ in Bodansky D, Brunnée J 
and Hey E (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford 
University Press 2007) at 420.  
276  See, for example, 1991 UNECE Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention); Article 8 of the 1997 
IAEA Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety 
of Radioactive Waste Management available at <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc546.pdf> accessed 30 April 2012.
277  FX Perrez, Cooperative Sovereignty : From Independence to Interdependence 
in the Structure of International Environmental Law (Kluwer Law International 2000) 
at 308.
278  See O McIntyre, ‘The World Court’s Ongoing Contribution to International 
Water Law: The Pulp Mills Case between Argentina and Uruguay’ (2011) 4 Water 
Alternatives 124.
significant transboundary harm.  It established that 
EIA ‘may now be considered a requirement under 
general international law’ with regard to activities 
which ‘may have a significant adverse impact in a 
transboundary context.279’  The importance here is 
the argument of the court that the duty to notify, linked 
with the duty to conduct an EIA, exists in customary 
international law. Hence, it applies to all states – 
irrespective of the existence of such obligations in the 
relevant transboundary water agreements.280  However, 
due to the fact that this obligation is rather open and 
imprecise, it leaves considerable room for debate as 
to which elements to include in an EIA.281  An example 
of an international agreement which provides further 
information can be seen in the UNECE Convention 
on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context.282 
279  Pulp Mills Case Judgement, para 204.
280  McIntyre, ‘The World Court’s Ongoing Contribution to International Water Law: 
The Pulp Mills Case between Argentina and Uruguay’ at 124.  
281  Perrez, Cooperative Sovereignty : From Independence to Interdependence in 
the Structure of International Environmental Law at 309.
282  Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 
(adopted 25 February 1991, entered into force 10 September 1997), available at 
<http://www.unece.org/env/eia/eia.html> accessed 30 April 2012.
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12.2 Additional reading
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, in Report of the International 
Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 
UNGAOR, 49th Sess, Supp (No. 10), UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) 
Art 12 at 111-113.
McCaffrey SC, The Law of International Watercourses (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2007).
McIntyre O, ‘The World Court’s Ongoing Contribution to 
International Water Law: The Pulp Mills Case between 
Argentina and Uruguay’ (2011) 4 Water Alternatives 124.
Rieu-Clarke A and Gooch G, ‘Governing the Tributaries of the 
Mekong: The Contribution of International Law and Institutions 
to Enhancing Equitable Cooperation over the Sesan’ (2010) 
22 Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law 
Journal 193.
Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing 
(Kluwer Law International 2001).
Third Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, by Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, 
Special Rapporteur, in the Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1987, Vol II (Part 1) 15-46, document A/CN.4/406 
and Corr.1 and Add.1 & 2.
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13.1 Commentary
The provisions of the previous Article on notification 
have two effects. Firstly, the period for reply to the 
notification starts to run (this Article); secondly, it 
imposes obligations specified under Article 14 on the 
notifying state.
     Subparagraph (a) of Article 13 provides the notified 
state(s) with a period of six months for the study 
and evaluation of the possible effects of the planned 
measures. Its subparagraph (b) recognises that specific 
circumstances may cause the notified state to require 
additional time to reply. A state which has been notified 
and then seeks such an extension must cite the 
‘special difficulty’ by which to justify the request.
     During the period for reply to notification, Article 
14 requires that the notifying state, inter alia, does 
not proceed with the implementation of its plans 
without the consent of the notified state. In any event, 
paragraph 1 of Article 15 requires the notified state to 
reply as early as possible, on the basis of good faith, 
and in the interest of the notifying state proceeding with 
its plans. Of course, the notified state may reply after 
the stipulated period has elapsed, but such a reply 
could not operate to prevent the notifying state from 
proceeding with the implementation of its plans, in view 
of the provisions of Article 16. The latter article allows 
the notifying state to proceed to implementation if it 
receives no reply within the six month period.
     In drafting the UN Watercourses Convention, the 
ILC considered the option of using a general standard 
for the determination of the time given for the reply, 
such as ‘a reasonable period of time’ or ‘timely’ (see, 
for example, Article 12) rather than the fixed period.283  
However, the ILC came to the conclusion that the 
six month period would ultimately be in the interests 
283  1994 Draft Articles at 114, Article 13, para 3; see also Art 8 of the 1975 Statute 
of the Uruguay River (Actos Internacionales, Uruguay-Argentina, 1830-1980 (1981) 
593; stipulating a six month period.
Article 13 | Period for 
Reply to Notification
Unless otherwise agreed:
(a)  A watercourse state providing a notification under 
Article 12 shall allow the notified states a period 
of six months within which to study and evaluate 
the possible effects of the planned measures and 
to communicate the findings to it;
(b)  This period shall, at the request of a notified state 
for which the evaluation of the planned measures 
poses special difficulty, be extended for a period 
of six months.
| Article 13
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of both the state planning the measure and its co-
riparian(s). While a general standard would obviously 
be more flexible and allow for adaptation in different 
situations, its intrinsic uncertainty could lead to add-
itional debates between the watercourse states.284 
In acknowledging the need for watercourse states 
to agree upon a period of time that is appropriate to 
the respective case, the opening clause of Article 13 
– ‘unless otherwise agreed’ – intends to encourage 
states to agree upon an appropriate period themselves 
in cases where a six month period is deemed 
unfeasible. Hence, the initial period for reply as well as 
the possible extension only applies in the absence of 
a specific agreement between the states concerned 
dealing with this matter.
284  1994 Draft Articles at 114, Article 13, para 3.
13.2 Additional reading
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, in Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 
UNGAOR, 49th Sess, Supp (No. 10), UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) 
Art 13 at 113-114.
McCaffrey SC, The Law of International Watercourses (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2007).
Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing 
(Kluwer Law International 2001).
Third Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, by Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, 
Special Rapporteur, in the Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1987, Vol II (Part 1) 15-46, document A/CN.4/406 
and Corr.1 and Add.1 & 2.
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Article 14 | Obligations of 
the Notifying State During 
the Period for Reply
During the period referred to in Article 13, the notifying 
state:
(a)  Shall cooperate with the notified states by 
providing them, on request, with any additional 
data and information that is available and 
necessary for an accurate evaluation; and
(b)  Shall not implement or permit the implementation 
of the planned measures without the consent of 
the notified states.
14.1 Commentary
Article 14 deals with the obligations of the notifying 
state during the period for reply (see 13). These 
are twofold: (1) an obligation of cooperation, which 
includes a duty to provide the notified states (at their 
request) ‘with any additional data and information that 
is available and necessary for an accurate evaluation’ 
of the possible impacts of the planned measures; and 
(2) that at least during the period of notification and 
consultation set out in Article 13, there is an obligation 
not to ‘implement or permit the implementation of the 
planned measures without the consent of the notified 
states.’ The obvious reason for the second obligation 
imposed by Article 14 is to help with the compliance 
of the general principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilisation. If the notifying state was to proceed with 
the planned project before the notified state has 
an opportunity to assess the potential impacts of 
the measures (and informs the notifying state of its 
findings), the notifying state would most certainly not be 
in a position - due to a lack of sufficient information - to 
determine whether it was in compliance with Articles 5 
to 7.285 For the interpretation of the terms ‘available’ and 
‘implement or permit the implementation’ see sections 
12.1.4 and 12.1.2 respectively.
285  Ibid.
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14.2 Additional reading
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, in Report of the International 
Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 
UNGAOR, 49th Sess, Supp (No. 10), UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) 
Art 14 at 114.
McCaffrey SC, The Law of International Watercourses (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2007).
Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing 
(Kluwer Law International 2001).
Third Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, by Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, 
Special Rapporteur, in the Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1987, Vol II (Part 1) 15-46, document A/CN.4/406 
and Corr.1 and Add.1 & 2. 
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15.1 Commentary
Article 15 deals with the obligations of the notified 
state(s) regarding their response to a notification of 
planned measures (see Article 12). Notified states are 
accordingly obliged to communicate their findings 
concerning possible effects of the planned measures 
to the latter ‘as early as possible’ – within the period 
provided for in Article 13. The requirement to inform 
the notifying state immediately of their findings can be 
considered as an extension of the principle of good 
faith (see Glossary of Terms) since it tries to, firstly, 
avoid any unnecessary delay of the project in case 
the findings conclude that the planned measures are 
consistent with Articles 5 and 7. Secondly, it provides 
a trigger for the consultation and negotiation process 
(see Article 17) as soon as possible, in case the findings 
suggest non-compliance with the principle of equitable 
and reasonable utilisation.
     In case a notified state ‘finds that implementation 
of the planned measures would be inconsistent with 
the provisions of Articles 5 or 7’, it has to provide a 
‘documented explanation’ of its reasoning. Hence, it 
must support its reply with an indication of the factual 
or other bases of its findings and clearly lay out the 
reasons for its conclusion that the implementation of 
the planned measures would constitute a violation of 
Articles 5 or 7. The 1975 Statute of the Uruguay River 
provides a similar requirement by stating that the 
communication of the notified party ‘shall state which 
aspects of the works or of the mode of operation may 
cause appreciable harm to […] the regime of the river or 
the quality of its waters, the technical grounds for that 
conclusion and suggested changes in the project or the 
mode of operation’.286
286  Art 11 of the 1975 Statute of the Uruguay River.
Article 15 | Reply 
to Notification
The notified states shall communicate their findings to 
the notifying state as early as possible within the period 
applicable pursuant to Article 13. If a notified state finds 
that implementation of the planned measures would be 
inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 5 or 7, it shall 
attach to its finding a documented explanation setting 
forth the reasons for the finding.
| Article 15
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The term ‘would,’ rather than ‘might,’ was used to 
indicate that the notified state must conclude that a 
violation of the principle of equitable and reasonable 
use (Articles 5 to 7) is more than just a mere 
possibility.287  This rather strict obligation is due to the 
fact that a communication of the kind described here 
permits a notified state to request further suspension 
of the implementation of the planned measures in 
question (see Article 17 (3)). The strong effect of the 
communication, in combination with the principle 
of good faith, justifies the requirement that the 
notified state has to demonstrate its comprehensive 
assessment of the possible impacts of the planned 
measures.  As noted in section 12.1.2, the term 
‘implementation’ applies to measures288 planned by 
both private parties and the state itself.
287  1994 Draft Articles at 115, Article 15, para 2.
288  Ibid.
15.2 Additional reading
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, in Report of the International 
Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 
UNGAOR, 49th Sess, Supp (No. 10), UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) 
Art 15 at 114-115.
McCaffrey SC, The Law of International Watercourses (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2007).
Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing 
(Kluwer Law International 2001).
Third Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, by Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, 
Special Rapporteur, in the Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1987, Vol II (Part 1) 15-46, document A/CN.4/406 
and Corr.1 and Add.1 & 2.
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Article 16 | Absence of 
Reply to Notification
1.  If, within the period applicable pursuant to Article 
13, the notifying state receives no communication 
under Article 15, it may, subject to its obligations 
under Articles 5 and 7, proceed with the 
implementation of the planned measures, in 
accordance with the notification and any other 
data and information provided to the notified 
states.
2.  Any claim to compensation by a notified state 
which has failed to reply within the period 
applicable pursuant to Article 13 may be offset by 
the costs incurred by the notifying state for action 
undertaken after the expiration of the time for a 
reply which would not have been undertaken if 
the notified state had objected within that period.
16.1 Commentary
Article 16 concerns cases where the notifying state, 
during the period for reply (see Article 13), receives no 
communication under Article 15. Here, the notifying 
state may proceed with the implemention, or permit the 
implementation, of the planned measures. However, 
such a move is subject to two conditions: firstly, the 
plans must be implemented ‘in accordance with 
the notification and any other data and information 
provided to the notified states’ (see Articles 12 and 
14); and, secondly, the implementation of the planned 
measures is consistent with the obligations of the 
notifying state under the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilisation and the ‘no-significant harm rule’ 
(Articles 5 and 7).
     While the arguments for the second condition are 
obvious, the reason for the first one is that the silence 
of a notified state with regard to the planned measures 
can only be regarded as tacit consent with regard 
to matters which were brought to its attention by the 
notifying state. Allowing the planned measures to 
progress in a specific case is an important element of 
the attempt to balance the interests of both notifying 
and notified states.289 
     Paragraph 2 of Article 16 establishes that the 
costs incurred by the notifying state, which relies 
on the absence of a reply from the notified state, in 
continuation with its planned measures can be off 
set against any future claims by a notified state which 
has failed to reply. In drafting the Convention, the ILC 
decided that to explicitly allow for counter claims by a 
notifying state could prove overly troublesome in 
some cases.290 
289  1994  Draft Articles at 115, Article 16, para 2. 
290  Ibid, para 3. 
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16.2 Additional reading
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, in Report of the International 
Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 
UNGAOR, 49th Sess, Supp (No. 10), UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) 
Art 16 at 115.
McCaffrey SC, The Law of International Watercourses (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2007).
Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing 
(Kluwer Law International 2001).
Third Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, by Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, 
Special Rapporteur, in the Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1987, Vol II (Part 1) 15-46, document A/CN.4/406 
and Corr.1 and Add.1 & 2.
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 1.  If a communication is made under Article 15 that 
implementation of the planned measures would 
be inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 5 
or 7, the notifying state and the state making the 
communication shall enter into consultations and, 
if necessary, negotiations with a view to arriving at 
an equitable resolution of the situation.
2.  The consultations and negotiations shall be 
conducted on the basis that each state must in 
good faith pay reasonable regard to the rights 
and legitimate interests of the other state.
3.  During the course of the consultations and 
negotiations, the notifying state shall, if so 
requested by the notified state at the time 
it makes the communication, refrain from 
implementing or permitting the implementation of 
the planned measures for a period of six months 
unless otherwise agreed.
17.1 Commentary
Article 17 deals with circumstances in which there 
has been a communication containing a finding by 
the notified state that ‘implementation of the planned 
measures would be inconsistent with the provisions of 
Articles 5 or 7’ – i.e. incommensurable with the general 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation.
The first paragraph of Article 17 calls for the notifying 
state to enter into consultations and, if necessary, 
negotiations with the state making such communication 
‘with a view to arriving at an equitable resolution of the 
situation.’ The term ‘if necessary’ was included here 
since some members of the ILC drew a distinction 
between consultations and negotiations. In some 
cases, consultations can already resolve the issue(s) 
– and thus, do not always have to be followed by 
negotiations.291  The ‘situation’ referred to is the finding 
of the notified state that implementation of the planned 
measures would be inconsistent with the principle 
of equitable and reasonable utilisation. The term 
‘equitable resolution’ includes, among other things, 
modification to the initial plan so as to eliminate its 
potentially harmful elements, adjustment of other uses 
being made by either of the states, or the provision by 
the notifying state of compensation (monetary or other) 
acceptable to the notified state.292  
291  1994 Draft Articles at 116, Article 17, para 2.
292   Ibid.
Article 17 | Consultations
and Negotiations 
Concerning Planned 
Measures
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Consultations and negotiations are a requirement of 
a number of international agreements,293  decisions 
of courts and tribunals,294  and the need for such 
procedures has also been recognised in numerous 
publications by intergovernmental295  and non-
governmental organisations.296
     Paragraph 2 of Article 17 concerns the manner in 
which the consultations and negotiations provided 
for in paragraph 1 are to be conducted. The text has 
been mainly inspired by the award of the tribunal in 
the Lac Lanoux Arbitration 297 and by the judgment of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland) Case.298  The 
fashion in which states are to consult and negotiate 
was also addressed by the ICJ in another (non-
293 See, for example, the 1954 Convention between Yugoslavia and Austria 
concerning water economy questions relating to the Drava (United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 227, p. 111), Art. 4; the 1960 Convention on the protection of Lake 
Constance against pollution (Legislative Texts, p. 438, Treaty No. 127), Art. 1, para. 
3; the 1964 Agreement between Poland and the USSR concerning the use of water 
resources in frontier waters (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 552, p. 175), Art. 6; 
the 1964 Agreement concerning the Niger River Commission and the navigation and 
transport on the River Niger (ibid., vol. 587, p. 19), Art. 12; and the 1981 Convention 
between Hungary and the USSR concerning water economy questions in frontier 
waters (referred to in Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development. Legal 
Principles and Recommendations (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 106), Arts. 
3-5. 
294 See also Lac Lanoux Arbitral Award and the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark, and Federal Republic of Germany 
v Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, especially at 
46-48, paras. 85 and 87.
295 See, for example, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
(General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974), Art. 3; General 
Assembly resolution 3129 (XXVIII) of 13 December 1973 on cooperation in the field 
of the environment concerning natural resources shared by two or more States; the 
“Principle of information and consultation” annexed to the 1974 OECD “Principles 
concerning transfrontier pollution” (Recommendation c (74) 224 adopted by the 
Council of OECD on 14 November 1974) OECD, OECD and the Environment (Paris, 
1966), p. 142; and UNEP’s 1978 “Draft principles of conduct” concerning shared 
natural resources (UNEP, Environmental Law: Guidelines and Principles: No. 2, 
Shared Natural Resources (Nairobi, 1978) (principles 5, 6 and 7)).
296 See, for example, the above-mentioned resolutions adopted by the Institute 
of International Law in 1961 (Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International, 1961, vol. 
49-II, pp. 381-384, Art. 6) and in 1979 (Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International, 
1979, vol. 58-II, pp. 196 et seq., art. VII); and the articles adopted by the ILA in 1980 
(ILA, Report of the Fifty-second Conference, Helsinki, 1966, pp. 484 et seq., art. 8) 
and in 1982 (ILA, Report of the Sixtieth Conference, Montreal 1982, pp. 535 et seq. 
Art. 6).
297 See United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. XII, p 281. 
298 See Judgment, United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol II 
at 921, para 78.
freshwater-related) famous case: the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Case.299 Further, the term ‘legitimate 
interests’ has been used in Article 3 of the Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States300  and is 
employed in paragraph 2 of Article 17 of the UN 
Watercourses Convention in order to limit the scope of 
‘interests’.
299  See Judgement, paras 85 and 87.
300  United Nations General Assembly resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 
December 1974.
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Paragraph 3, then, requires the notifying state – if 
requested by the notified state in its communication 
under Article 15 – to suspend implementation of 
the planned measures for six months. This seems 
reasonable, since proceeding with the planned 
measures during the period of consultations and 
negotiations would not be consistent with the concept 
of ‘good faith’ required by paragraph 2. Also in line with 
the idea of ‘good faith,’ however, consultations and 
negotiations should not suspend the implementation 
of the planned measures for longer than is deemed 
reasonable. The establishment of the appropriate 
length of the period is subject to agreement between 
the states concerned, as they are in the best position 
to consider all the particular circumstances. Only in 
case they cannot reach an agreement, paragraph 3 
sets a period of six months; hence the use of the term 
‘unless otherwise agreed.’ After this period has expired, 
the notifying state may proceed with implementation 
of its planned measures – subject, however, to its 
obligations under Articles 5 and 7 (the general principle 
of equitable and reasonable utilisation).
17.2 Additional reading
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, in Report of the International 
Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 
UNGAOR, 49th Sess, Supp (No. 10), UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) 
Art 17 at 115-116.
McCaffrey SC, The Law of International Watercourses (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2007).
Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing 
(Kluwer Law International 2001).
Third Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, by Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, 
Special Rapporteur, in the Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1987, Vol II (Part 1) 15-46, document A/CN.4/406 
and Corr.1 and Add.1 & 2
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1.  If a watercourse state has reasonable grounds to 
believe that another watercourse state is planning 
measures that may have a significant adverse 
effect upon it, the former State may request the 
latter to apply the provisions of Article 12. The 
request shall be accompanied by a documented 
explanation setting forth its grounds.
2.  In the event that the state planning the measures 
nevertheless finds that it is not under an 
obligation to provide a notification under Article 
12, it shall so inform the other state, providing a 
documented explanation setting forth the reasons 
for such finding. If this finding does not satisfy the 
other state, the two states shall, at the request of 
that other state, promptly enter into consultations 
and negotiations in the manner indicated in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 17.
3.  During the course of the consultations and 
negotiations, the state planning the measures 
shall, if so requested by the other state at the  
time it requests the initiation of consultations  
and negotiations, refrain from implementing  
or permitting the implementation of those 
measures for a period of six months unless 
otherwise agreed.
18.1 Commentary
Article 18 addresses cases where a watercourse state 
is aware of measures being planned in another state 
and believes they may have a significant adverse effect 
upon it, but has received no notification by the planning 
state. In such an instance, the former is allowed to 
initiate the procedure provided for under Articles 12-17.
     While paragraph 1 allows any watercourse state 
which is in the above mentioned position to request 
the planning state ‘to apply the provisions of Article 
12,’ this expression does not mean that the latter has 
automatically failed to comply with its obligations under 
Article 12.301  It could well be the case that the planning 
state, during the initial assessment of the possibility 
of the planned measures to cause significant adverse 
effects upon other watercourse states, concluded in 
‘good faith’ that no such impacts would result. This is 
why a watercourse state is allowed under this provision 
to request that the planning state takes another look 
at its assessment, and does not prejudge whether 
the planning state complied with its obligation to 
notify or not.302  
     In order to be warranted such a query, however, 
the requesting state has to meet two conditions. 
Firstly, it must have ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ 
that measures are being planned which may have 
a significant adverse effect upon it. Secondly, the 
requesting state must prepare a ‘documented 
explanation setting forth its grounds’. These conditions, 
similar to the ones laid out in Article 15, are intended 
to require that the requesting state has more than a 
mere apprehension. This extension of the concept of 
‘good faith’ demands for a serious and substantiated 
belief, which seems appropriate given the possibility 
that the planning state may be required to suspend 
implementation of its planned measures under 
paragraph 3 of Article 18.
301  See 1994  Draft Articles at 116, Article 18, para 2.
302  Ibid.
Article 18 | Procedures in 
the Absence of Notification
Convention text
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The first sentence of paragraph 2 deals with the 
situation in which the planning state concludes, after 
taking another look at its planned measures as laid out 
in paragraph 1, that it is not under an obligation to notify 
(under Article 12). Here, the Convention aims to strike 
a fair balance between the interests of the parties by 
requiring the planning state to justify its findings in the 
same manner as was demanded from the requesting 
state under Paragraph 1.
     The second sentence of paragraph 2 relates to the 
case where the finding of the planning state does not 
convince the requesting state. It demands the former 
to promptly enter into consultations and negotiations 
with the latter, if deemed necessary by the requesting 
state. The process of consultation and negotiation has 
to follow the manner described in Article 17 (1) and 
(2) – i.e. on the basis of ‘good faith’ and with the aim to 
reach ‘an equitable resolution of the situation’.
Finally, paragraph 3 requires the planning state to 
refrain from implementing the planned measures for a 
period of six months – unless otherwise agreed. This 
provision resembles Article 17(3); the only difference 
being that here the period starts to run from the time 
of the request for consultations under paragraph 2 of 
Article 18.
18.2 Application of Articles 12-18
A dispute has arisen between two states over the 
interpretation of the obligation to exchange data 
and information.
     Upper riparian state A shares an international 
watercourse with lower riparian state B. State A is 
planning to authorise the construction of a large 
dye-work plant in close proximity to a wetland shared 
with state B. While state A acknowledges the risk the 
plant may pose on this pristine natural resource, in 
its view the economic benefits outweigh the potential 
environmental drawbacks. State A hopes that further 
companies will follow the dye-work plant and a new 
industrial park will eventually emerge – contributing to 
the economic prosperity of the region.
     During a presentation at a meeting of the regional 
economic integration organisation, which both heads of 
state attend, the delegation of state A reveals the basic 
points of the plan and indicate that work will begin 
within the next three months.
     After the rather surprising presentation, state 
B exchanges an official communiqué with state A, 
claiming that state A did not respect its international 
obligations. According to state B, state A has failed 
to comply with various provisions of Article 12 of the 
UNWC: (1) oral notification cannot be perceived as 
sufficient; (2) giving notice only three months before the 
beginning of work is not ‘timely’; (3) an Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) must be carried out and its 
findings have to be communicated to state B; and (4) a 
land-use plan should accompany the information to see 
the extent and type of industrial settlement planned in 
the area. 
     In its response, state A argues that the UN 
Watercourses Convention does not prescribe any form 
of notification, and thus its oral presentation of the 
planned measures was sufficient. It was also timely, 
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since the planning agency only recently finalised the 
details of the plan. Furthermore, an EIA would drive 
up the costs, making the whole project less viable 
economically. According to state A, such a complicated 
and time-consuming assessment will not be necessary, 
since state B can fully trust state A’s judgement. State 
A further argues that the UN Watercourses Convention 
does not even require that an EIA be carried out; it 
merely requires that the results of such an assessment 
should be shared if it had been undertaken voluntarily. 
Finally, state A suggests state B buy a copy of the land-
use plan, since its conception was rather expensive.
(1)  The argument of state A regarding its oral 
notification will not hold. While it is correct that 
Article 12 does not mention a requirement for 
notifications concerning planned measures to 
be in writing, a presentation at a conference, or 
even a phone call, would (most likely) not suffice 
in communicating all relevant facts regarding any 
planned measure. Treaty practice supports this.303 
(2)  The reasoning of state A that it wanted to 
wait until all relevant data and information was 
available is equally weak. The requirement 
of ‘timely’ does not allow for delaying the 
notification; it rather tries to allow for a thorough 
evaluation of the possible impacts by all 
watercourse states at an early stage in the 
planning process; which is a prerequisite for 
meaningful consultations between the states. 
This line of argument has been strengthened by 
the ICJ in the judgement of the Pulp Mills Case,304  
where the court stated that notification should 
take place at a very early stage and distinguished 
between the duty to inform and a subsequent 
(and more comprehensive) duty to notify, even 
though the initial information provided might not 
include all relevant data. Given the fact that Article 
13(a) of the Convention allows the notified state 
a period of six months during which the possible 
effects of the planned measures have to be 
evaluated, the three months before the start of 
construction works are clearly too short.
303 See, for example, Art XII (3) of the Columbia River Basin Treaty.
304 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 
Judgment of 20 April 2010, para 99, citing art 7 of the 1975 Statute.
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(3)  While state A is correct in stating that the 
Convention does not specifically require the 
planning state to conduct an EIA; according 
to various scholars and recently also the ICJ, 
such an assessment is now an obligation under 
customary international law whenever a project 
may have adverse transboundary effects. This 
obligation is particularly clear in the case at hand, 
as the planned measure might have a significant 
adverse effect upon the wetland.
(4)  Furthermore, state A will not be able to charge 
state B for the copy of the land-use plan, since 
state A has to submit all available technical 
data and information; and the land-use plan 
clearly falls into this category since it has already 
been finalised. The term ‘available’ points to 
cases where a state which has been notified 
requests more data or information that is not 
readily available and can only be gathered by the 
notifying state. It is only in such instances where it 
is deemed appropriate for the former to cover the 
expenses for the additional information.
After consulting with its international lawyers, state 
A – reluctantly – accepts the four points, conducts an 
EIA, and sends all technical data and information to 
its downstream neighbour state B. Five months into 
the evaluation process, state B requests an extension 
of the six months period for its reply – as provided for 
in Article 13(b) of the UN Watercourses Convention  
– arguing that the assessment of all the data and 
information ‘poses special difficulty’ due to translation 
problems, a mismatch in the approach of evaluating the 
EIA, and a lack of staff available to analyse the data. A 
lack of staff capable of evaluating the shared data alone 
would surely not qualify as posing ‘special difficulty.’ 
However, the two other grounds, i.e. different 
languages and variations in the standards of EIAs, 
may well suffice in reasoning for extending the review 
period for another six months – depending on the 
specific complexity of each case. This does not mean, 
however, that state B can use Article 13 for delaying 
tactics, since Article 15 demands the reply to be 
communicated to the notifying state (here state A) as 
early as possible.
     While state A understands its obligation under 
Article 14 not to implement the planned measures 
without the consent of state B, it nevertheless begins 
work on the infrastructure for the industrial area. 
Realising this, state B requests state A immediately 
puts all construction projects on hold, until the two 
states have agreed on the terms of the planned 
measures. State A in turn argues that the infrastructural 
facilities (mainly roads at this stage) will have no impact 
on the transboundary watercourse and that state A 
will of course respect state B’s period for reply during 
which time state A will not begin with the construction 
of the actual ‘planned measure’ – the dye-work plant.
Here, state A’s argument is convincing. Article 14(b) 
does not oblige state A to stop any works on its 
territory – only the implementation of the actual planned 
measures which may have a significant adverse 
(transboundary) effect. However, it would be wise for 
state A to await the outcome of state B’s evaluation 
of the shared data and information and the potential 
following negotiations between the states. Otherwise, 
state A takes the risk that its infrastructure does not 
match the final project. Furthermore, state A has to 
be aware that Articles 5-7 of the Convention, i.e. the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation, 
apply in any case – regardless of the notification 
and reply process.
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Nine months after state A shared the data and 
information with its downstream neighbour, state B 
claims in its reply that the carrying capacity of the 
transboundary watercourse and the linked wetland is 
much lower than estimated by state A and demands 
the designated area for the industrial park to be scaled-
down considerably. According to state B, if state A 
would proceed with the original plan, it would violate 
the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation. 
State A on the other hand argues that the proposed 
dye-work plant and the planned industrial area are in 
line with the sustainable management of the river; and 
thus comply with Articles 5-7 of the Convention.
     A consultation and negotiation process follows 
according to Article 17 of the UN Convention. Both 
watercourse states have to try to reach an ‘equitable 
resolution’ of the conflicting views, based on the 
principle of good faith (see Glossary of Terms). Their 
ultimate goal is to arrive at a point where both states 
agree that the planned measure is consistent with 
Articles 5-7 – e.g. by amending the initial plan or paying 
compensation. In the case at hand one could think of 
downscaling the size of the dye-work plant, imposing 
strict environmental regulation or standards on the 
industrial development in the area, or payment by 
state A for environmental protection measures in the 
transboundary wetland.
18.3 Additional reading
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, in Report of the International 
Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 
UNGAOR, 49th Sess, Supp (No. 10), UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) 
Art 18 at 116-117.
McCaffrey SC, The Law of International Watercourses (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2007).
Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing 
(Kluwer Law International 2001).
Third Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, by Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, 
Special Rapporteur, in the Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1987, Vol II (Part 1) 15-46, document A/CN.4/406 
and Corr.1 and Add.1 & 2.
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Figure 3.1 |
Planned Measures (Source Authors)
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1.  In the event that the implementation of planned 
measures is of the utmost urgency in order 
to protect public health, public safety or other 
equally important interests, the state planning 
the  measures may, subject to Articles 5 and 7, 
immediately proceed to implementation, 
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 14 and 
paragraph 3 of Article 17.
2.  In such case, a formal declaration of the urgency 
of the measures shall be communicated without 
delay to the other watercourse states referred to 
in Article 12 together with the relevant data and 
information.
3.  The state planning the measures shall, at 
the request of any of the states referred to in 
paragraph 2, promptly enter into consultations 
and negotiations with it in the manner indicated in  
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 17.
Article 19 | Urgent 
Implementation of 
Planned Measures
19.1 Commentary
Article 19 of the UN Watercourses Convention 
addresses planned measures which are of the ‘utmost 
urgency in order to protect public health, public safety 
or other equally important interests’. Those measures 
should not be confused with ‘emergency situations’, 
which are dealt with under Article 28. Article 19 
concerns highly exceptional cases in which interests 
of overriding importance require the immediate 
implementation of planned measures – without the 
need to wait for the expiry of the periods established 
for the reply to notification and for consultations and 
negotiations.305  The language of the Article is supposed 
to guard against potential abuse of the narrow 
exception it lays down.
     Paragraph 1 refers to the kinds of interests that must 
be involved in order for a state to be entitled to proceed 
to implementation under Article 19. The interests in 
question are those of the highest order of importance, 
such as protecting the population from the danger of 
flooding or issues of vital national security. Paragraph 1 
also contains a waiver of the waiting periods provided 
for under Articles 14 and 17(3). The right of the state to 
proceed to implementation is, however, subject to its 
obligations under paragraphs 2 and 3.
     Paragraph 2 requires a state which proceeds 
with the measures to immediately provide the 
‘other watercourse states referred to in Article 12’ 
with a formal communication of the urgency of 
such measures, together with all relevant data and 
information. Again, these requirements are intended 
to adhere to the principle of ‘good faith’ when a state 
proceeds to implementation, as well as ensuring that 
the other states are informed as fully as possible at 
the particular point in time of the potential impacts 
of the measures. The ‘other watercourse states’ are 
those upon which the measures ‘may have a significant 
adverse effect’ under Article 12.
305 1994  Draft Articles at 118, Article 19, para 1.
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The last paragraph of Article 19 requires that the state 
which proceeds to immediate implementation enters 
‘promptly’ into consultations and negotiations with 
the other state(s) concerned, if and when requested 
to do so by those states.306  Again, the process of 
consultations and negotiations has to be carried out in 
the fashion indicated in Article 17 (1) and (2) – i.e. on the 
basis of ‘good faith’ and with the goal to achieve ‘an 
equitable resolution of the situation’.
306 1994  Draft Articles at 118, Article 19, para 3. 
19.2 Application
19.2.1 Scenario 1
State A (upstream) and state B (downstream) share 
a transboundary river. State A is a small developing 
country with low GDP but it has considerable 
deposits of rare earth minerals. Mining company X is 
contemplating a huge investment in state A to develop 
these resources. This investment would result in an 
enormous economic boom for state A, but the water-
hungry operation would require a substantive reservoir 
to be built. 
     During the initial negotiation, company X is making 
it clear that it will only invest in state A if the necessary 
water infrastructure will be in place. Since there are 
other countries state X could exploit the minerals in, 
the company pushes state A to initiate the construction 
of a dam as soon as possible in order not to lose the 
lucrative business.
     State A, aware of its legal obligations, immediately 
submits a declaration of urgency to state B, arguing 
that the dam will have to be built immediately, since the 
time frame given by company X is very limited.
     In this case, however, the economic pressures do 
not satisfy the requirements for ‘urgent implementation,’ 
which only come into play where public health or safety 
is at risk. Hence, state A and state B would have to 
follow the procedures of Articles 13-18.
| Article 19
163
19.2.2 Scenario 2
State A (upstream) and state B (downstream) share 
a transboundary river. State A, a small developing 
country, has a significant agricultural base supporting 
its people, 80% of which live below the poverty level 
and depend upon subsistence farming.
     State A depends heavily on the shared river 
for irrigation, since it does not have any alternative 
freshwater resources and the climate does not allow 
for rain-fed agriculture. Due to a change of climate, the 
level of snowfall which feeds the headwaters of the 
international watercourse was remarkably lower this 
winter compared to previous years. 
     In order to avoid famine, state A is now rushing 
to upgrade its reservoirs, allowing for more storage 
capacity. It argues that the exceptional circumstances 
allow for procedures under Article 19 of the Convention, 
since there is little time left to avoid a widespread 
humanitarian disaster in the region.
     In this case, state A would likely be allowed to 
immediately start implementation, without having to 
wait for the expiry of the periods in place for the reply 
of state B to its notification and potential consultations 
and negotiations – subject to being confident that its 
(state A) actions are consistent with Articles 5-7 of the 
Convention. 
19.3 Additional reading
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, in Report of the International 
Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 
UNGAOR, 49th Sess, Supp (No. 10), UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) 
Art 19 at 117-118.
McCaffrey SC, The Law of International Watercourses (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2007).
Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing 
(Kluwer Law International 2001).
Third Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, by Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, 
Special Rapporteur, in the Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1987, Vol II (Part 1) 15-46, document A/CN.4/406 
and Corr.1 and Add.1 & 2.
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Key points
•	 States	are	obliged	to	protect	and	preserve	the	
ecosystem of international watercourses as an 
extension of the general principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilisation and participation. 
•	 States	are	under	a	due	diligence	obligation	to	
prevent new sources of pollution, and reduce 
and control existing sources consistent with the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation 
and participation. 
•	 States	must	take	all	necessary	measures	to	
prevent the introduction of species, alien or 
new, that may have detrimental effects on an 
ecosystem of an international watercourse 
resulting in significant harm to other watercourse 
states. 
•	 The	UN	Watercourses	Convention	obliges	states	
to cooperate with other states to protect and 
preserve the marine environment. 
•	 Pursuant	to	the	Convention,	states	are	under	an	
obligation to enter into consultations with a view 
to establishing joint institutional arrangements for 
the management of international watercourses.  
In many circumstances, joint arrangements 
will be the most appropriate means by which 
to ensure the provisions of the Convention are 
implemented. 
•	 States	must	cooperate	where	necessary	to	
regulate the flow of an international watercourse, 
and maintain installations.
•	 Articles	20-25	collectively	provide	the	basis	by	
which an ecosystem approach has been reflected 
within the UN Watercourses Convention. 
Article 20 | Protection 
and Preservation of 
Ecosystems
Watercourse states shall, individually and, where 
appropriate, jointly, protect and preserve the 
ecosystems of international watercourses
Part IV | 
Protection, Preservation 
and Management 
(Articles 20-26)
What is an ‘ecosystem’?
‘ecosystem’ - ‘…a dynamic complex of plant, 
animal, and micro-organism communities and their 
non-living environment interacting as a functional 
unit’ (Article 2, UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity (adopted 5 June 1992, entered into force 
29 December 1992) (1992) 31 International Legal 
Materials 822)
‘ecosystem’ – ‘a system of plants, animals and 
micro-organisms together with the non-living 
components of the environment’  (Experts Group 
on Environmental Law, Legal Principles and 
recommendations (WCED 1987))
‘water-related ecosystems’ - ‘ecosystems such 
as forests, wetlands, grasslands and agricultural 
land that play vital roles in the hydrological cycle 
through the service they provide’ (UN ECE, 
Recommendations on Payments for Ecosystem 
Services in Integrated Water Resources 
Management (UN ECE 2007), 2)
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20.1 Commentary
The need to protect and preserve ecosystems is 
increasingly recognised throughout the world. Major 
consumptive uses, such as irrigation, municipal or 
industrial uses; and non-consumptive uses, including 
hydropower and navigation, constitute direct drivers of 
ecosystem degradation.307  The Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (MEA) estimated that water withdrawn 
from inland waters system has increased by at least 
15 times over the past two centuries; with humans 
now controlling and using more than half the world’s 
accessible runoff.308 Increased uses of water have 
also impacted on water quality, with major pollutants, 
such as nutrients, heavy metals, nitrogen, organic 
compounds, suspended participles, contaminants and 
salinity, affecting aquatic ecosystems.309  In this regard, 
the World Water Commission has estimated that half of 
the world’s major rivers are seriously polluted.310 
     Article 20, described as, ‘a simple, but potentially 
powerful, provision’, seeks to address the challenges 
faced by the existing and potential degradation of 
ecosystems of international watercourses.311  
The provision, modelled on Article 192 of the UN Law 
of the Sea, sets out a general obligation on states to 
protect ecosystems of international watercourses,312 and 
is considered to reflect an emerging principle of 
307  B Aylward, and others ‘Freshwater Ecosystem Services’, in R Hassan, R 
Scholes and A Neville, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: current state and trends 
(Island Press 2005), 216.
308  Ibid.
309  Ibid. 
310 World Water Commission, A Water Secure World: Vision for Water, Life and 
the Environment (World Water Council 1999), at 13.
311  SC McCaffrey, ‘An Overview of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the 
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses’ (2000) 20 Journal of Land 
Resources and Environmental Law 57, 66.
312  UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered 
into force 16 November 1994) (1994) 21 International Legal Materials 1261: Article 
192 provides that, ‘States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine 
environment’.
customary law.313 
     When drafting the text of the UN Watercourses 
Convention, the ILC preferred the term ‘ecosystem’ 
over ‘environment’ as they felt that the latter term 
could be interpreted quite broadly; thus covering areas 
that, ‘have minimal bearing on the protection and 
preservation of the watercourse itself’.314 
An ‘ecosystem’ was defined by the ILC as being, 
‘an ecological unit consisting of living and non-living 
components that are interdependent and function as 
a community’315   [emphasis added] (see page 165 for 
additional definitions). 
     Article 20 requires watercourse states to ‘protect’ 
and ‘preserve’ the ecosystems of international 
watercourses. The obligation to ‘protect’ ecosystems 
of international watercourses’ can be seen as 
an extension of Article 5 of the Convention, plus 
the obligation that states must use and develop 
an international watercourse, ‘in a manner that is 
consistent with adequate protection thereof’ (Article 
5 (1). Adequate protection encompasses measures 
relating to conservation, security, and water-related 
disease, as well as technical and hydrological ‘control’ 
mechanisms, such as the regulation of flow, floods, 
pollution, erosion, drought and saline intrusion.316 
Some of these aspects, such as pollution and 
regulation of flow, are covered in more detail in Part IV 
of the Convention (see below).  
Additionally, the obligation to protect includes the duty 
313  See McCaffrey, ‘An Overview of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-
navigational Uses of International Watercourses’, at 70.
314  1994 Draft Articles at 119.
315  Ibid.
316  Ibid.
166
to shield ecosystems from a significant threat of harm.317 
Inherent in the notion of protection is therefore the need 
to adopt a precautionary approach.  Such an approach 
provides that where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
cannot be used to justify not imposing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.318 
Pursuant to the precautionary principle, a proportionate 
approach should be adopted that weighs up the 
degree of harm vis-à-vis the level of scientific certainty. 
Where full scientific certainty is lacking, but the degree 
of harm is potentially imminent, serious or irreversible, 
precautionary measures might therefore be justified.319 
The precautionary principle is widely reflected in treaty 
317  Ibid. 
318  Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development’ (Rio de 
Janeiro) (13 June 1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol I).   
319  P Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2003), 269.
practice related to transboundary harm.320  
     The obligation to ‘preserve’ ecosystems of 
international watercourses applies to freshwater 
ecosystems in a ‘pristine or unspoiled condition’321 , 
and can be seen as subordinate to the obligation to 
protect. Schwebel introduced the notion within the 
work of the ILC through his discussion of ‘wild and 
scenic watercourses’.322  He noted that preservation, 
‘involves the setting aside of a portion, or the entirety, 
of a stream, selected for its aesthetic beauty or its 
condition of being relatively unmodified by man: the 
native flora and fauna are typically abundant. Such free-
320  Owen McIntyre, Environmental Protection of International Watercourses under 
International Law (Ashgate 2007), 265-283. McIntyre observes that the principle 
is likely to represent customary international law, given its ‘prevalence … in recent 
environmental treaties, declarations and resolutions as well as its inclusion in the Rio 
Declarations and the UNCED treaties’, 272. 
321 Ibid. 
322   ILC, ‘Third Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, by Mr Stephen M Schwebel, Special Rapporteur’, UN Doc A/
CN.4/348 and Corr. 1, 190.
Figure 4.1 | 
Ecosystem Services and Rivers (Source UK MEA 2011)
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running and unspoiled watercourses, so designated, 
will thus still be able to be experienced by future 
generations’.323  Schwebel therefore proposed that, ‘the 
Commission’s articles on the non-navigational uses 
of international water-courses could be cast in such a 
way as to contemplate this emerging practice and to 
comprehend such preservation regimes as an element 
of a State’s equitable participation in the development, 
use, protection and control of international 
watercourse systems’.324  
     However it should be noted that, on the basis 
of equity, the ultimate decision whether or not to 
preserve a particular ecosystem in a ‘pristine or 
unspoiled condition’ will be weighed against all relevant 
factors, including the social and economic needs of 
watercourse states.  In weighing up such factors, 
Utton and Utton point out that, ‘for many states, the 
preservation of wild and scenic watercourses would 
prove too great a development sacrifice’. 325 However, 
the latter authors also point out that, ‘where politically 
feasible, such a strategy should be employed to protect 
what few unspoiled stretches of rivers remain today. 
Depending upon the usages allowed under a wild and 
scenic watercourse regime, the economic advantages 
of a pristine river system may make up for the sacrificed 
developmental usages’.326  Recognition of the economic 
benefits of ecosystems is embodied in the notion of 
‘ecosystem services’ (figures 4.1). 
Adopting such an ecosystem services approach may 
even provide alternative financial incentives through 
the concept of payment for ecosystem services.  For 
instance, Sadoff and others observe that:
323  Ibid.
324  Ibid.
325  Albert E Utton and John Utton, ‘Adequate Stream Flows’ in Slavko Bogdanovic 
(ed), International Law of Water Resources – Contribution of the International Law 
Association (1954-2000) (Kluwer Law International 2001), 405. 
326  Ibid.
‘While payment for ecosystem services is increasingly 
popular in national contexts, it has not yet been 
pursued as a strategy in financing or developing 
transboundary water management institutions. One 
possible avenue from a developing country perspective 
is to label the outcomes of cooperative management 
as international public goods – in terms of positive 
environmental outcomes, regional security or other 
factors – for which international, non-basin actors could 
choose to contribute. Such a ‘payment for ecosystem 
and security services’ approach could help move 
financing from the paternalistic donor-recipient model 
to a service provider-customer model made up of equal 
partners. However, it is critical that a broad range of 
local stakeholders are involved in the decision-making 
process to ensure that the resulting agreements and 
financial flows have broad support’.327 
Central to the protection of ecosystems of international 
watercourses is the concept of ‘environmental 
flows’.328   While Article 20 does not explicitly mention 
environmental flows, the need to ‘ensure stream 
flows adequate to protect the biological, chemical, 
and physical integrity of international watercourses, 
including their estuarine zones’329  can be considered 
as inherent in the obligation to protect ecosystems 
of international watercourses.  Considerable treaty 
practice and international policy has reflected the notion 
of environmental flows.330  For instance, the 2002 Inco-
327  C Sadoff, T Greiber, M Smith and G Bergkamp, Share: managing waters across 
boundaries (IUCN 2008), 78. 
328  McIntyre O., Environmental Protection of International Watercourses under 
International Law (Ashgate 2007), 292. 
329  AE Utton and J Utton, ‘Adequate Stream Flows’, in Slavko Bogdanovic (ed), 
International Law of Water Resources – Contribution of the International Law 
Association (1954-2000), 387.
330  See J Scanlon and A Iza, ‘International Legal Foundations for Environmental 
Flows’, (2003) 14 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 81.  See also Article 
19 of the Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development, which 
stipulates that ‘parties must take all appropriate measures, in particular through 
conservation and management of water resources, to ensure the availability of a 
sufficient quantity of water to satisfy basic human needs and to maintain aquatic 
systems’, <http://www.i-c-e-l.org/indexen.html> accessed 24 October 2011. 
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Maputo Agreement provides details pertaining to flow 
regimes, and recognises, ‘the need to ensure water of 
sufficient quantity with acceptable quality to sustain 
the watercourse and their associated ecosystem’.331  
Also the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation 
for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong 
River Basin obliges states to maintain, ‘acceptable 
minimum monthly flows’ to protect the ecological 
integrity of the Mekong.332 Additionally, the need to 
protect ‘environmental flows’ can be found in national 
legislation. For instance, the 1998 South African 
Water Act utilises the concept of the ‘reserve’, which 
is defined as being, ‘the quantity and quality of water 
required … to protect aquatic ecosystems in order to 
secure ecologically sustainable development and use 
of the relevant water resource’.333  
     A further important aspect of Article 20 is the 
inclusion of the phrase, ‘individually and, where 
appropriate, jointly’. This phrase recognises that in 
certain circumstances, states will not be able to act 
alone in protecting the ecosystem of international 
watercourses, but must work with states sharing a 
particular watercourse on an equitable basis.  The 
requirement to act jointly where appropriate can 
therefore be seen as an extension of the obligation 
contained in Article 5(2) for watercourse states to, 
‘participate in the use, development and protection 
of an international watercourse in an equitable and 
reasonable manner [emphasis added]’; and the 
requirement under Article 8 that watercourse states 
331  Tripartite Interim Agreement for Co-operation on the Protection and Sustainable 
Utilisation of the Water Resources of the Incomati and Maputo Watercourse 
(adopted 29 August 2002), Article 9, ‘the need to ensure water of sufficient 
quantity with acceptable quality to sustain the watercourse and their associated 
ecosystems’.
332   Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the 
Mekong River Basin, Article 6, requires parties to provide for ‘acceptable minimum 
monthly flows’ to protect the ecological integrity of the Mekong.
333  National Water Act, No. 36 of 1998, 20 August 1998,<ftp://ftp.hst.org.za/pubs/
govdocs/acts/1998/act36.pdf>, accessed 24 October 2011.
cooperate in order to attain optimal utilisation and 
adequate protection of international watercourses.’ 334  
In summarising this obligation, the ILC stipulates that:
 
‘The duty to participate equitably in the protection 
and preservation of the ecosystems of an international 
watercourse is not to be regarded as implying an 
obligation to repair or tolerate harm that has resulted 
from another watercourse state’s breach of its 
obligations under the draft articles. But the general 
obligation of equitable participation demands that the 
contributions of watercourse states to joint protection 
and preservation efforts be at least proportional to the 
measure in which they have contributed to the threat or 
harm to the ecosystems in question’.335 
Joint action may therefore be necessary within the case 
of contiguous watercourses, but may not be required 
where the cause and effect of a particular use can be 
solely attributable to one watercourse state. 
     A further issue that should be considered in 
connection with Article 20 is the extent of the obligation 
to protect. Article 20 is ‘not qualified’, unlike Articles 7, 
21 or 22 for example, which make reference to ‘other 
watercourse states’.  A question arising is therefore 
whether the obligation to protect ecosystems under 
Article 20 would apply where such harm only arises 
in one states, or whether there is more harm to 
the ecosystems of other states sharing a particular 
international watercourse.336  Most commentators 
believe that Article 20 should be interpreted as being 
consistent with the overarching principles of Articles 
5-7.  Article 20 is therefore considered an obligation to 
334  Refer to Part II of User’s Guide 100-133
335  1994 Draft Articles at 119.
336  SC McCaffrey, ‘An Overview of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-
navigational Uses of International Watercourses’, at 66.
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The MEA identifies a range of services that 
ecosystems provide including provisioning, 
supporting, regulating and cultural services (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human 
Well-being: A Framework for Assessment (Island Press 
2003)). Water-related ecosystems services are defined 
by the UN ECE to include: 
‘…services such as flood prevention, control and 
mitigation; regulating runoff and water supply; 
improving the quality of surface waters and 
groundwaters; withholding sediments, reducing 
erosion, stablilising river banks and shorelines and 
lowering the potential of landslides; improving water 
infiltration and supporting water storage in the soil; 
and facilitating groundwater recharge. Water-related 
ecosystem services also include cultural services, 
such as recreational, aesthetic and spiritual benefits of 
forests and wetlands’ (UNECE, Recommendations on 
Payments for Ecosystem Services in Integrated Water 
Resources Management, available at <http://www.
unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/publications/
documents/PES_Recommendations_web.pdf> 
accessed 30 April 2012).
The advantage of an ecosystem services approach 
is that it provides a powerful instrument by which to 
justify the protection of ecosystems.  As noted by 
Salzman, ‘while a wetland surely provides existence 
and option values to some people, the benefits 
provided by the wetland’s nutrient retention and 
flood protection services are both universal and 
undeniable. Tastes may differ over beauty, but they 
are in firm accord over the high costs of polluted 
water and flooded homes’ (James Salzman, Barton 
H. Thompson Jr and Gretchen C Dailey, ‘Protecting 
Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics and Law’ 
(2001) 20 Stanford Environmental Law Journal 309, 
312). Similarly, Tarlock observes that, ‘much energy 
has been devoted to the development of 
environmental ethics, but the strongest case for 
environment protection can be justified by hard 
numbers’; and ‘because ecosystem services provision 
is either tied to a market or to government subsidies, 
it can be a fair and equitable way of reallocating 
resources’ (Dan Tarlock, ‘Ecosystem Services in the 
Klamath Basin: Battlefield Causalities or the Future?’ 
(2007) Journal of Land Use 207, 217).
 
An ecosystem services approach has yet to become 
widely implemented within the context of international 
watercourses, however, examples of such an 
approach do exist within the context of the Red 
River, the Okavango Rive and the La Plata Basin (see 
Dimple Roy, Jane Barr and Henry David Venema, 
Ecosystem Approaches in Integrated Water Resources 
Management – A Review of Transboundary River 
Basins (UNEP 2011)).
An Ecosystem Services approach
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exercise due diligence to protect and preserve water 
ecosystems.337 Tanzi and Arcari therefore claim that, 
‘although no express indication is provided either in 
Article 20, or in the relevant ILC commentary, it may 
be excluded that this obligation is one of an absolute 
character.’338    In this regard, the ILC’s commentary 
to Article 21(2) states that, ‘as with the obligation to 
“protect” ecosystems under Article 20, the obligation 
to prevent pollution “that may cause significant harm” 
includes the duty to exercise due diligence to prevent 
the threat of such harm’ [emphasis added].339   
     An additional aspect which is important to point 
out is the implication of the obligation.  McCaffrey 
maintained that, ‘there would seem to be little danger 
of states making frivolous claims in respect of this 
obligation, despite the lack of a requirement of resulting 
transboundary harm. States do not normally make 
claims against other states unless they consider that 
they have been injured or are threatened, and there is 
no reason to believe that their behaviour in respect of 
this obligation would be any different’.340  Along similar 
lines, a causal link must be established between a 
state’s activities and the existing or potential damage.  
The ability of states to prove ecosystem damage, which 
may not necessarily manifest itself immediately, might 
also act as a barrier to states making claims against 
other states.341
337  Ibid, 66.
338  A Tanzi and M Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the Law of 
International Watercourses (Kluwer Law International 2001), 246.  See also O 
McIntyre, ‘The Emergence of an ‘Ecosystem Approach’ to the Protection of 
International Watercourses under International Law’ (2004) 13(1) Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law 1, 9.
339  1994 Draft Articles at, 291.
340  SC McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press), 459.
341  D Tarlock, ‘Ecosystems’, in D Bondansky, J Brunnée and E Hey, (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2007), 
583.
20.2 Application
20.2.1 Transboundary conservation areas 
and protection of ecosystems
State A and state B share a river that flows through 
a number of conservation areas which have been 
afforded protected area status under national legislation 
within the two states. The states take the decision 
to preserve the ecosystems of this international 
watercourse by designating the entire river basin as a 
transboundary protected area. 
     State A receives a planning proposal to drain a 
wetland in order to develop the land for agricultural 
purposes.  However, joint studies demonstrate that 
draining the wetland would increase the severity of 
floods downstream in state B.  Studies also show 
there are significant recreational and cultural benefits 
associated with the wetland, such as the unique flora 
and fauna, and the site is popular with walkers, cyclists 
and kayakers who contribute significantly to the local 
economy. An analysis of the costs and benefits of 
maintaining the site as a natural wetland therefore 
demonstrate that any draining of the wetland would be 
inequitable and unreasonable. 
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20.2.2 Protection of salmon fisheries
State A upstream is reliant on salmon fisheries to 
support its tourist economy. Anglers travel from far and 
wide, paying significant premiums to fish for salmon in 
the headwaters of the river X.  However, downstream 
state B plans to build a hydropower plant which would 
threaten the migratory routes of the salmon, and have a 
devastating effect on the salmon population upstream, 
the supporting ecosystems, and the local economy.  
Such activities are considered inconsistent with the 
obligation to protect the ecosystems of international 
watercourses, and the states must work together to 
mitigate the impacts that the planned hydropower 
developments downstream will have on upstream state 
A, for example through the use of fish ladders. 
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Article 21 | Prevention, 
Reduction and Control 
of Pollution
1.  For the purpose of this article, ‘pollution of an 
international watercourse’ means any detrimental 
alteration in the composition or quality of the 
waters of an international watercourse which 
results directly or indirectly from human conduct. 
2.  Watercourse states shall, individually and, where 
appropriate, jointly, prevent, reduce and control 
the pollution of an international watercourse that 
may cause significant harm to other watercourse 
states or to their environment, including harm 
to human health or safety, to the use of the 
waters for any beneficial purpose or to the living 
resources of the watercourse. Watercourse states 
shall take steps to harmonise their policies in this 
connection. 
3.  Watercourse states shall, at the request of any of 
them, consult with a view to arriving at mutually 
agreeable measures and methods to prevent, 
reduce and control pollution of an international 
watercourse, such as:
(a)  Setting joint water quality objectives and criteria; 
(b)  Establishing techniques and practices to address 
pollution from point and non-point sources;
(c)  Establishing lists of substances, the introduction 
of which into the waters of an international 
watercourse is to be prohibited, limited, 
investigated or monitored.
21.1 Commentary
Pollution constitutes a major challenge for the world’s 
international watercourses.  UNEP estimates that every 
day millions of tons of inadequately treated sewage 
and industrial and agricultural wastes enter the world’s 
water sources, resulting in negative impacts on human 
health, food production such as fisheries, and as 
inland and coastal ecosystems.342   Similarly, the Global 
International Waters Assessment (GIWA) found that 
transboundary pollution is the top priority concern in 
most regions of the world.343 
     Article 21 of the UN Watercourses Convention 
addresses transboundary pollution, which is defined 
as being ‘any detrimental alteration in the composition 
or quality of the waters of an international watercourse 
which results directly or indirectly from human conduct’. 
The intention of this definition is to provide a general, 
factual definition which does not mention particular 
types of pollution or polluting agents.344   Additionally, 
the definition covers ‘any detrimental alteration’, 
leaving questions over the threshold of pollution under 
Article 21(2).   Also, the types of detrimental effects, 
for example harm to human health, property, or living 
resources, are not explicitly listed in this definition.345  By 
focusing on a factual definition of pollution, rather than 
stipulating legal parameters, the approach adopted by 
the UN Watercourses Convention is consistent with 
the 1966 Helsinki Rules, which defines pollution as, 
‘any detrimental change resulting from human conduct 
in the natural composition, content, or quality of the 
waters of an international drainage basin’346
342  UNEP and Pacific Institute, Clearly the Waters – A focus on water quality 
solutions (UNEP 2010).
343  Global International Waters Assessment, Challenges to International Waters – 
Regional Assessments in a Global Perspective (UNEP, 2006), 36-53.
344  1994 Draft Articles at 121.
345  Ibid. 
346  Slavko Bogdanovic (ed), International Law of Water Resources – Contribution of 
the International Law Association (1954-2000), 109.
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Water quality criteria: The UN ECE Guide to 
implementation defines ‘water quality criteria’ as 
being, the ‘minimum concentration levels for oxygen 
and maximum concentration levels for substances 
in water that do not harm a specific single form of 
water use (e.g. drinking water use, use of water for 
livestock watering, irrigational water use, water use for 
recreational purposes, use of water by aquatic life)’.  
Water quality objectives are described as constituting a 
numerical concentration or narrative statement that has 
been established to support and protect designated 
uses of water. 
Annex III of the 1992 UN ECE Water Convention 
contains guidance on the establishment of  water 
quality objectives and criteria, which should: 
(a) Take into account the aim of maintaining and, 
where necessary, improving the existing water 
quality; 
(b) Aim at the reduction of average pollution loads 
(in particular hazardous substances) to a certain 
degree within a certain period of time; 
(c) Take into account specific water-quality 
requirements (raw water for drinking-water  
purposes, irrigation, etc); 
(d) Take into account specific requirements regarding 
sensitive and specially protected waters and 
their   environment e.g. lakes and groundwater 
resources; 
(e) Be based on the application of ecological 
classification methods and chemical indices 
for the medium- and long-term review of water 
quality maintenance and improvement; 
(f) Take into account the degree to which objectives 
are reached and the additional protected 
measures, based on emission limits, which may 
be required in individual cases.
The 1992 UN ECE Water Convention also provides 
further guidance on ‘techniques and practices 
to address pollution from point and non-point 
sources’.  Pursuant to the latter Convention, such 
techniques and practices include the establishment 
of water discharge limits based on best available 
technology; biological treatment or equivalent 
processes should be applied to municipal 
wastewater; appropriate measures should be taken, 
such as the application of best available technology, 
in order to reduce nutrient inputs from industrial and 
municipal sources; and appropriate measures and 
best environmental practices should be developed 
and implemented for the reduction of inputs of 
nutrients and hazardous substances from diffuse 
sources, especially where the main sources are 
from agricultures. 
Water quality criteria, objectives and standards
under the 1992 UN ECE Water Convention
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Annex I of the 1992 UN ECE Water Convention defines 
‘best available technology’ as being: 
‘…the latest stage of development of processes, 
facilities or methods of operation which indicate the 
practical suitability of a particular measure for limiting 
discharges, emissions and waste.  In determining 
whether a set of processes, facilities and methods of 
operation constitute the best available technology in 
general or individual cases, special consideration is 
given to:
(a)  Comparable process, facilities or methods of 
operation which have recently been successful 
tried out;
(b)  Technological advances and changes in 
scientific knowledge and understanding; 
(c)  The economic feasibility of such technology; 
(d)  Time limits for installation in both new and 
existing plants;
(e)  The nature and volume of the discharge and 
effluents concerned; 
(f)    Low- and non-waste technology’
The Annex to the Convention goes on to comment 
that, ‘what is “best available technology” for a 
particular process will change with time in the light 
of technological advances, and economic and social 
factors, as well as in the light of changes in scientific 
knowledge and understanding.’
Additionally, the Annex to the Convention provides 
guidelines for development of best environment 
practices, thus stipulating that the following measures 
should be considered, 
(a)  Provision of information and education to the 
public and to users about the environmental 
consequences of the choice of particular activities 
and products, their use and ultimate disposal; 
(b)  The development and application of codes of 
good environmental practice which cover all 
aspects of the product’s life;  
(c)  Labels informing users of environmental risks 
related to a product, its use and ultimate 
disposal; 
(d)  Collection and disposal systems available to the 
public; 
(e)  Recycling, recovery and reuse;
(f)  Application of economic instruments to activities, 
products or groups of products; 
(g)  A system of licensing, which involves a range of 
restrictions or a ban. 
When determining the suitability of such practices, 
factors that should be taken into account include: 
(a)  the environmental hazard of the product, its 
production, use or ultimate disposal; 
(b)  substitution by less polluting processes or 
substances; 
(c)  scale of use; 
(d)  potential environmental benefit or penalty of 
substitute materials or activities; 
(e)  advances and changes in scientific knowledge 
and understanding; 
(f)  time limits for implementation; and (g) social and 
economic implications.
For more information see: The UN ECE Water 
Convention - http://www.unece.org/env/water.html
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In justifying a broad approach to the definition of 
pollution, the ILA felt that the nature and effect of 
pollutants are likely to change over time, so it was 
better to provide a broad definition, for example ‘any 
detrimental change resulting from human conduct’, 
irrespective of the effects on subsequent users347  
- effects are covered in Article 21(2). The explicit 
reference to ‘human conduct’ in Article 21(1) is intended 
to distinguish between natural and anthropogenic 
changes, and refers to both acts and omissions, or 
failures to act.348 
     In obliging states to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution, ‘that may cause significant harm’; Article 
21(2) incorporates pollution issues within the general 
substantive obligation to prevent significant harm 
contained in Article 7.  Certain harm, even leading to 
significant pollution, may therefore be tolerated if the 
polluting watercourse state is making its ‘best efforts to 
reduce the pollution to a mutually acceptable level.’349   
The rationale behind such a condition, is to prevent 
‘undue hardship’ or inequitable results, whereby the 
detriment to the watercourse state experiencing harm 
is ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the benefit gained by 
the polluting watercourse state.350   However, it should 
be remembered that the polluting watercourse state 
is still under an obligation to exercise ‘due diligence’ 
(see Glossary of Terms) in the reduction of pollution 
to an acceptable level, and ensure consistency with 
Article 20 and other obligations to protect the long-term 
viability of a renewable resource. 
347   Ibid, 11.
348  Ibid, 111.
349  1994 Draft Articles at 122.
350  Ibid.
According to Article 21(2) states are obliged to ‘prevent’ 
new pollution, and ‘reduce and control’ existing 
pollution that may cause significant harm.  The use 
of the term ‘may’ in Article 21(2) also recognises a 
precautionary approach (see Glossary of Terms).351 
     Article 21(2) goes further than Article 7 in 
one respect, namely that harm may be to ‘other 
watercourse States or to their environment’.  As 
stipulated in Article 21(2) such harm may include 
harm to ‘human health or safety’, or the use of 
water for any beneficial purpose. The choice of the 
term ‘environment’ – broader than the concept of 
‘ecosystem’ – was used to cover impacts such as 
those on ‘the living resources of the watercourse’, ‘flora 
and fauna dependent upon the watercourse, and the 
amenities connected with it’.352 
     Like the obligation to protect the ecosystems 
of international watercourses under Article 20, Article 
21(2) requires states to adopt joint measures 
‘where appropriate’.353  
     Closely aligned with the obligation to take joint 
measures is the obligation ‘to take steps’ to harmonise 
policies relating to pollution. The obligation to 
harmonise policies, ‘addresses the problems that 
often arise when states adopt divergent policies, or 
apply different standards, concerning the pollution of 
international watercourses’.354  Article 21(3) expands 
on the need to harmonise polices relating to pollution 
between states by requiring that, watercourse states 
consult over joint measures, such as setting joint water 
quality objectives and criteria; establishing techniques 
and practices to address point and non-point source 
351  Also refer to Article 20 at page 165
352  1994 Draft Articles at 122.
353  See section 20.1 at page 169
354  1994 Draft Articles at 123. 
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pollution; and establish a list of potentially dangerous 
substances.
     The obligation contained in Article 21(3) is one of 
consultation, in good faith355 (see Glossary of Terms), 
consistent with the general obligation to cooperate.  
Although the establishment of such standards will often 
be critical to ensuring that the substantive obligations to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution are met.
355   Refer to section 3.1.4 at page 91.
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The World Health Organisation and Water Quality Standards
The World Health Organisation (WHO) has produced a number of international standards related to water 
quality and human health. The 2011 Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality provide recommendations for 
managing risk from hazards that may compromise the safety of drinking-water. The guidelines can be 
accessed at:  http://whqlibdoc.who.int/
Introduction
(Chapter 1)
A conceptual framework for 
Implementing the Guidelines
(Chapter 2)
Health-based targets
(Chapter 3)
Public Health context
and health outcome 
System
assessment
Monitoring Management and 
communication
Surveillance
(Chapter 5)
Application of the Guidelines 
In specific circumstances
(Chapter 6)
Climate change, Emergencies Rainwater 
harvesting, Desalination systems, Travellers,
Planes and ships etc.
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The World Health Organisation 
Water Quality Standards
| Article 21
179
21.2 Application
21.2.1 Transboundary impacts
A small-scale farmer in state A waters his cattle within 
the waters of an international watercourse, which 
results in waste causing detrimental change to the 
composition and quality of the water.  However, such 
harm is localised and therefore of no harm to human 
health or safety, or to downstream beneficial uses or 
living resources of the watercourse in downstream state 
B.  The actions of the farmer in state A do not therefore 
fall within the scope of the Convention.
21.2.2 Natural vis-à-vis human conduct
Underground percolation of water in state A washes 
minerals into the waters of an international river, causing 
a detrimental change in the composition and quality 
of the water. Such a change is not pollution within the 
definition contained in Article 21 given that it is naturally 
occurring.356 
356 See S Bogdanovic (ed), International Law of Water Resources – Contribution 
of the International Law Association (1954-2000), 111.
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Watercourse states shall take all measures necessary 
to prevent the introduction of species, alien or new, 
into an international watercourse which may have 
effects detrimental to the ecosystem of the watercourse 
resulting in significant harm to other watercourse 
States.
22.1 Commentary
Alien or new species that become invasive are 
considered to be a major direct driver of biodiversity 
loss across the globe.357   The socio-economic costs 
of prevention, control and mitigation, as well as the 
indirect impact on ecological services, can be extremely 
high.358 However, it should be pointed out that not all 
alien or new species would have a detrimental effect 
on ecosystems of international watercourses.  As 
noted by Davis and others, ‘increasingly, the practical 
value of the native-versus-alien species dichotomy in 
conservation is declining’.359 The latter authors call for 
a more considered assessment of the environmental 
impact of new or alien species, and observe that, ‘the 
effects of non-native species may vary with time, and 
species that are not causing harm now might do so in 
the future. But the same is true of natives, particularly in 
rapidly changing environments’.360 
     The text of Article 22 is sensitive to the latter 
concerns in that it does not completely ban the 
introduction of alien or new species.  Instead the 
Article requires states to take all measures necessary 
to prevent the introduction of alien or new species, 
‘which may have effects detrimental to the ecosystem 
of the watercourses resulting in significant harm to other 
watercourse states’. 
     The obligation in Article 22 therefore firstly 
incorporates a precautionary approach through the use 
of the term ‘may’, and secondly sets the threshold at 
‘detrimental effects resulting in significant harm to other 
watercourse states’. 
357  Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Invasive Alien Species – Status, impacts and 
trends of alien species that threaten ecosystems, habitats and species’ (26 February 
2001), UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/6/INF/11, 7.
358  JA McNeely and others (eds.), A Global Strategy on Invasive Alien Species 
(IUCN 2001).
359  MA Davis, ‘Don’t Judge Species on their Origin’ (2011) 474 Nature 153, 153.
360  Ibid.
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Additionally, as with the obligation contained in Article 
21, the obligation in Article 22 is one of due diligence, 
thus requiring states to take all ‘appropriate’ measures 
necessary to prevent the introduction of alien or new 
species (see figure 4.6).
     ‘Species’ is defined by the ILC as including, ‘both 
flora and fauna, such as plants, animals and other 
living organisms.’361 ‘Alien’ relates to ‘species that are 
non-native’, while ‘new’ covers, ‘species that have 
been genetically altered or produced through biological 
engineering.’362   The provision is intended to cover 
the introduction of species into the watercourse itself, 
rather than fish farming or other activities conducted 
outside the watercourse, with no detrimental impact 
on the latter. 363
361  Ibid. 
362  Ibid.
363  Ibid.
22.2 Application
State A (upstream) has allowed invasive non-native 
species, including Himalayan balsam and Japanese 
knotweed, to develop within the upper reaches of river 
X. This has resulted in native species being crowded out 
and, where such species have died down in the winter, 
river banks have become bare resulting in increased 
soil erosion.  The build up of sedimentation due to the 
soil erosion has had significant impacts downstream. 
Most notably, the capacity of storage dams – used for 
agricultural purposes downstream – has been reduced 
considerably due to the build up of sedimentation in the 
dams.  Given that state A has not taken any measures 
to prevent the build up of the alien species within river X, 
they are deemed to be in violation of Article 22 of 
the Convention.
| Article 22
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A. General
Guiding Principle 1 – Precautionary Approach: 
Given the unpredictability of the pathways and 
impacts on biological diversity of invasive alien 
species, efforts to identify and prevent unintentional 
introductions as well as decisions concerning 
intentional introductions should be based on the 
precautionary approach, in particular with reference 
to risk analysis, in accordance with the guiding 
principles below. The precautionary approach is that 
set forth in principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development and in the 
preamble of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
The precautionary approach should also be applied 
when considering eradication, containment and 
control measures in relation to alien species that 
have become established. Lack of scientific certainty 
about the various implications of an invasion should 
not be used as a reason for postponing or failing 
to take appropriate eradication, containment and 
control measures.
Guiding Principle 2 – Three-stage hierarchical 
approach: 
(1)  Prevention is generally far more cost-effective 
and environmentally desirable than measures 
taken following introduction and establishment 
of an invasive alien species. 
(2)  Priority should be given to preventing and 
introduction of invasive alien species, between 
and within states. If an invasive alien species 
has been introduced, early detection and rapid 
action are crucial to prevent its establishment. 
The preferred response is often to eradicate the 
organisms as soon as possible (principle 13). 
In the event that eradication is not feasible or 
resources are not available for its eradication, 
containment (principle 14) and long-term 
control measures (principle 15) should be 
implemented. Any examination of benefits 
and costs (environment, economic and social) 
should be done on a long-term basis. 
Guiding Principles for the Prevention, Introduction and Mitigation of Impacts of 
Alien Species That Threaten Ecosystems, Habitats or Species, Decision V1/23, 
Conference of Parties to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity  
Guiding principle 3: Ecosystem approach: 
Measures to deal with invasive alien species 
should, as appropriate, be based on the ecosystem 
approach, as described in decision V/6 of the 
Conference of the Parties.
Guiding principle 4: The role of states: 
(1) In the context of invasive alien species, states 
should recognize the risk that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control may pose to other 
states as a potential source of invasive alien 
species, and should take appropriate individual 
and cooperative actions to minimise that 
risk, including the provision of any available 
information on invasive behaviour or invasive 
potential of a species. 
(2)  Examples of such activities include: 
(a)  The intentional transfer of an invasive alien 
species to another state (even if it is harmless 
in the state of origin); and 
(b)  The intentional introduction of an alien species 
into their own state if there is a risk of that 
species subsequently spreading (with or 
without a human vector) into another state and 
becoming invasive; 
(c)  Activities that may lead to unintentional 
introductions, even where the introduced 
species is harmless in the state of origin.
(3)  To help states minimise the spread and impact 
of invasive alien species, states should identify, 
as far as possible, species which could 
become invasive and make such information 
available to other states.
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Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Invasive Alien Species 
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ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
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and 2, 123-124.
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Article 23 | 
Protection and 
Preservation of the Marine 
Environment
Watercourse states shall, individually and, where 
appropriate, in cooperation with other states, take all 
measures with respect to an international watercourse 
that are necessary to protect and preserve the marine 
environment, including estuaries, taking into account 
generally accepted international rules and standards.
23.1 Commentary
Land-based pollution is considered to be the single 
most important cause of marine pollution, contributing 
an estimated 80 percent of all marine pollution.364   
Various land-based sources may causes pollution, 
including municipal, industrial and agricultural 
practices. These sources may reach the marine 
environment from the coast, the atmosphere, and via 
international watercourses.365  Economic development, 
coupled with a greater scientific understanding of the 
linkages between freshwater and marine ecosystems, 
has meant that there is now a greater recognition of the 
fact that the status of the marine environment is largely 
dependent on the behaviour of states that may not 
even belong to a particular maritime region.366   Those 
states may be land-locked and not necessarily affected 
by the marine pollution.367  
     Article 23 seeks to address this situation by 
providing a bridge between two legal regimes, the 
law of international watercourses and the law of 
the sea.368   In so doing, the Article complements 
provisions contained in various treaties dealing with 
marine environments.  Such treaties include the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which requires 
states to, ‘adopt laws and regulations to prevent, 
control and reduce pollution of the marine environment 
from land-based sources, including rivers, estuaries, 
pipelines and outfall structures, taking into account 
internally agreed rules, standards and recommended 
364  UN General Assembly, ‘Oceans and the Law of the Sea, Report of the 
Secretary-General,’ (18 August 2004), UN Doc A/59/62/Add.1, 29.  
365  Y Tanaka, ‘Regulation of Land-based Marine Pollution in International Law: A 
Comparative Analysis Between Global and Regional Legal Frameworks’ (2006) 66 
Heidelberg Journal of International Law 533. 
366  S Vinogradov, ‘Marine Pollution via Transboundary Watercourses – An Interface 
of the ‘Shoreline’ and ‘River-Basin’ Regimes in the Wider Black Sea Region’, (2007) 
22(4) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 585, 585-586.
367  Ibid. 
368  A Chircop, ‘Marine Pollution from Land-Based Activities: Legal Regimes and 
Management Frameworks’, in D Vidas and W Ostreng, eds., Order for the Oceans at 
the Turn of the Century (Kluwer Law International 1999), 174. 
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practise and procedures’.369 The latter Convention goes 
on to stipulate that, ‘states, acting especially through 
competent international organisations or diplomatic 
conference, shall endeavour to establish global and 
regional rules, standards and recommended practices 
and procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution 
of the marine environment from land-based sources’.370 
     While there is no legally-binding global instrument 
dealing exclusively with land-based pollution, a non-
binding set of recommendations and guidelines have 
been adopted by UNEP’s Global Programme of Action 
for the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
Land-based Activities (GPA) (see figure 20.6).371  At the 
regional level a number of legally-binding instruments 
deal with land-based sources of pollution. While most 
regional regimes only include coastal states within their 
membership, some allow for non-coastal states to 
become party.372  In its reference to taking into account, 
‘generally accepted rules and standards relating to the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment’, 
Article 23 seeks to ensure that watercourse state 
practice reflects these global and regional instruments.  
In reference to the obligation to ‘take into account’, 
Tanzi and Arcari comment that the obligation, ‘is not 
to impose on watercourse states the straightforward 
application of rules and standards drawn from different 
agreements, but, more modestly, that of ensuring that 
the measures that states are planning or implementing 
on an international watercourse under Article 23 of the 
Convention be at least consistent with the pertinent 
rules and standards governing the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment.’373 
369  UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 207. 
370  UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 207(4). 
371  UNEP, ‘Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Land-Based Activities’ (5 December 1995), UN Doc UNEP(OCA)/
LBAIIG.2/7.
372  S Vinogradov, ‘Marine Pollution via Transboundary Watercourses – An Interface 
of the ‘Shoreline’ and ‘River-Basin’ Regimes in the Wider Black Sea Region’, 590-
591.
373  A Tanzi and M Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the Law of 
International Watercourses, 278.
Additionally, through the use of the term ‘take all 
measures… that are necessary to protect and 
preserve’, Article 23 adopts the same standard of 
responsibility contained, and discussed, under Article 
7, namely that of due diligence (see Glossary of Terms).  
What may be deemed as appropriate can be gleaned 
from the global and regional instruments noted above. 
Measures that might be considered ‘appropriate’ could 
therefore include environmental impact assessments, 
monitoring, notification, information exchange and 
consultation, scientific and technical cooperation, 
assistance to developing countries, development of 
control strategies, and so forth.374  
     The same standards to protect and preserve 
are also included, which would incorporate the 
precautionary approach (see Glossary of Terms). 
Additionally, the same requirement as contained in 
Article 20 is included, namely to cooperate, ‘where 
appropriate’, with other states. 375  However, a slight 
variation occurs in reference to ‘other states’ rather 
than ‘watercourse states’.  This deviation reflects 
that scenario whereby states sharing a particular 
marine environment, but not necessarily the same 
watercourse, may find it advantageous to cooperate.
     The ILC Commentary makes it clear that the 
obligation set forth in this Article is not an obligation 
to protect the marine environment in the strict sense 
of the term, but rather a more precise one to take 
measures with respect to an international watercourse 
that are necessary to protect the marine environment.376  
The latter commentary also makes it clear that 
374  See generally, Y Tanaka, ‘Regulation of Land-based Marine Pollution in 
International Law: A Comparative Analysis Between Global and Regional Legal 
Frameworks’; Also see UNEP, ‘Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities’. 
375  See section 20.1
376  Refer 1994 Draft Articles at 124-125.  
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A. Identify and assess problems related to the: 
(1) nature and severity of problems in relation to: 
food security and poverty alleviation; public 
health; coastal and marine resources and 
ecosystem health, including biological diversity; 
and economic and social benefits and uses, 
including cultural values. 
(2)  severity and impacts of contaminants including 
sewage, persistent organic pollutants, 
radioactive substances, heavy metals, oils, 
nutrients, sediment mobilisation and litter. 
(3)  physical alteration, including habitat 
modification and destruction, in areas of 
concern. 
(4)  sources of degradation, including: coastal and 
upstream point sources; coastal and upstream 
non-point (diffuse) sources; and atmospheric 
deposition caused by transportation, power 
plants and industrial facilities, incinerators and 
agricultural operations. 
(5) the affected or vulnerable areas of concern 
such as critical habitats, habitats of endangered 
species, ecosystem components, shorelines, 
coastal watersheds, estuaries, special 
protected marine and coastal areas, and small 
islands.
B.  Establish priorities for action by assessing 
the five factors above, reflecting the relative 
importance of impacts upon food security, 
public health, coastal and marine resources, 
The Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
Land-based Sources recommends that states: 
ecosystem health, and socio-economic benefits, 
including cultural values in relation to
(i)  source categories, 
(ii)  the area affected 
(iii)  the costs, benefits and feasibility of options for 
action. In the process of establishing priorities, 
states should (amongst others): 
(1) apply integrated coastal area management 
approaches, including provisions to involve 
stakeholders. 
(2) recognise the basic linkages between the 
freshwater and marine environment through 
application of watershed management. 
(3) recognise the basic linkages between sustainable 
development of coastal and marine resources, 
poverty alleviation and protection of the marine 
environment. 
(4)  apply environmental impact assessment 
procedures in assessing options. (5) integrate 
national action with any relevant regional and 
global priorities, programmes and strategies.
C.  Set management objectives for priority problems 
for source categories and areas affected on the 
basis of established priorities. 
D.  Identify, evaluate and select strategies and 
measures to achieve these objectives. 
E.  Develop criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of 
strategies and measures. 
For more information see http://www.gpa.depiweb.org. 
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the requirement in Article 23 is separate from the 
obligations contained in Articles 20-22. Activities that 
cause pollution to an estuary may therefore not meet 
the threshold of significant harm, as stipulated for in 
Article 21, but could still be deemed to have breached 
the requirement contained in this article to protect and 
preserve an estuary.377 
377  1994 Draft Articles at 124. 
23.2 Application
In recent years a coral reef ecosystem shared between 
the coastal states B and C has become severely 
degraded.  It is difficult to pinpoint one factor that has 
led to the degradation of the coral reef, but likely causal 
factors include excessive sediment, nutrient, toxins, 
and pathogen loads. State A, a land-locked country, 
is heavily reliant on agricultural practices.  State A has 
also in recent years exploited its forests for additional 
income.  As well as its contribution to pollution loads, 
these upstream activities have resulted in high levels of 
sedimentation – which is acknowledged as one of the 
primary causes of coral reef ecosystem degradation.  
While states B and C are parties to an agreement that 
seeks to protect the coral reef ecosystem, there is no 
provision for allowing additional states to become party 
to the agreement.  States B and C therefore amend the 
agreement to allow in-land states to become party to it, 
where the activities of those states impact on the status 
of the coral reef.   State A then become a party to the 
wider agreement and its activities are aligned with that 
of Article 23 of the UN Watercourses Convention.
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•	 Convention	for	the	Protection	of	the	
Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution 
(adopted 16 February 1976, entered into 
force 1978), and Protocol on Land-Based 
Sources (adopted 17 May 1980, entered into 
force 17 June 1983)
•	 Kuwait	Regional	Convention	for	Cooperation	
on the Protection of the Marine Environment 
From Pollution (adopted 24 April 1978, 
entered into force 1 July 1979), and Protocol 
for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
Against Pollution from Land-based Sources 
(adopted 1990, entered into force 2 January 
1993) 
•	 Convention	for	Cooperation	in	the	Protection	
and Development of the Marine and Coastal 
Environment of the West and Central African 
Region (adopted March 1981, entered into 
force 5 August 1984)
•	 Convention	for	the	Protection	of	the	Marine	
Environment and Coastal Area of the 
South-East Pacific (adopted 12 November 
1981, entered into force 19 May 1986), and 
Protocol for the Protection of the South-east 
Pacific Against Pollution from Land-based 
Sources (adopted 23 July 1983, entered 21 
September 1986)
•	 Regional	Convention	for	the	Conservation	of	
the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment 
(adopted 14 February 1982, entered into 
force 20 August 1985)
Regional Sea Conventions Addressing Land-based Pollution
•	 Convention	for	the	Protection	and	Development	
of the Marine Environment of the Wider 
Caribbean Region (adopted 24 March 1983, 
entered into force 11 October 1986), and 
Protocol on the Prevention, Reduction and 
Control of Land-based Sources and Activities 
(6 October 1999, entered into force 13 August 
2010)
•	 The	Convention	for	the	Protection,	Management	
and Development of the Marine and Coastal 
Environment of the Eastern African Region 
(adopted 21 June 1985, entered into force 1986)
•	 Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Natural	
Resources and Environment of the South Pacific 
Region (adopted 24 November 1986, entered 
into force 22 August 1990) 
•	 Convention	on	the	Protection	of	the	Black	Sea	
Against Pollution (adopted 21 April 1992, 15 
January 1994), and Protocol on Protection of the 
Black Sea Marine Environment Against Pollution 
from Land-based Sources (adopted 17 April 
2009, not yet in force)
•	 Convention	for	Cooperation	in	the	Protection	
and Sustainable Development of Marine and 
Coastal Environment of the Northeast Pacific 
(adopted 18 February 2002, not yet in force) 
•	 The	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	the	Marine	
Environment of the North-east Atlantic   
(adopted 22 September 1992, entered into  
force 25 March 1998)
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Article 24 | Management
1.  Watercourse states shall, at the request of any 
of them, enter into consultations concerning the 
management of an international watercourse, 
which may include the establishment of a joint 
management mechanism.
2.  For the purposes of this article, ‘management’ 
refers, in particular, to: (a) planning the sustainable 
development of an international watercourse and 
providing for the implementation of any plans 
adopted; and (b) otherwise promoting the rational 
and optimal utilisation, protection and control of 
the watercourse.
24.1 Commentary
Article 24(1) can be seen as an extension of a number 
of articles contained within the Convention, most 
notably at the general level, the obligation to cooperate 
(Article 8) and the obligation of equitable participation 
in Article 5(2).  ‘Joint management mechanisms’ may 
also be the most appropriate instrument to implement 
a range of specific provisions contained within the 
Convention, such as the need to regularly exchange 
data and information (Article 9), the requirement to 
notify and consult on planned measures (Articles 11-
19), the obligation to protect and preserve ecosystems 
(Article 20, and Articles 21-23), regulate flow (Article 
25), prevent and mitigate harmful conditions (Article 27), 
address emergency situations (Article 28), and settle 
disputes peacefully (Article 33). 
     The obligation contained in Article 24, consistent 
with Article 8, is to ‘enter into consultations’, 
concerning the management of an international 
watercourse, ‘which may’ include the establishment 
of a joint management mechanism.  The result of 
any consultations is therefore left open, and there 
is no explicit obligation to actually establish such 
mechanisms. The UN Watercourses Convention 
therefore falls short of the stricter requirement 
contained in the 1992 UN ECE Water Convention 
which, pursuant to Article 9(2), explicitly requires 
riparian parties to establish ‘joint bodies’.378  
     However, in his sixth ILC report as Special 
Rapporteur, McCaffrey observed that, ‘the 
management of international watercourse systems 
through joint institutions is not only an increasingly 
common phenomenon, but also a form of co-
operation between watercourse States that is almost 
indispensable if anything approaching optimum 
utilisation and protection of the system of waters is to 
378  Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes (adopted 17 March 1992, entered into force 6 October 1996), 
(1992) 31 International Legal Materials 1312. 
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be attained’ [emphasis added].379  Similar sentiments 
were voiced by the ILA, which observed that, ‘the need 
for an institutionalised co-ordination of competitive 
and concurrent needs and interests is deeply felt by 
the international community and is evidenced by the 
considerable number of agreements concluded in this 
respect.’ 380Effective implementation of the Convention 
will therefore almost invariably rest on some degree 
of joint institutional arrangement being established 
between watercourse states. 
     What might constitute a ‘joint management 
mechanism’ is also quite open. In its commentary, 
the ILC suggested that the term ‘joint management 
mechanism’ might encompass not only formal 
organisational arrangements, but less formal means 
such as, ‘the holding of regular meetings between 
the appropriate agencies or other representatives of 
the States concerned.’ 381  The ILA adopted alternative 
terminology when it considered ‘international water 
resource administrations’, which were defined as, ‘any 
form of institutional or other arrangement established 
by agreement among two or more Basin States’, thus 
recognising the need to formalise the relationship.  In 
adopting the latter approach, the ILA commented 
that, ‘it is not possible in the abstract to suggest any 
particular type of administrative institution such as 
a single or several, ad hoc or permanent, technical 
or political, joint international, co-ordinating, policy-
making, operational or regulatory commissions, 
committees, boards, authorities or agencies’.382   
Pursuant to the 1992 UN ECE Water Convention, ‘Joint 
379  ILC, ‘Sixth Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, by Mr Stephen C McCaffrey, Special Rapporteur’, UN Doc A/
CN.4/436 and Corr 1, para. 7.
380   S Bogdanovic (ed), International Law of Water Resources – Contribution of the 
International Law Association (1954-2000), 251.
381  1994 Draft Articles at 125.
382  S Bogdanovic (ed), International Law of Water Resources – Contribution of the 
International Law Association (1954-2000), 253. 
Bodies’ are defined as, ‘any bilateral or multilateral 
commission or other appropriate arrangements for 
cooperation between the riparian parties.’383  The 
Guide to Implementing the Convention goes further by 
describing ‘joint commissions’ as, ‘a collective term 
meant to cover also, for example, “joint water authority”, 
“committee”, “joint working group”, etc’.384 
     Article 24(2) of the UN Watercourses Convention 
sets out the common features of ‘management’ 
including planning and implementation. Most of the 
specific terms contained in Article 24(2) are included 
in other provisions of the Convention, which can be 
read as an explicit attempt to align management 
activities with the substantive Articles 5-7.  The ILC 
goes on to observe that, ‘management’ would include 
the functions of, ‘planning of sustainable, multi-
purpose and integrated development of international 
watercourses; facilitation of regular communication and 
exchange of data and information between watercourse 
states; and monitoring international watercourses on a 
continuous basis’ (see Figure 20.8).385   
     The UNECE’s Implementation Guide identifies 
some common features of commissions, including: 
(i) a permanent body meeting reasonably regularly; 
(ii) compromised of representations of riparian states, 
including officials from water and water-related 
authorities from national, regional and local authorities; 
(iii) with decision-making, executive and subsidiary 
bodies, such as working or expert groups, monitoring, 
data collection and processing unites; and (iv) often 
including a secretariat.386
383  UN ECE, ‘Draft Guide to Implementing the Convention, (31 August 2009), UN 
Doc ECE/MP.WAT/2009/L.2, 88-92 
384  Ibid.
385  1994 Draft Articles at 125. 
386  UN ECE, ‘Draft Guide to Implementing the Convention, 89.
| Article 24
193
The 1992 UN ECE Water Convention identifies a 
number of tasks that ‘joint bodies’ should conduct 
including,
(a) To collect, compile and evaluate data in order 
to identify pollution sources likely to cause 
transboundary impact;
(b) To elaborate joint monitoring programmes 
concerning water quality and quantity;
(c) To draw up inventories and exchange 
information on the pollution sources;
(d) To elaborate emission limits for waste water 
and evaluate the effectiveness of control 
programmes;
(e) To elaborate joint water-quality objectives and 
criteria, and to propose relevant measures for 
maintaining and, where necessary, improving 
the existing water quality;
Roles and Responsibilities of ‘Joint Bodies’ 
under the 1992 UN ECE Water Convention
(f) To develop concerted action programmes for 
the reduction of pollution loads from both point 
sources (e.g. municipal and industrial sources) 
and diffuse sources (particularly from agriculture);
(g) To establish warning and alarm procedures;
(h) To serve as a forum for the exchange of 
information on existing and planned uses of water 
and related installations that are likely to cause 
transboundary impact;
(i) To promote cooperation and exchange of 
information on the best available technology, as 
well as to encourage cooperation in scientific 
research programmes;
(j) To participate in the implementation of 
environmental impact assessments relating 
to transboundary waters, in accordance with 
appropriate international regulations.
For more information see ‘UNECE, River basin 
commissions and other institutions for transboundary 
water cooperation’ (2009),http://www.unece.org/
fileadmin/DAM/env/water/documents/CWC_publication_
joint_bodies.pdf> accessed 18 May 2012.
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In its Guidelines for the Establishment of an 
International Water Resources Administration,the ILA 
goes further by recommending that such institutions 
serve a range of functions, including (i) advisory, 
consultative, co-ordinating, or policy-making; (ii) 
executive, such as carrying out studies, exploration, 
investigation and surveys, preparation of feasibility 
reports, inspection and control construction, 
operation, maintenance and financing; (iii) regulatory 
function, including implementation of decisions of the 
administration, as well as law-making; and (iv) judicial, 
including arbitration and final dispute settlement.   In 
terms of objects and purposes, the ILA Guidelines 
suggest that such institutions should: (i) collect and 
exchange information and data; (ii) formulate, co-
ordinate and exchange joint and national plans; (iii) 
construct, operate and maintain waterworks; (iv) control 
one or more beneficial uses of water; (v) control the 
harmful effects of water; and (vi) control water quality.   
Similarly, the 1992 UN ECE Water Convention provides 
specific tasks that joint bodies must carry out. 
24.2 Application
State A, B and C share river X.  The catchment of 
the river is largely within the territory of states B  and 
C, although state A’s territory contributes part of the 
flow of the river.  States B and C have entered into 
a treaty arrangement for the joint use, development 
and protection of river X.  The arrangement sets up a 
sophisticated institutional arrangement which includes 
a joint commission encompassing a secretariat, 
working groups, and so forth.  The activities of the 
commission include joint monitoring of the river, joint 
infrastructure development, stakeholder participation, 
and compliance and enforcement mechanisms.   State 
B and State C consider that the commission has 
been an effective means by which to use, develop 
and protect river X in a collective manner.  Given the 
success of the institutional arrangement, States B and 
C would like state A to become party to the institutional 
arrangement. State A is not willing to become party 
to the institutional arrangement.  While state A is 
keen to cooperate with states B and C in the sharing 
of data and information, monitoring, development 
plans, and so forth it feels that the financial costs of 
joining such a sophisticated institutional arrangement 
as the commission outweigh the benefits.   States B 
and C argue that state B has an obligation to join the 
commission given the explicit and implicit requirements 
under Article 24 of the UN Watercourses Convention.  
As no agreement can be made, and in an endeavour to 
maintain good relations between the states, the parties 
submit their dispute to a tribunal.   The court supports 
state A’s position on the basis that its contribution and 
use of the river is negligible compared to States B and 
C, and it is therefore able to satisfy the requirements of 
the Convention in relation to river X without entering into 
any institutional arrangement. 
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24.3 Additional reading
Burchi S and Spreij M, Institutions for International Freshwater 
Management (UNESCO 2003).
Dombrosky I, Conflict, Cooperation and Institutions in 
International Water Management: An Economic Analysis 
(Edward Elgar 2007).
Ely N and Wolman A, ‘Administration’, in Garretson, AH, 
Hayton RD and Olmstead CJ (eds.), The Law of International 
Drainage Basins (Oceana Publications 1968).
ILA, ‘Administration of International Watercourses’, in S 
Bogdanovic (ed), International Law of Water Resources – 
Contribution of the International Law Association (1954-2000) 
(Kluwer Law International 2001), 245-268.
ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses’, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.493 and Add.1 
and 2, 125-127.
‘International River Basin Organisations’ <http://www.
transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/RBO> accessed 25 
October 2011.
Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of International Watercourses (Kluwer Law International 
2001), 214-216.
UN ECE, ‘Draft Guide to Implementing the Convention, (31 
August 2009), UN Doc ECE/MP.WAT/2009/L.2, 88-92.
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1.  Watercourse states shall cooperate, where 
appropriate, to respond to the needs or 
opportunities for regulation of the flow of the 
waters of an international watercourse. 
2.  Unless otherwise agreed, watercourse states 
shall participate on an equitable basis in the 
construction and maintenance or defrayal of the 
costs of such regulation works as they may have 
agreed to undertake. 
3.  For the purposes of this article, ‘regulation’ 
means the use of hydraulic works or any other 
continuing measure to alter, vary or otherwise 
control the flows of the waters of an international 
watercourse.
25.1 Commentary
The ILA justifies the need for regulation on that basis 
that, ‘under natural conditions, the periodic changes 
of the flow of water of an uncontrolled watercourse 
may lead to damage during high flood-flows, and on 
the other hand may lead to scarcity of water during a 
dry period.’387 A strong link therefore exists between 
this Article and Article 20.  As noted previously, 
Article 20 implies the need to recognise a ‘minimum 
flow.’388  On this point, Utton and Utton maintain that, 
‘river regulation directly mandates the maintenance 
of minimum flows for the dilution of pollutants and for 
other reasons.’389
     Article 25(3) defines ‘regulation’ as meaning ‘the use 
of hydraulic works or any other continuing measures to 
alter, vary or otherwise control the flows of the waters 
of an international watercourse.’  Such measures might 
include ‘dams, reservoirs, weirs, canals, embankments, 
dykes, and river ban fortifications’. 390  A similar 
approach is adopted by the ILA, which define regulation 
as, ‘continuing measures intended for controlling, 
moderating, increasing and otherwise modifying the 
flow of the waters in an international watercourse for 
any purpose; such measures may include storing, 
releasing and diverting of water by means such as 
dams, reservoirs, barrages and canals’391.  
     As well as defining the scope of regulation activities, 
Article 25 also sets out the obligations incumbent 
upon states, which can be seen as an extension of 
the requirements found elsewhere in the Convention, 
such as the substantive requirements under Articles 
5 and 7 to utilise an international watercourse in an 
equitable reasonable manner, and under Article 8 the 
387  S Bogdanovic (ed), International Law of Water Resources – Contribution of the 
International Law Association (1954-2000), at 253.
388  See pages 167-168.
389  AE Utton and J Utton, ‘The International Law of Minimum Stream Flows’ (1999) 
10 Colorado Journal of International Law and Policy 7, 36.
390  1994 Draft Articles at 127.
391  S Bogdanovic (ed), International Law of Water Resources – Contribution of the 
International Law Association (1954-2000), 274.
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obligation to cooperate.  Article 25(1) therefore sets 
out the obligation that, ‘where appropriate’ states 
should cooperate in the regulation of international 
watercourses. The importance of such cooperation is 
clearly spelled out by the ILA which states:
‘The regulation of a border-river is hardly possible 
without the co-operation or consent of the state on the 
other side of the river. As regards watercourses crossing 
state borders, efficient regulation of activities likewise 
require the close co-operation of the states concerned. 
There are often important reasons which speak in 
favour of a joint venture but also in other cases it is 
obvious that legal questions relating to the regulation 
of an international watercourse must be settled by an 
agreement between the states concerned.’392
The ILA also points out that, ‘planning and the 
realisation of regulation may be a very complicated 
undertaking. Different kinds of information, particularly 
meteorological and hydrological data, must be 
collected, technical possibilities and economic factors 
must be evaluated, and the legal conditions of the 
undertaking must be cleared up and settled.’393
     Clearly, within an international watercourse, such 
activities require a strong level of cooperation between 
watercourse states.  
Cooperative activities are likely to include: 
(i)  the collection and exchange of data; 
(ii)  the preparation and mutual exchange of surveys, 
investigations and studies;
(iii)  planning and designing of relevant measures; 
(iv)  operation and maintenance of works; 
392  Ibid, 271. 
393  Ibid, 271.
(v)  sharing expenses; and 
(vi)  forecasting and communication of relevant 
 hydrological data.394 
However, the ILC is keen to point out that the use of 
the term ‘where appropriate’ implies that states are 
not under a strict obligation to identify needs and 
opportunities for regulation, but rather to ‘respond to 
those that exist.’395 
     Consistent with Article 5(2) of the UN Watercourses 
Convention any form of cooperation between 
watercourse states will be agreed on an equitable 
basis. Where the construction and maintenance 
of regulation works has taken place, the costs and 
benefits of such activities will therefore be allocated on 
an equitable basis. If one state derives all the benefits 
from regulation, on the basis of equity, they should bear 
the full costs.396 
394  Ibid, 280. 
395  1994 Draft Articles  at 126.
396  Ibid, 127.
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25.2 Application
State A, an upstream state, has developed a dam 
upstream on river X, which is primarily used for 
hydropower generation, although water is stored within 
the reservoir for the benefit of agricultural needs within 
the state.  State A is a relatively poor state compared 
to its downstream neighbour state B. State A wishes 
to store more water in the reservoir in order to provide 
increased supplies of water for agricultural purposes 
throughout the year.  However, state B argues that 
such water storage will have a detrimental effect on 
their downstream agricultural needs.  Having jointly 
commissioned a joint options appraisal, the parties 
agree to jointly cooperate over the regulation of the 
river.  Annual, seasonal and monthly flow regimes 
are therefore worked out, which allow for agricultural 
needs in upstream state A, as well has hydropower 
generation. State B is able to benefit from relatively 
stable water flows to satisfy its basic agricultural 
requirements.  While there is not enough water for state 
B to expand its agricultural industry in the river basin, it 
is able to rely on favourable prices for the sale of energy 
from the hydropower generation in upstream state A, 
which benefits industrial development in the region.
25.3 Additional reading
ILA, ‘Regulation of the Flow of Water of International 
Watercourses, in S Bogdanovic (ed), International Law of 
Water Resources – Contribution of the International Law 
Association (1954-2000) (Kluwer Law International 2001), 
269-292.
ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses’, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.493 and Add.1 
and 2, 126-127.
‘International River Basin Organisations’ <http://www.
transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/RBO> accessed 25 
October 2011.
Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of International Watercourses (Kluwer Law International 
2001), 214-216.
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Article 26 | Installations
 1.  Watercourse states shall, within their respective 
territories, employ their best efforts to maintain 
and protect installations, facilities and other works 
related to an international watercourse.
2.  Watercourse states shall, at the request of 
any of them which has reasonable grounds to 
believe that it may suffer significant adverse 
effects, enter into consultations with regard 
to: (a) The safe operation and maintenance of 
installations, facilities or other works related to an 
international watercourse; and (b) the protection 
of installations, facilities or other works from wilful 
or negligent acts or the forces of nature.
26.1 Commentary
Article 26 of the UN Watercourses Convention 
concerns ‘installations, facilities and other works’ which 
are defined by the ILC as including, ‘dams, barrages, 
dykes and weirs.’397   As stipulated in Article 26(1), 
and consistent with the due diligence obligations (see 
Glossary of Terms) found elsewhere in the Convention, 
states are under an obligation to employ their ‘best 
efforts’ to maintain and protect installations, facilities 
and other works.  The question of whether or not a 
state has fulfilled this obligation will therefore rest on 
examination of its capacity.  As noted by the ILC: 
‘A watercourse state should exercise due diligence to 
maintain a dam, that is to say, keep it in good order, 
such that it will not burst, causing significant harm 
to other watercourse states. Similarly, all reasonable 
precautions should be taken to protect such works 
from foreseeable kinds of damage due to forces of 
nature, such as floods, or to human acts, whether wilful 
or negligent. The wilful acts in question would include 
terrorism and sabotage, while negligent conduct would 
encompass any failure to exercise ordinary care under 
the circumstances which resulted in damage to the 
installation in question.’398
397  1994 Draft Articles at 127.
398   Ibid, 128.
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Article 26(2) requires states to enter into consultations, 
where one state has, ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe 
that they may suffer significant adverse effects.   As 
noted above,399  in the use of the term ‘may suffer 
significant adverse effects’, the threshold is set at 
a lower level than significant harm.  Article 26(2) 
envisages two scenarios in which consultations might 
arise. Firstly, in relation to operation and maintenance; 
and secondly, where ‘wilful or negligent acts or forces 
of nature’ arise. This Article should be contrasted with 
Article 28 dealing with emergency situations.  While 
the latter Article deals with imminent threats, Article 26 
would be more preventative in nature.
399  See section 3.1.3 for an explanation of significant adverse effects.
26.2 Application
State A, an upstream state, has neglected to maintain a 
dam in the upper reaches of river X.  Much of the area’s 
population has moved elsewhere in search of jobs and 
improved livelihoods.  The dam is therefore not used 
for any purposes.  The region is particular vulnerable to 
earthquakes and one day an earthquake compromises 
the integrity of the dam, which leads to a major release 
of water from the reserve. This in turn impacts on the 
lives and livelihoods of populations living alongside the 
river in downstream state B.  Pursuant to Article 26, 
state A is found liable for the damage caused due to 
the improper maintenance of the dam.
26.3 Additional reading
ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses’, UN Doc A/
CN.4/L.493 and Add.1 and 2, 127-128.
Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United Nations Convention 
on the Law of International Watercourses (Kluwer Law 
International 2001), 220-221.
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Article 27 | 
Prevention and Mitigation 
of Harmful Conditions
Key points
•	 Article	27	of	the	UN	Watercourses	Convention	
provides that states are under an obligation 
to individually and, where appropriate, jointly 
take measures to prevent or mitigate harmful 
conditions that may be a result of both natural 
causes, such as floods and droughts, or human 
conduct. 
•	 In	focusing	on	the	prevention	and	mitigation	
of harmful conditions, Article 27 provides an 
important bridge to strategies concerning the 
adaptation to climate change. 
•	 While	Article	27	focuses	on	the	prevention	and	
mitigation of harmful conditions, Article 28 deals 
with the situation where harmful conditions 
nevertheless occur.  
•	 Pursuant	to	Article	28	states	must	notify	
potentially affected states and competent 
international organisations of emergency 
situations; and states should cooperate in order 
to prevent, mitigate and eliminate the effects of 
such emergency situations. 
•	 Article	28	also	requires	states	and	international	
organisations, where necessary, to jointly develop 
contingency plans to respond to emergencies. 
Watercourse states shall, individually and, where 
appropriate, jointly, take all appropriate measures to 
prevent or mitigate conditions related to an international 
watercourse that may be harmful to other watercourse 
states, whether resulting from natural causes or human 
conduct, such as flood or ice conditions, water-borne 
diseases, siltation, erosion, salt-water intrusion, drought 
or desertification.
Part V | Harmful 
Conditions and 
Emergency Situations 
(Articles 27-28)
Convention text
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27.1 Commentary
In recent years there has been a growing recognition 
that climate change will continue to cause an increase 
in the magnitude and frequency of extreme events. 
Such events will have a range of impacts on social, 
economic and environmental uses of international 
watercourses (See figure 27.1).  Article 27 of the UN 
Watercourses Convention deals with the prevention 
and mitigation of such events or ‘harmful conditions’.  
Pursuant to the article, these ‘harmful conditions’ 
include ‘flood or ice conditions, water-borne diseases, 
siltation, erosion, salt-water intrusion, drought or 
desertification.’ While limited in content, this Article 
provides an important link between the law of 
international watercourses, and international law and 
policy relating to climate change adaptation. 
     In terms of international law relating to climate 
change, the 1992 Climate Change Convention obliges 
states to, ‘cooperate in preparing for adaptation to 
the impacts of climate change; develop and elaborate 
appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone 
management, water resources and agriculture, and for 
the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particular in 
Africa, affected by drought and desertification, as 
well as floods.’400    
     Along similar lines but in more general terms Article 
27 of the UN Watercourses Convention requires 
states to adopt, ‘all appropriate measures’ to prevent 
or mitigate conditions related to an international 
watercourse that may be harmful to other 
watercourse states; thus couching this Article as a 
due diligence obligation. 
     While what may constitute ‘appropriate measures’ 
has been discussed generally within the context of 
Article 7 of the UN Watercourses Convention,401 it is 
important to recognise that there has been a growing 
400  UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered 
into force 24 March 1994) (1992) 31 International Legal Materials 849, art 4(1) (e). 
401  See section 7.1.
trend to develop adaptation measures to cope with the 
impacts of climate change.  The importance of such 
adaptation measures cannot be underestimated.  As 
noted by the UN ECE, ‘adaptation to climate change 
is … indispensable and urgent since the climate is 
already changing in some respects, and mitigation will 
take too long to show effects. Further climate change 
throughout this century and beyond is almost certain 
even if global mitigation efforts prove successful. In 
addition it is more cost-effective to start preparing 
adaptation now.’402 
     Tarlock maintains that, ‘adaptation to the projected 
adverse hydrological impacts of global climate change 
requires the presence of a reasonably well-developed 
property rights regime in the effected basin, and that 
the regime must be supported by public and private 
adaptive management institutions’.403  Within the 
context of international watercourses, joint institutions 
are therefore considered an effective mechanism by 
which to cope with the hydrological impacts of climate 
change.  Tanzi and Arcari even maintain that, ‘the fact 
that a state has adopted all the appropriate measures 
that can be taken individually may not be sufficient to 
face certain harmful conditions or emergency situations 
adequately. Cooperation through joint action could be 
required according to the circumstances pertaining 
either to the nature of the actual harmful conditions, or 
to the affected area’ [emphasis added].404 
402  UN ECE, Guidance on Water and Adaptation to Climate Change 
(UN 2009), 11. 
403  D Tarlock, ‘How Well Can International Water Allocation Regimes Adapt to 
Global Climate Change?’ (2000) 15 Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law 
423, 424.
404   A Tanzi and M Arcari, The United Nation Convention on the Law of 
International Watercourses (Kluwer Law International 2001), 222.  See also S C 
McCaffrey, ‘The Need for Flexibility in Freshwater Treaty Regimes’ (2003) Natural 
Resources Forum 156, 160-161.
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Figure 5.1 | Effects of climate 
change and its impacts on 
water services
Observed effect Observed/ possible impacts
Increase in atmospheric temperature
Increase in surface water temperature
Sea-level rise
Shifts in precipitation patterns
Increase in interannual precipitation 
variability
Increased evapotranspiration
More frequent and intense extreme 
events
•	 Reduction	in	water	availability	in	basins	fed	by	
glaciers that are shrinking, as observed in some 
cities along the Andes in South America
•	 Reductions	in	dissolved	oxygen	content,	mixing	
patterns, and self purification capacity
•	 Increase	in	algal	blooms
•	 Salinisation	of	coastal	aquifers
•	 Changes	in	water	availability	due	to	changes	in	
precipitation and other related phenomena (e.g. 
groundwater recharge, evaportranspiration
•	 Increases	the	difficulty	of	flood	control	and	
reservoir utilisation during the flooding season
•	 Water	availability	reduction
•	 Salinisation	of	water	resources
•	 Lower	groundwater	levels
•	 Floods	affect	water	quality	and	water	
infrastructure integrity, and increase fluvial 
erosion, which introduces different kinds of 
pollutants to water resources
•	 Droughts	affect	water	availability	and	water	quality
Amended from BC Bates, ZW Kundzewicz, S Wu and JP 
Palutikof (eds.), Climate Change and Water (IPPC 2008), 70.
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Within the context of Article 27 of the UN Watercourses 
Convention, the ILC identifies a number of measures 
that may assist in the prevention and mitigation of 
harmful conditions and might be facilitated through joint 
institutions, namely the regular and timely exchange of 
data and information, holding consultations concerning 
planning and implementation of joint measures, and 
the preparation of studies of the efficacy of measures 
that have been taken’. 405 Cooley and others also 
suggest that an important role that can be played by 
joint institutions is ‘to convene a technical committee to 
develop a common hydrological model of the basin and 
common climate change scenarios’.406    
Within the context of flooding the ILA identifies a 
number of areas where states may cooperate, including 
(i)  the collection and exchange of relevant data:, 
(ii)  the preparation of surveys, investigations and 
studies and their mutual exchange; 
(iii)  planning and designing of relevant measures;
(iv)  execution of flood control measures; 
(v)  operation and maintenance of works; 
(vi)  flood forecasting and communication of flood 
warnings; and 
405  1994 Draft Articles at 129.
406  H Cooley and others, Understanding and Reducing the Risk of Climate Change 
for Transboundary Waters (Pacific Institute 2009), 16.
(vi)  setting up of a regular information service 
charged to transmit the height of water levels and 
the discharge quantities.407  
Along similar lines is the UN ECE’s Model Provisions 
on Flood Management, that states should cooperate in 
order to: 
(i)  monitor/ data collection, exchange of hydrological 
and meteorological data, and development of a 
forecasting model covering the whole river basin 
or of a linkage between the Parties’ respective 
forecasting models;
(ii)  prepare surveys, studies (including cost-benefit 
or cost-effectiveness analysis), flood plain 
maps, flood risk assessments and flood risk 
maps, taking due account of local knowledge, 
and exchange of relevant national data and 
documentation; 
(iii)  develop a comprehensive flood action plan or a 
set of co-ordinated flood action plans addressing 
407  ILA, ‘Flood Control’, in S Bogdanovic, International Law of Water Resources 
– Contribution of the ILA (1954 – 2000) (Kluwer Law International 2001), 151. See 
also A Rieu-Clarke, ‘A Survey of International Law Relating to Flood Management: 
Existing Practices and Future Prospects’, (2008) 48 Natural Resources Journal 649.
Work area 6 of the Nairobi work programme, under 
the UN Climate Change Convention, seeks to collect, 
analyse and disseminate information on past and 
current practical adaptation actions and measures so 
that governments, relevant organisations, business, 
communities, decision makers, and other regional 
and national stakeholders can learn from each other 
to reduce vulnerability and adapt to the impacts of 
climate change in the most effective manner.  The 
range of potential adaptation actions include short- 
and long-term strategies and projects involving 
changes in lifestyle and behaviour, resource 
management such as farming, food and water 
Adaptation Planning and Practices - Work Area 6 of the Nairobi Work Programme
storage, and changes in regulatory frameworks 
and laws such as for housing and infrastructure. 
The effectiveness of a practice tends to be context-
specific, although there is still much value in sharing 
knowledge and information on practices so that 
they can be considered, replicated, improved and/or 
adapted to suit different needs, scales and geographic 
locations.
(For more information see: http://unfccc.int/adaptation/
nairobi_work_programme/programme_activities_and_
work_areas/items/3991.php)
| Article 27
205
prevention, protection, preparedness and 
response and providing common objectives, joint 
action, contingency plans, information policy, 
flood plain management and, where appropriate, 
flood control works and financing mechanisms; 
(iv)  raise awareness and provide access to 
information, publication participation and access 
to justice408 (see also text 27.3 EU floods 
directive).
408  UN ECE, ‘Declaration of Bonn, Rules of procedures for Meetings of the Parties 
and Model Provisions on Transboundary Flood Management’ (23 December 2008), 
ECE/MP.WAT/19/Add1. See also, UN ECE, ‘Sustainable Flood Prevention’ (14 
January 2000), MP.WAT/2000/7.
27.2 Application
Six riparian states have established a joint commission 
to manage river X.  Recently the states have set up 
a working group under the institutional structure of 
the commission entitled ‘Climate Change Adaptation 
Strategies’.  Firstly, the working group commissioned 
a study on ‘Scenarios for the Discharge Regime of the 
Regime’, which examines how the discharge patterns 
of the river may be effected by climate change. The 
effects considered included flood periods and low 
flow periods.  Various aspects were considered 
including the likely impact of increased flooding, lower 
flows affecting navigation, and reducing groundwater 
recharge, as well as quality issues. Following the 
evaluating of likely scenarios the states are now in the 
process of developing adaptation measures to address 
the likely scenarios. 
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The Floods Directive focuses on three areas: 
(1) preliminary flood risk assessment; 
(2) flood maps; and 
(3) flood risk management plans. 
In the context of flood risk assessment, member states 
are obligated to conduct a preliminary assessment, 
which should include maps of the river basin district, a 
description of past floods which have had a significant 
adverse impact, and the likely adverse consequences 
of future floods. Following the preliminary flood risk 
assessment, member states must identify those 
river basin districts where potential significant flood 
risks exist or might be considered likely to occur. The 
Floods Directive also provides that preliminary flood 
assessments must be made available to the public.
For areas where a potential significant flood risk 
exists or might be considered likely to occur, member 
states must prepare flood hazard maps and flood risk 
maps. Flood hazard maps should contain information 
on the potential extent of floods, water depths or 
water level, and flow velocity or relevant water flow, 
where appropriate.’ Flood risk maps should show the 
potential adverse consequences associated with likely 
The 2007 European Union Floods Directive
floods, in terms of, inter alia, inhabitants, economic 
activities, and installations affected. Under the Floods 
Directive, member states are obliged to ensure that 
the maps are made available to the public.
Finally, member states are required to establish 
flood risk management plans. Active involvement 
of ‘interested parties’ in the production, review, and 
updating of the flood risk management plans must 
be encouraged by the member states, and the plans 
must be made available to the public. Management 
plans should include conclusions made after the 
first preliminary flood risk assessment, flood hazard 
and flood risk maps, a description of the appropriate 
objectives of flood risk management, and a summary 
of measures and their aims to achieve the appropriate 
objectives of flood risk management’. The flood 
risk management plan should also include: ‘(1) a 
description of the prioritisation and the way in which 
progress in implementing the plan will be monitored; 
(2) a summary of public information and consultation 
measures/action taken; and (3) a list of competent 
authorities and, as appropriate, a description of the 
coordination process within any international river 
basin district.’
For more informations see: http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/water/flood_risk/index.htm
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Within the context of the Mekong, the Mekong River 
Commission has implemented a programme for Flood 
Management and Mitigation.  
The programme was established in 2005 and consists 
of five components, namely
 (i)  the establishment of a regional flood centre in 
Phnom Penh, Cambodia that provides flood-
related tools, data and knowledge at national 
and regional levels, produces regional flood 
forecasts, and provides tools for flood risk 
assessment and transboundary impact analysis; 
(ii)  structural measures and flood proofing, 
including reservoirs, embankments and 
waterways; 
Floods and the Mekong River Commission
(iii)  mediation of transboundary flood issues, that 
facilitates dialogue and resolution of issues 
concerning land management and land use 
planning, infrastructure development and cross-
border emergency management of floods;
(iv)  flood emergency management, which seeks to 
deal with the negative impacts of floods more 
effectively through capacity building, knowledge 
sharing and public awareness campaigns; and 
(v)  land management, which covers issues such as 
land use planning and damage reducing land 
management policies.
For more information visit: http://www.mrcmekong.org/
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1. Establish the policy, legal and institutional 
framework
a. Assess existing international commitments, 
policies, laws and regulations for water and 
related sectors (e.g. agriculture, health case, 
hydropower development, inland water 
transport, forestry, disaster management, nature 
conservation) in relation to their effectiveness 
in reducing climate-induced vulnerabilities and 
to their capacity to support the development 
of adaptation strategies and then revise and 
complement them as needed; 
b. Define the institutional processes through which 
adaptation measures are or will be planned and 
implemented, including where decision-making 
authority lies at the transboundary, national 
and local levels and what the links are between 
these levels; 
2. Understand the vulnerability of society
a. Ascertain the information needed to assess 
vulnerability
b. Gauge the future effects of climate change 
on the hydrological conditions of the specific 
transboundary basin in terms of water demand 
and water availability, including its quality, based 
on different socio-economic and environmental 
scenarios; 
c. Identify the main current and climate-induced 
vulnerabilities that affect communities, with 
particular attention paid to water resources and 
the health-related aspects; 
d. Determine, through participatory processes, 
the needs, priorities and adaptive capacities of 
different states; 
UN ECE – Key-steps for the development of an adaptation strategy:
3. Develop, finance and implement an adaptation 
strategy
a. Identify potential adaptation measures to 
reduce vulnerability to climate change and 
climate variability by preventing negative 
effects, by enhancing the resilience of natural, 
social and economic systems to climate 
change, or by reducing the effects of extreme 
events through preventive, preparatory, reactive 
and recovery measures. Measures should 
include both structural and non-structural 
measures as well as the financial means 
and the institutional changes necessary to 
implement successful adaptation processes; 
b. Based on participatory processes, prioritise 
the potential measures and investments 
needed taking into account the financial and 
institutional resources and other means and 
knowledge available to implement them; 
c. Ensure the step-by-step implementation 
of the adaptation strategy, in accordance 
with determined priorities, including coping 
measures from the local to the states and 
transboundary level. 
4. Evaluate
a. Determine whether the measures are 
implemented and if those measures that are 
implemented lead to reduction of vulnerability; 
if not, adjust the measures accordingly; 
b. Assess whether the scenarios as applied 
materialise in practice and adjust them 
accordingly. 
For more information see: UNECE, Guidance on 
Water and Adaptation to Climate Change 
(UNECE 2009).
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1.  For the purpose of this article, ‘emergency’ 
means a situation that causes or poses an 
imminent threat of causing, serious harm to 
watercourse states or other states and that 
results suddenly from natural causes, such as 
floods, the breaking up of ice, landslides or 
earthquakes, or from human conduct, such as 
industrial accidents. 
2.  A watercourse State shall, without delay and 
by the most expeditious means available, notify 
other potentially affected States and competent 
international organisations of any emergency 
originating within its territory. 
3.  A watercourse State within whose territory 
an emergency originates shall, in cooperation 
with potentially affected States and, where 
appropriate, competent international 
organisations, immediately take all practicable 
measures necessitated by the circumstances to 
prevent, mitigate and eliminate harmful effects of 
the emergency.
4.  When necessary, watercourse States shall jointly 
develop contingency plans for responding to 
emergencies, in cooperation, where appropriate, 
with other potentially affected States and 
competent international organisations.
28.1 Commentary
Articles 27 and 28 of the UN Watercourses Convention 
are closely related.  However, while the purpose of 
Article 27 is to prevent and mitigate harmful conditions 
in advance of such events occurring, Article 28 deals 
with the roles and responsibilities of watercourse states 
when such events actually happen.  As with Article 
27, Article 28 covers both natural and human induced 
events or a combination thereof, including floods, the 
breaking up of ice, landslides or earthquakes, and 
industrial accidents.  Tanzi and Arcari therefore observe 
that, ‘the same factual situation, being susceptible to 
escalation, may, in different points in time, fall within the 
purview of both provisions.’409
     The inclusion of ‘other States’ in Article 28(1) 
recognises that some ‘watercourse-related’ 
emergencies may affect non-watercourse States, 
such as a chemical spill that is transported via an 
international watercourse to the sea and beyond.410  
     Article 28(2) provides an obligation upon 
watercourse States to notify others of any emergency 
originating within its territory without delay. ‘Without 
delay’ has been interpreted as meaning, ‘upon learning 
of the emergency’; and ‘by the most expeditious means 
available’ can be defined as, ‘the most rapid means 
of communication that is accessible.’411 Pursuant to 
Article 28(2) both watercourse and non-watercourse 
States must be notified, if potentially affected, and the 
inclusion of ‘competent international organisations’ 
within the articles relates to those, ‘competent to 
participate in responding to the emergency by virtue of 
its constituent instrument.’412  
Article 28(3) requires states to take all ‘practicable 
409  A Tanzi and M Arcari, The United Nation Convention on the Law of 
International Watercourses, 223.  
410  1994 Draft Articles at 130. 
411  Ibid.
412  Ibid.
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measures’ to prevent, mitigate and eliminate 
harmful effects’, which might be jointly undertaken if 
necessary.  The qualification, ‘practicable’ seeks to 
cover those measures that are, ‘feasible, workable 
and reasonable’.413  Additionally, Article 28(4) calls for 
anticipatory measures in order to clearly set out the 
roles and responsibilities of states and competent 
international organisations in the eventuality of an 
emergency situation. The use of the term ‘where 
necessary’, recognises that in certain circumstances, 
‘some watercourse States and international 
watercourses may not justify the effort and expense 
involved in the development of contingency plans.’414 
Within the context of transboundary harm, the ILC has 
commented that:
‘…the duty to prevent environmental disasters obligates 
413  Ibid. 
414  Ibid.
In Europe, a number of industrial accidents prompted 
an evolution in the applicable law and policy.  A 
release of dioxin at Seveso in Italy in 1976 led 
to the adoption of the first piece of legislation to 
prevent and control such accidents, the Seveso 
Directive 85/501/EEC of the European Community 
in 1982.  In 1999, Council Directive 96/82/EC on 
the control of major-accident hazards updated the 
Seveso Directive.   January 2000 witnessed another 
industrial accident in Romania, which had a severe 
transboundary impact on the Danube river basin.  
The mining company, Baia Mare in Northern Romania, 
spilled over 100,000 cubic meters of cyanide-polluted 
water into a tributary of the Danube river basin.  These 
incidents also motivated the UN ECE to develop 
laws relating to transboundary industrial accidents, 
namely the Convention on the Transboundary Effects 
of Industrial Accidents, and Protocol on Civil Liability, 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes.
For more information see: http://www.unece.org/env/
teia/welcome.html
Industrial Accidents and the International Watercourses
States to enact safety measures and procedures 
to minimise the likelihood of major environmental 
accidents, such as nuclear reactor accidents, 
toxic chemical spills, oil spills or forest fires. Where 
necessary, specific safety or contingency measures 
are open to States to negotiate and agree in matters 
concerning management of risk of significant 
transboundary harm, such safety measures could 
include: (a) adoption of safety standards for the location 
and operation of industrial and nuclear plants and 
vehicles; (b) maintenance of equipment and facilities to 
ensure ongoing compliance with safety measures; (c) 
monitoring of facilities, vehicles or conditions to detect 
dangers; and (d) training of workers and monitoring of 
their performance to ensure compliance with safety 
standards.  Such contingency plans should include the 
establishment of early warning systems.’415
 
415  Ibid.
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28.2 Application
High flow levels occur in state A, upstream of river 
X.  State A is aware of the likely impacts that such 
high flow levels might have downstream but does not 
have sufficient data to determine the likely impact in 
downstream state B.  Much of the data on the likely 
impacts of floods in state B is not shared by state A.  
Serious floods occur within state B, and once state A 
is informed about these flood events, they notify state 
B with all relevant information on flow levels of river X 
in order to mitigate further flooding.   State B claims 
that state A did not follow the strict requirements of 
Article 28, as it did not notify it of the likely impact of the 
high flows in time.  The case is taken to international 
arbitration, where the tribunal agrees with state B’s 
argument, thus stating that there was at the very least 
‘an imminent threat’ of the high flow levels causing 
significant harm downstream stream through flooding. 
International Law 
Association Flood Rules
Article 4
1. Basin States should communicate amongst 
themselves as soon as possible on any 
occasion such as heavy rainfalls, sudden 
melting of snow or other events likely to 
create floods and dangerous rises of water 
levels in their territory. 
2. Basin States should set up an effective 
system of transmission in order to fulfil the 
provisions contained in para. 1, and should 
ensure priority to the communication of flood 
warnings in emergency cases. If necessary a 
special system of translation should be built 
up between the basin States. 
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 Key Points
•	 The	effect	of	Article	29	of	the	UN	Watercourses	
Convention is that during a period of armed 
conflict where an international watercourse may 
be potentially affected by warfare, both the laws 
of international watercourses (the 1997 UN 
Watercourses Convention) and the laws of armed 
conflict (see Fig. 6.2) will apply (with qualifications) 
to maintain the protection and prevention of 
significant harm to an international watercourse 
and protect a non-belligerent state’s use of the 
international watercourse.
•	 Article	30	reiterates	that	even	under	exceptional	
circumstances of diplomatic breakdown or 
warfare, where states are unable to communicate 
in the direct manner envisaged under Articles 
9-19 of the Convention, states are still under  
an obligation to cooperate by utilising ‘any other 
indirect procedure accepted by them’ for the 
purpose of conveying communications to  
each other.
•	 Article	31	creates	a	very	narrow	exception	to	the	
requirements of exchanging information under 
articles 9 to19 – with the effect that states are 
not required to release information concerning 
a watercourse which is ‘vital to their national 
defence or security’. What is considered vital to 
national defence or security is interpreted very 
narrowly and this argument cannot be used to 
justify the refusal to co-operate in connection 
with the application of the principle of equitable 
utilisation and of the no harm rule unless 
these reasons constitute a ‘state of necessity’ 
argument.
•	 Article	32	sets	out	‘the	basic	principle	that	
watercourse states are to grant access to 
their judicial and other procedures without 
discrimination on the basis of nationality, 
residence or the place where the damage 
occurred’. This means that where significant 
harm is or is likely to be caused by activities in 
one state, which may adversely affect foreign 
nationals who are residing in that state or such 
harm crosses international boundaries, potentially 
affecting the citizens of another watercourse 
state, both classes of persons have the 
procedural right to pursue their claims and seek 
remedies in the domestic courts of the country 
where the cause of injury originated.
•	 For	a	summary	of	the	procedure	of	dispute	
settlement under Article 33, see the UNWC 
Dispute Settlement Table in Section 33.1 below.
Part VI | Miscellaneous 
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Due to a range of converging factors – future conflicts 
over water are predicted to increase in both frequency 
and intensity.416  The importance of understanding 
the contribution that Part VI of the Convention can 
make to resolving potential conflicts-of-use through 
effective dispute resolution mechanisms is pertinent 
to addressing the global water crisis. Clarifying the 
relationship between the Convention and the other 
bodies of international law as they apply to armed 
conflicts involving an international watercourse is also 
increasingly necessary.  Moving forward – exploring 
how the wealth of knowledge surrounding the creation 
of the Convention can support the provision of water 
security and conflict management in an increasingly 
dynamic and complex global situation is an opportunity 
that should not be missed.  
     In general terms treaties give rise to numerous 
disputes about their interpretation or application. Most 
treaties prescribe how disputes will be settled and 
potential conflict will be managed. Dispute settlement in 
general covers a broad spectrum of rules, procedures 
and mechanisms, all consistent with the UN Charter 
requirement that international disputes between nation 
states be resolved peacefully – ranging from formal 
dispute management such as judicial adjudication 
through to more diplomatic methods of negotiation.  
Part VI of the Convention covers conflict management 
and dispute settlement – Article 33 was the subject 
of particularly intense debate during the negotiation 
and drafting of the Convention and continues to cause 
apprehension for states considering becoming a 
contracting party – though it’s full force and 
effect is largely misunderstood and will be clarified 
in this section.
416 PH Gleick, Water Conflict Chronology (2008).
The Maplecroft Water Security Risk Index in Figure 6.1 
below shows areas where water resources are under 
the most pressure and this is directly correlated to 
those areas which are most prone to future conflict 
over water resources.
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Figure 6.1 |
Water Security Risk Index (Source Maplecroft, 2011)
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International watercourses and related installations, 
facilities and other works shall enjoy the protection 
accorded by the principles and rules of international 
law applicable in international and non-international 
armed conflict and shall not be used in violation of 
those principles and rules.
29.1 Commentary
29.1.1 The Convention and international 
law applicable in armed conflict
While international watercourses have never been the 
sole reason of an international armed confrontation, 
international watercourses and related facilities continue 
to be used in many instances as a military target, tool, 
or object.417  Article 29 of the Convention does not lay 
down any new rule; it simply addresses the relationship 
between the law of international watercourses 
and the rules of international law applicable during 
international and internal armed conflict which involves 
an international watercourse and its installations.418  
The legal effect of Article 29 is that states will be 
obligated to protect and use international watercourses 
in accordance with the rules and principles of the 
Convention during times of armed conflict.  However, 
where armed conflict affects an international 
watercourse including its facilities – the rules and 
principles of international law governing international 
and non-international armed conflict will also apply (see 
Figure 6.2 below).419  There are numerous prominent 
examples of where the destruction of a regional water 
supply as a result of armed conflict has resulted in 
widespread suffering for the local population and 
therefore it is important to clarify the protection afforded 
by this body of international law.420
     It is noteworthy that unlike other provisions of the 
UN Watercourses Convention, Article 29 is addressed 
to all states, not just watercourse states, while a state 
not party to the Convention would not be bound by this 
provision, non-watercourse states are included within 
Article 29 because of the importance of the subject. 
417  PH Gleick, Water Conflict Chronology (2008). Also see Wouters, Vinogradov 
and Magsig, ‘Water Security, Hydrosolidarity and International Law: A River Runs 
through It’ at 122.
418  1994 Draft Articles at 131.
419  1994 Draft Articles at 131.
420  A selection of examples includes 1998 Somalia, 1993 Bosnia, 1999 Former 
Yugoslavia, 2002 Iraq, 2009 Afghanistan, 2002 Israeli/West Bank, 2011 Libya. See 
F Lorenz, The Protection of Water Facilities under International Law (UNESCO 2003) 
at 4.
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A further proviso to this point is that the principles 
and rules of armed conflicts that are ‘applicable’ in a 
particular case are those that are binding on the states 
concerned. Article 29 does not extend the applicability 
of any international instrument to states not parties to 
that instrument.  Of course even with these exceptions 
- in cases not covered by specific international 
agreements, civilians and combatants will still remain 
under the protection and authority of the principles of 
customary and conventional international law governing 
armed conflict.421
421  It is argued that Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention is already customary 
law and thus binding on all states. For a discussion of customary law on warfare as 
it relates to water as well as more detailed examination of Treaty Law see Lorenz 
F, The Protection of Water Facilities under International Law (UNESCO 2003) at 9-11.
29.1.2 International humanitarian laws 
applicable to armed conflict involving 
watercourses422 
Article 29 of the Convention does not provide an 
indicative list of the international laws of armed conflict 
that apply to the protection of water during time of 
war – however the core instruments of this branch of 
public international law (also known as International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL)) which apply are summarised in 
the following Figure 6.2 next page.
422  For more extensive discussion on how these instruments interact with Article 
29 see Wouters, Vinogradov and Magsig, ‘Water Security, Hydrosolidarity and 
International Law: ‘A River Runs through It’ at 121.
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Type of Conflict IHL Applicable             Relevant Provisions and Effect 
International 
armed conflict
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of 
Land Warfare   
 
Armed conflict 
between the State 
and one or several 
non-State actors, 
or between two or 
more such actors. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I), 8 June 1977423
Convention on the prohibition of 
military or any hostile use of 
environmental modification 
techniques, 10 December 1976424 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II), 8 June 1977.426
 
 
Armed conflict 
between two or 
more States 
Articles 54,55 and 56  contain a number of water-
related provisions aimed at the protection of the natural  
environment, objects indispensable to the survival of 
the civilian population,and works and installations. They 
impose, a prohibition to attack drinking water installations 
and supplies and irrigation works (Article 54, para. 2) as 
well as works or installations containing dangerous forces, 
such as dams and dikes, ‘if such attack may cause the 
release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses 
among the civilian population’(Article 56, para. 1). Article 
55 further provides that ‘care shall be taken in warfare to 
protect the natural environment against widespread long-
term and severe damage which includes a prohibition of 
the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended 
or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural 
environment and thereby to rejudice the health or survival of 
the population’.
Articles 14 and 15 Protection of objects indispensable 
to the survival of the civilian population - prohibited 
from attacking objects indispensable to the survival 
of the civilian population such as drinking water 
installations and supplies and irrigation works (Article 
14). Protection of works and installations containing 
dangerous forces, namely dams and dykes, if such 
attack may cause the release of dangerous forces 
and consequent severe losses among the civilian 
population (Article 15).
Article I calls on the states parties ‘not to engage 
in military or any other hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques having widespread, long-
lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, 
damage or injury to any other State Party.’
Non-international 
armed conflict 
Figure 6.2 | International humanitarian laws applicable to 
armed conflict involving watercourses (Source Authors)
| Article 29
Prohibits the poisoning of water supplies ( Art. 23)425
Footnotes :423 424 425 426  
423   Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 
June 1977. Available at International Humanitarian Law Treaties and Documents 
(ICRC) <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/470?OpenDocument> accessed 30 
September 2011.
424 Convention on the prohibition of military or any hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques, 10 December 1976. Available at International 
Humanitarian Law Treaties and Documents (ICRC) <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
FULL/475?OpenDocument> accessed 30 September 2011. 
425 Hague Convention No IV Respecting the Laws of Customs of War on Land 
(October 18 1907) Annex Art. 23.  Available at International Hmanitarian Law 
Treaties and Documents (ICRC) <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/195> accessed 
30 September 2011. 
426 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II), 8 June 1977. Available at International Humanitarian Law Treaties 
and Documents <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/475?OpenDocument> 
accessed 30 April 2012.  
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29.1.3 Other international law (soft) 
applicable to water during armed conflict
In 1976 the ILA adopted at its Madrid Conference 
a non-binding resolution entitled Water Resources 
and Installations in Times of Armed Conflict (Madrid 
Rules). This resolution contains many guidelines 
aimed to protect water as it affects the civilian 
population and the environment.427  A subsequent ILA 
instrument - the Berlin Rules on Water Resources 
(Berlin Rules), adopted by the ILA Conference in 2004, 
also contains important provisions on the protection 
of international watercourses during armed conflict. 
Chapter X reiterates and slightly modifies the Madrid 
Rules - Article 52 is especially important and calls 
on combatants to not, ‘for military purposes or as 
reprisals, destroy or divert waters, or destroy water 
installations, when such acts would cause widespread, 
long-term, and severe ecological damage prejudicial 
to the health or survival of the population or if such 
acts would fundamentally impair the ecological integrity 
of waters.’428
     It is argued that the instruments of international 
humanitarian law (Figure 6.2) - coupled with the 
above instruments of water law including Article 29 of 
the Convention - ‘point to the universal acceptance of 
certain legally binding rules prohibiting hostile activities 
against or using water resources and installations as
a weapon.’429 
427  ILA, Report of the Fifty-Seventh Conference, Madrid, at 237–9 (1976). 
428  See 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources (Adopted by the ILA at the Seventy-
First Conference, Berlin, August 2004) <http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.
cfm/cid/32> accessed 30 April 2012 [Berlin Rules].  For extensive Commentary see 
Wouters, Vinogradov and Magsig, ‘Water Security, Hydrosolidarity and International 
Law: A River Runs through It’ at 126
429  Wouters, Vinogradov and Magsig, ‘Water Security, Hydrosolidarity and 
International Law: A River Runs through It ...’ (2009) at 126
29.2 Application
29.2.1 Hypothetical scenario -  
Application of the UN Convention and 
protection of international watercourses 
during armed conflict
How does the Convention and other international law 
apply during armed conflict where an international 
watercourse may be potentially affected by such 
warfare?  The example below demonstrates that 
both the laws of international watercourses (the 
1997 UN Watercourses Convention) and the laws of 
armed conflict will apply to maintain the protection 
and prevention of significant harm to an international 
watercourse and to a non-belligerent (neutral) state’s 
use of the international watercourse during a time of 
armed conflict.430 
     State A is a non-riparian state sharing an 
international border with upstream riparian state B who 
is sharing international watercourse X with downstream 
riparian state C.  State A conducts an armed attack 
against state B.  This armed conflict may cause 
significant harm to the international watercourse X and 
to the non-belligerent downstream riparian State C’s 
use of watercourse X.
     What obligations do states A and B owe to state C?
The law of international watercourses will continue to 
apply to govern the relationship between belligerent 
state B and neutral state C despite the fact that state 
B is in conflict with state A.  State B is still under 
an obligation under Articles 7, 20 and 28 of the 
Convention to take all appropriate measures to prevent 
harm occurring to neutral state C. It is also argued 
that, due to the law of neutrality and the law of state 
responsibility, state A could also be under an obligation 
not to hinder state B in its ability to prevent or mitigate 
harm to state C.431 What obligations do states A and B 
owe to each other?
430  Scenario adapted from detailed commentary in Tanzi and Arcari, The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for 
Sharing at 70. 
431  The principle of the law of neutrality relevant for this purpose is Art 1 of the 
1907 Hague Convention on Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers 
and Persons in Case of War on Land, which provides that ‘[t]he territory of neutral 
Powers is inviolable.’ Reprinted in A Roberts and R Guelff, Documents on the 
Laws of War (Oxford 2003). For extensive commentary on Article 29 see Tanzi and 
Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the Law of International Watercourses: A 
Framework for Sharing at 71.
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The laws of armed conflict will apply directly to govern 
this particular circumstance of armed conflict. The 
general rules on the protection and use of international 
watercourses under the UN Watercourses Convention 
will also apply in providing for the obligations between 
state A and B. Although the relevant HR law contains 
more detailed provisions to deal specifically with this 
particular situation, this does not imply a need to 
balance HR law with the UN Convention as they do 
not conflict. A summary of the relevant instruments 
and rules which would apply to states A and B are as 
described in Figure 6.2 above. One important effect of 
these rules is that state A is generally prohibited from 
manipulating the international watercourse as a means 
of warfare.432  State A is also prohibited from attacking 
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation 
works as well as works or installations containing 
dangerous forces, such as dams and dykes, but only 
‘if such attack may cause the release of dangerous 
forces and consequent severe losses among the 
civilian population’ of State B.433  It is also argued that 
the Berlin Rules Chapter X, as a reflection of customary 
international law, would apply to support this general 
outcome.434
432  Art 1 ENMOD. 
433  Protocol II Arts 54 (2) and 56 (1).   
434  Wouters, Vinogradov and Magsig, ‘Water Security, Hydrosolidarity and 
International Law: A River Runs through It ...’ (2009) at 126. 
29.3 Additional reading
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. 
Available at International Humanitarian Law Treaties 
and Documents (ICRC) <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
FULL/470?OpenDocument> accessed 30 September 2011.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 
June 1977. Available at International Humanitarian Law 
Treaties and Documents <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
FULL/475?OpenDocument> accessed 30 September 2011.
Convention on the prohibition of military or any hostile use 
of environmental modification techniques, 10 December 
1976. Available at International Humanitarian Law Treaties 
and Documents (ICRC) <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
FULL/475?OpenDocument> accessed 30 September 2011.
1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of International Rivers 
(adopted by the International Law Commission (ILA) at the 
52nd Conference, Helsinki, August 1966)
Lorenz F, The Protection of Water Facilities under International 
Law (UNESCO 2003) at 7-11.
Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing 
(Kluwer Law International 2001) at 70.
Tignino M, ‘Water, International Peace, and Security’ (2010) 92 
International Review of the Red Cross 647.
Wouters P, Vinogradov S and Magsig B-O, ‘Water Security, 
Hydrosolidarity and International Law: A River Runs through It 
...’ (2009) 19 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 97 
at 122-126.
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In cases where there are serious obstacles to direct 
contacts between watercourse States, the states 
concerned shall fulfil their obligations of cooperation 
provided for in the present Convention, including 
exchange of data and information, notification, 
communication, consultations and negotiations, 
through any indirect procedure accepted by them.
Article 30 | Indirect 
Procedures 
30.1 Commentary
30.1.1 Obligations of cooperation in 
exceptional circumstances
Article 30 addresses the exceptional circumstance in 
which direct contact cannot be established between 
the watercourse states and therefore states are 
prevented from being able to comply with their existing 
obligations in the manner set out under Articles 9 to 
19 of the Convention.  Exceptional circumstances 
can include for example during an armed conflict or 
during a time where the absence of diplomatic relations 
poses serious obstacles to the kinds of direct contacts 
provided for under the Convention.435 
     However, even during such exceptional 
circumstances states are still under an obligation to 
cooperate by utilising ‘any other indirect procedure 
accepted by them’ for the purpose of conveying 
communications to each other – examples of indirect 
procedures can include employing the assistance of 
third countries, armistice commissions and the good 
offices of international organisations.436 
     There are several examples where states continued 
to cooperate over water using such procedures whilst 
they were at war. Israel and Jordan held secret ‘picnic 
table’ talks on managing the Jordan River despite being 
at war with each other from Israel’s independence 
in 1948 until the 1994 treaty.437  India and Pakistan 
continued to cooperate during two major wars with the 
initial assistance of the good offices of the World Bank 
(which later developed into a much more active role) 
and were assisted towards signing the Indus Water 
Treaty in 1960, during a period where conflict continued 
within Kashmir.438 A final example of such cooperation is 
over the Mekong.  In 1957 the Mekong Committee was 
established by the governments of Cambodia, Laos, 
435  1994 Draft Articles at 132. 
436  Ibid 132.
437  PR MacQuarrie, V Viriyasakultorn and AT Wolf, ‘Promoting Cooperation in the 
Mekong Region through Water Conflict Management, Regional Collaboration, and 
Capacity Building’ (2008) 2 GMSARN International Journal 175 at 176.
438  Ibid. 
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Thailand, and Viet Nam and continued to exchange 
data and information on water resources development 
throughout the Vietnam War.  Additionally, during 
the 1970s, and despite the wars in Indochina, the 
committee managed to produce plans to develop water 
resources in the lower Mekong basin. This cooperation 
was assisted with significant involvement by the US and 
Asian Development Bank.439
439  Ibid at 179. 
30.2 Application
30.2.1 Scenario - Exceptional cases utilise 
indirect procedure to cooperate
Upper riparian state A and lower riparian state B have 
a long history of disagreement over the transboundary 
river.  State A has also recently emerged from a 30 
year period of internal conflict and this has prevented 
it from fully developing its hydro-potential to irrigate 
its highly fertile soils.  State B has experienced a less 
tumultuous internal period and has built up significant 
industry based around a reliable flow from the river.  
State A begins unilaterally developing barrages and 
canal diversions for irrigation.  This threatens State 
B’s existing industry and economy and State B sends 
military forces to inspect the developments.  State A 
reacts and significantly reduces the flow of water into 
State B. This brings both parties to the brink of conflict.
     There is no specific treaty for sharing the river 
but both States are contracting Parties to the UN 
Watercourses Convention.  Relations have deteriorated 
so rapidly that direct contact cannot be established 
between the watercourse states and therefore they are 
prevented from being able to comply with their existing 
obligations in the manner set out under Articles 9 to 
19 of the Convention.  However, even during such 
exceptional circumstances, the existence of Article 
30 means that the states are still under an obligation 
to cooperate by utilising ‘any other indirect procedure 
accepted by them’ for the purpose of conveying 
communications to each other.  Both states agree to an 
offer by the UN Secretary-General to utilise the good 
offices of the UN Secretary-General to assist them in
exchanging information.440 
440  See United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Handbook on the Peaceful 
Settlement of Disputes between States (United Nations 1992) at 37 – 39 for 
examples of the use of the UN Secretary General’s Good Offices. 
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30.3 Additional reading
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses in UNGA ‘Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth 
Session’ (2 May-22 July 1994) UNGA 49th Session Supp No 
10 UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) at 132.
MacQuarrie PR, Viriyasakultorn V and Wolf AT, ‘Promoting 
Cooperation in the Mekong Region through Water Conflict 
Management, Regional Collaboration, and Capacity Building’ 
(2008) 2 GMSARN International Journal 175.
Salman SMA, The World Bank Policy for Projects on 
International Waterways: An Historical and Legal Analysis 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009). 
Salman SMA and Uprety K, Conflict and Cooperation on 
South Asia’s International Rivers - a Legal Perspective (World 
Bank 2002) at 37-57.
United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Handbook on the 
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States (United 
Nations 1992).
Wirsing RG, ‘Rivers in Contention: Is There a Water War in 
South Asia’s Future?’ (2008) 41 Heidelberg Papers in South 
Asian and Comparative Politics.
Zawahri NA, ‘Capturing the Nature of Cooperation, Unstable 
Cooperation and Conflict over International Rivers: The Story 
of the Indus, Yarmouk, Euphrates and Tigris Rivers’ (2008) 8 
International Journal of Global Environmental Issues 286.
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31.1 Commentary
31.1.1 Limitations to the obligation to 
exchange data and information 
Article 31 creates a very narrow exception to the 
requirements of articles 9 to 19 – with the effect 
that states are not required to release information 
concerning a watercourse which is ‘vital to their 
national defence or security’. What is considered ‘vital 
information to national defence or security’ is not 
defined by the Convention but refers mainly to strategic 
or military types of information.441
     This exception is limited by the corresponding 
obligation that a watercourse state that may experience 
adverse effects from the planned measures of another 
state should not be left entirely without information 
concerning those possible effects.442 Additionally, Article 
31 requires a state which is withholding information for 
national defence and security reasons to continue to 
‘cooperate in good faith’ with the other watercourse 
states with a view to providing ‘as much information as 
possible under the circumstances’.443  The obligation 
to provide ‘as much information as possible’ could be 
fulfilled in most cases by providing a general description 
of the manner in which the measures would alter the 
condition of the water or affect other states.’444
     It is important to emphasise that the ILC intended 
good-faith445 cooperation to be the guiding principle 
of Article 31. The prominence of this principle can 
be ‘explained by the discussion within the ILC that 
the concept of what information could potentially be 
441  Vinogradov, ‘Observations of the International Law Commission’s Draft Rules 
on the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Management and 
Domestic Remedies’ (1992) 3 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law 
and Policy 235 at 249.
442 1994 Draft Articles at 132.
443 1994 Draft Articles at 132.
444  Ibid. 
445  For an explanation of ‘Good Faith’ as a general principle of international law, 
refer to commentary in Part I (Article 3 and 4) and the Glossary.
  
Nothing in the present Convention obliges a 
watercourse state to provide data or information vital 
to its national defence or security.  Nevertheless, 
that state shall cooperate in good faith with the other 
watercourse states with a view to providing as much 
information as possible under the circumstances.
Article 31 | Data and 
Information Vital to National 
Defence or Security
| Article 31
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withheld as a state secret was open to abuse and 
therefore needed to be safeguarded.’446 
     The 1992 UN ECE Helsinki Convention and 
the 1998 Aarhus Convention each contain similar 
provisions to Article 31 of the UN Convention.  The 
obligation to exchange information under Article 
13 of the UN ECE Convention may be subject to 
‘protection of information’ limitations. Article 8 allows 
parties in accordance with their national legal systems 
and applicable supranational regulations to protect 
information related to industrial and commercial 
secrecy, including intellectual property, or national 
security.447  Although commentary to the Helsinki 
Convention says parties should apply Article 8 
restrictively with regard to requests for information 
from other parties, especially when these concern data 
relating to discharges into transboundary waters. Article 
4 (4) of the Aarhus Convention sets out a framework 
through which members of the public can gain access 
to environmental information from public authorities 
and, in some cases, from private parties. Public 
authorities could refuse to give information on the 
basis of ‘proceedings of public authorities, international 
relations, national defence or public security, course 
of justice, commercial and industrial confidentiality, 
intellectual property rights, personal data, voluntary 
information, and protecting the environment’. Of 
particular interest to our understanding of Article 31 
of the UN Convention is the definition of the terms 
‘international relations’, ‘national defence’ or ‘public 
security’ - however the Aarhus Convention does not 
define these terms but suggests that the definition 
of such terms will be determined by the parties 
consistent with international law, and it does provide 
446  Yearbook... 1988, vol. I., p. 53 (Mr. Beesley).  Also see Vinogradov  
‘Observations of the International Law Commission’s Draft Rules on the Non-
navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Management and Domestic 
Remedies’ at 249 
447  Paragraph 292, 1992 Helsinki Guide. 
examples of state practice in this area.448 Essentially 
the grounds of refusing access to information in both 
these Conventions are to be interpreted in a restrictive 
way, particularly when the data requested relates to 
emissions into the environment.449 
     An important comparative observation - the 
exception in Article 31 of the UN Convention only 
applies to information vital to national defence or 
security and does not include the right to withhold 
commercial or industrial information that is deemed 
confidential and so this provision is much narrower 
than the exceptions within both the Aarhus and UN 
ECE Conventions.
448  Aarhus Convention, at 59. 
449   Ibid at 60.  Also Paragraph 293 of the UNECE Helsinki Guide. 
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31.1.2 Limitation from Articles 5 & 7 and 
exception of state of necessity
A significant limitation on the exception under Article 
31 is that this provision is without prejudice to the 
obligations of the state under Articles 5 and 7. 
This means that national defence or security arguments 
cannot be used to justify the refusal to co-operate
in connection with the application of the principle 
of equitable utilisation and of the no harm rule 
unless these reasons constitute a ‘state of
necessity’ argument.450   
     The defence of ‘state of necessity’ is a ground 
recognised by customary international law and 
codified by Article 25 of the ILC’s 2001 Draft articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts.  This defence has the effect of making what 
would otherwise have been a wrongful act become 
legitimate. Article 25 sets out the four principles which 
a state must satisfy in order to invoke ‘necessity’ as a 
defence – these are:451
     
The act has to be the only way for the state to 
safeguard an essential interest against a grave and 
imminent peril.
     
The act must not seriously impair an essential interest, 
of such state or states, towards which the obligation 
exists, or of the international community as a whole.
The international obligation in question should not 
exclude the possibility of invoking necessity.
450  For examination of State Necessity in International Law T Yamada ‘State 
of Necessity in International Law: A Study of International Judicial Cases’ (2004) 
<http://www.law.kobegakuin.ac.jp/~jura/hogaku/34-4/34-4-04.pdf> accessed 2 
October 2011.  Also see Tanzi and Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing at 200.
451 ILC 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful 
acts, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 53rd session 
(2001) UN Doc A/56/10, at 43-365. 
The state should not have contributed to the situation 
of necessity.
The ICJ in Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros considered the ‘state 
of necessity’ in relation to international watercourses.452 
In this case downstream riparian Hungary halted 
construction of the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros barrage 
system provided for in the 1977 Treaty with Slovakia, 
alleging that continuation would pose grave risks 
to the Hungarian environment and water supply. 
Hungary relied on the ‘state of ecological necessity’ 
and ‘ecological risk’ to justify this act although it 
acknowledged that ‘necessity’ would not preclude it 
from compensating upstream riparian Slovakia.  The 
ICJ found that Hungary’s concerns were ‘an essential 
interest of the state’ but the potential environmental 
problems did not constitute a ‘grave and imminent peril’ 
which threatened the state’s interests.453  
The court held that the acts of Hungary were not 
justified by the exception of necessity454 stating that 
‘such grounds for precluding wrongfulness can only be 
accepted on an exceptional basis’ and ‘strictly defined 
conditions which must be cumulatively satisfied.’455 This 
means that all the four principles in Article 25 of the 
2001 Draft Articles must be satisfied.
452  The ICJ in the Case Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary 
v Slovakia) Judgement of 25 September 1997 (Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Case) 
[1997] ICJ Reports 1997 7 at 36 - 45 considered the ‘state of necessity’ in relation 
to international watercourses – however it is important to note that the court was 
not asked to apply the state of necessity rule as a justification for an inequitable or 
significantly harmful use of a river.. 
453  Ibid para 53. 
454  The court referred to a previous version of Article 25 of the 2001 Draft Articles 
which was then Article 33 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility.  
455  Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Case at 37. 
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31.2 Application
State A and state B share an international watercourse 
– state A is a wealthy upstream country with significant 
technological advancement in hydropower. State A 
wants to test a new method for generating hydropower, 
with the hope of securing intellectual property rights 
in this new technology.  The testing may cause harm 
and affect downstream state B which is a developing 
country with low levels of technological advancement.  
State B has received news that it may be affected by 
a new unknown water use from state A.  A dispute 
has arisen between the two states over the extent of 
the obligation to exchange data and information under 
Articles 9-19 of the UN Convention.  State A considers 
that the exception under Article 31 of the Convention 
also applies to commercial and industrial information 
and therefore exempts it from the obligation to give out 
the information to state B about how the testing of the 
technology will affect the watercourse.
     The exception in Article 31 only provides an 
exception for withholding information vital to national 
defence or security and does not include the right to 
withhold commercial or industrial information that is 
deemed confidential. That is to say in this case ‘the 
common interest in the management and protection 
of the international watercourse as a shared natural 
resource has an overriding relevance in the Convention 
over unilateral interests of economic value.’456
     Even if the new technology was also arguably 
vital to national defence, state A would still be under 
an obligation to cooperate in good faith with state 
B with a view to providing ‘as much information as 
possible under the circumstances’ which would include 
providing a general description of the manner in which 
the shared watercourse would be affected by any 
proposed use.
456  Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Case at 37.
31.3 Additional reading
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses in UNGA ‘Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth 
Session’ (2 May-22 July 1994) UNGA 49th Session Supp No 
10 UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) at 132.
ILC 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its 53rd session (2001) UN Doc 
A/56/10, at 43-365.
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters (Aarhus) (adopted 1998, entered into force 29 
October 2001) 38 ILM (1999) 517, Article 4.  Also see Aarhus 
Convention: An implementation guide (UN 2000), <http://
www.unece.org/env/pp/acig.html> accessed 1 October 2011.
Case Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary v Slovakia) Judgement of 25 September 1997 
(Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Case) [1997] ICJ Reports 1997 7 at 
36-39.
Tanzi A and Arcari M, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing 
(Kluwer Law International 2001) at 199-201.
Yamada T ‘State of Necessity in International Law: A Study 
of International Judicial Cases’ (2004), <http://www.law.
kobegakuin.ac.jp/~jura/hogaku/34-4/34-4-04.pdf> accessed 
2 October 2011. 
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Unless the watercourse states concerned have agreed 
otherwise for the protection of the interests of persons, 
natural or juridical, who have suffered or are under a 
serious threat of suffering significant transboundary 
harm as a result of activities related to an international 
watercourse, a watercourse state shall not discriminate 
on the basis of nationality or residence or place where 
the injury occurred, in granting to such persons, in 
accordance with its legal system, access to judicial 
or other procedures, or a right to claim compensation 
or other relief in respect of significant harm caused by 
such activities carried on in its territory.
32.1 Commentary
32.1.1 Non-discrimination and Equality of 
Access to National Remedies 
Equality of access to transboundary remedies is based 
on the principle of non-discrimination which means that 
where domestic remedies are already available to deal 
with environmental problems, international law may 
be used to ensure that the benefit of these remedies 
is extended to transboundary claimants.457   Article 32 
sets out ‘the basic principle that watercourse states are 
to grant access to their judicial and other procedures 
without discrimination on the basis of nationality, 
residence or the place where the damage occurred’.458   
Article 32 provides that where significant harm459  is or is 
likely to be caused by activities in one state, which may 
adversely affect foreign nationals (non-citizens or non-
residents) who are residing in that state or such harm 
crosses international boundaries, potentially affecting 
the citizens of another watercourse state, both classes 
of persons have the procedural right to pursue their 
claims and seek remedies in the domestic courts of the 
country where the cause of injury originated.460 
According to the ILC commentary ‘persons who…
have suffered or are under a serious threat of suffering’ 
significant harm, means that Article 32 is applicable 
‘both to cases involving actual harm and to those in 
which the harm is prospective in nature’.461 
     The guarantee of equality of access and non-
discrimination for such persons gives these persons 
access to the foreign national courts or ‘any other 
procedures’ in this foreign jurisdiction – these ‘other 
procedures’ could include the provision of access 
to information concerning the environmental risk, 
participation in hearings, preliminary enquiries, 
457  Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment at 304.  
See also O McIntyre Environmental protection of international watercourses under 
international law at 350. 
458  1994 Draft Articles at 132.
459  Ibid at 133.
460  McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses at 510. 
4611994 Draft Articles at 133 and see Trail Smelter Arbitration, 33 AJIL (1939) 182 
& 35 AJIL (1942).
  
Article 32 | 
Non-discrimination
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participation in the domestic land-use planning 
development control or pollution licensing procedures 
that relate to the offending use, and obtaining 
compensation.462 However, states can require that non-
residents or non-citizens provide a bond in order to 
utilise a national Court system to cover court costs and 
fees.463 
     An important note - the Article 32 non-discrimination 
rule is residual in that if ‘the states concerned have 
agreed otherwise’, they do not have to follow the 
procedure of Article 32. However, they must still provide 
an alternative inter-state procedure for resolution 
of such disputes for example through diplomatic 
channels.464    
462  See 1988 General Code of Procedure and for Commentary Birnie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, International Law and the Environment at 308.  
463  1994 Draft Articles at 132. 
464  Ibid at 133. 
32.1.2 Availability of private domestic 
remedies 
Private remedies (Article 32) will not always be available 
immediately or in some cases  will not be available 
at all. The granting of these rights may require the 
domestic legislation of some countries to be amended 
because in some countries administrative authorities 
are only empowered to consider the effects of 
proposed projects which may occur within the state 
that established the authorities.465 As noted by the ILC, 
a prominent watercourse dispute, the Trail Smelter 
arbitration, was set in motion because the national 
legislation of the country where the harm originated 
(Canada) did not grant the right of domestic recourse 
to those foreign nationals who had suffered damage 
abroad.466   Conversely in the Pulp Mills Case, it was 
found the Argentinian citizens enjoyed equal access 
to remedies and procedures under the national laws 
of Uruguay as Uruguayan citizens possess in respect 
of possible transboundary harm.467  Once the UN 
Convention has entered into force, its incorporation into 
the national legal system of a state party should imply 
an automatic adjustment of the national legal system 
(or states will as per their domestic legislation create 
additional implementing legislation) to implement the 
international legal obligations under Article 32 and the 
procedural right to access could be directly invoked by 
private foreign nationals without delay.468  
     For states who are not a contracting party to the 
Convention and where administrative law is viewed as 
strictly territorial, foreign citizens may not be protected 
by domestic law and may not be able to access private 
recourse in non-contracting states.
465  McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses at 510. 
466  1994 Draft Articles at 133 and see Trail Smelter Arbitration, 33 AJIL (1939) 182 
& 35 AJIL (1942) 
467  See 1988 General Code of Procedure and for Commentary Birnie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, International Law and the Environment at 308.  
468  Tanzi and Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the Law of International 
Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing at 171. 
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Additionally not all disputes will be able to be solved 
at the private level and the following section on Article 
33 of the Convention will discuss mechanisms which 
avoid or resolve disputes between states where private 
remedies are not available or do not adequately resolve 
the issues.
32.1.3 Advantages and disadvantages of 
private domestic remedies 
During the drafting of the Convention the Finnish 
representative in the Sixth Committee aptly observed 
the advantages of utilising domestic procedures at 
a private level including that such procedures were 
‘usually less costly; they involved individuals and 
companies actually engaged in the relevant activities; 
they provided a more effective incentive to comply 
with the rules; in certain cases they were faster than 
diplomatic channels; they led to legally binding and 
enforceable determinations of the relevant parties 
obligations; and they encouraged regional cooperation 
in the management of the particular watercourse 
system.’469 The disadvantages of equal access are 
that it does not guarantee a substantive standard of 
environmental protection and may give rise to problems 
in terms of language and unfamiliarity. Furthermore 
it does not solve the problems of the choice of law 
which arise in transboundary litigation.470  However, 
equal access to domestic remedies does not preclude 
access to other forums.471
469  UNGA Sixth Committee (45th Session) ‘Summary Record of the 24th (30 
October 1990) UN Doc A/C.6/45/SR.24 (1990) at 13. 
470  Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment at 310. 
471  Ibid. 
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Legal right of non-discrimination and equal access to national remedies
Prior to the Convention, 
the following 
instruments existed:
Selection of Instruments 
Post-Convention 
(though not based on 
Convention but helpful for 
understanding the evolution 
of the concept as it exists in 
international law):
The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between Canada and the US provides 
that injuries in one country caused by the diversion in the other of waters 
flowing across the boundary would ‘give rise to the same rights and 
entitle the injured parties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took 
place in the country where such diversion or interference occurs’. 
1974 OECD Recommendation of the Council on Principles concerning 
Transfrontier Pollution, 14 November 1974 - C (74)224 (Annex C (4) (d),  
D (5) (a), D (5) (b).
Article 8 of the International Law Association’s 1982 Montreal Rules on 
Water Pollution in an International Drainage Basin 
Part II.B.8 of the 1990 ECE Guidelines on Responsibility and Liability 
regarding Transboundary Water Pollution  
1982 UNCLOS Art 235 (2)
Article 2 (6) 1991 UNECE Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention). 
Art 3(9) 1998 Aarhus Convention 
Article 3(10)(c) of the 2000 SADC Revised Protocol on Shared 
Watercourses 
2003 UNECE Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage 
caused by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on 
Transboundary Waters, which supplements both the 1992 Convention on 
the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes and 1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents and acts to channel liability to the ‘operator’ responsible for 
causing transboundary damage. Expressly incorporates the principle of 
non-discrimination. 
Also ILA’s 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources Law, Articles 69 &71.
Figure 6.3 |
Legal right of non-discrimination and equal access to 
national remedies (Source Authors)
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32.1.4 State practice
The principle of non-discrimination is considered to 
be a broader principle of inter-state relations which 
includes but is not limited to equal access - Article 32 
of the UN Convention does not replicate this broader 
meaning of the principle and is instead limited to 
equal access.472 
      This legal right of non-discrimination and equal 
access 473 to national remedies is not new - there is 
substantial existing state practice concerning equal 
access to national legal systems for compensation and 
relief in respect of damage caused to watercourses.  
This state practice was in existence before the Con-
vention was adopted and has continued to develop 
since (a summary of the significant instruments is 
provided in Figure 6.3 ). However, state practice is 
heavily concentrated in Europe and North America 
and the legitimacy and practicality of non-discrimination 
and equal access in many other regions has been 
questioned. This argument is supported by the 
observation that there is no universal legal instrument 
in effect that would establish the rule of equal access 
as a generally recognised principle of international 
law. 474 Conversely, despite there being no universal 
instrument, given the ILC’s consistent endorsement 
of the non-discrimination principle and the other 
precedents listed in Figure 6.3 it might be argued
 that the principle exists as a general principle of 
international law.475
472  Vinogradov, ‘Observations of the International Law Commission’s Draft Rules 
on the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Management and 
Domestic Remedies’ at 240.
473  The principle of non-discrimination is considered to be a broader principle of 
inter-state relations which includes but is not limited to equal access. Article 32 of 
the UN Convention does not replicate this broader meaning of the principle and is 
instead limited to equal access.  See Vinogradov ‘Observations of the International 
Law Commission’s Draft Rules on the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses: Management and Domestic Remedies’ at 235.  
474  Vinogradov ‘Observations of the International Law Commission’s Draft Rules 
on the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Management and 
Domestic Remedies’ at 235. 
475  Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment at 306. 
32.2 Application
Company X in State A pollutes the international 
watercourse in State A and adversely affects individuals 
in downstream State B.  What basic obligations and 
remedies exist under Article 32 in this situation?  
State A has an international responsibility to State B of 
exercising due diligence in preventing or abating the 
transboundary harm (Article 7 UN Convention) therefore 
the dispute may need to be settled at this state level.
However the dispute may also be settled satisfactorily 
through the principle of non-discrimination and equal 
access national remedies. Individuals of State B are 
entitled procedurally to bring a claim by virtue of Article 
32 of the Convention in the domestic courts of state 
A where it could be considered satisfactory recourse 
that Company X pay the affected individuals of state B 
compensation under the domestic civil liability regime 
of state A and depending on the facts of the case it 
could be that no further international liability will exist. 
It is also important to note that the court in state A will 
apply any relevant binding national and international 
law to the case.  Finally, if the private recourse does not 
produce a satisfactory resolution, Article 33 (discussed 
below), which sets out the basic rules for the settlement 
of watercourse disputes on the inter-state level, 
could be used to resolve the case through state level 
mechanisms.  
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Article 33 | Settlement of 
Disputes
5.  If the members nominated by the parties are 
unable to agree on a Chairman within three 
months of the request for the establishment 
of the Commission, any party concerned may 
request the Secretary-General of the united 
Nations to appoint the Chairman who shall not 
have the nationality of any of the parties to the 
dispute or of any riparian state of the watercourse 
concerned.  If one of the parties fails to nominate 
a member within three months of the initial 
request pursuant to paragraph 3, any other party 
concerned may request the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations to appoint a person who shall 
not have the nationality of any of the parties to the 
dispute or of any riparian state of the watercourse 
concerned.  The person so appointed shall 
constitute a single member Commission.
6.  The Commission shall determine its own 
procedure.
7.  The parties concerned have the obligation to 
provide the Commission with such information 
as it may require and, on request, to permit the 
Commission to have access to their respective 
territory and to inspect any facilities, plant, 
equipment, construction or natural feature 
relevant for the purpose of its inquiry.
8.  The Commission shall adopt its report by a 
majority vote, unless it is a single-member 
Commission, and shall submit that report to the 
parties concerned setting forth its findings and 
the reasons therefore and such recommendation 
as it deems appropriate for an equitable solution 
of the dispute, which the parties concerned shall 
consider in good faith.
1.  In the event of a dispute between two or 
more parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of the present Convention, the parties 
concerned shall, in the absence of an applicable 
agreement between them, seek a settlement of 
the dispute by peaceful means in accordance 
with the following provisions.
2.  If the parties concerned cannot reach agreement 
by negotiation requested by one of them, they 
may jointly seek the good offices of, or request 
mediation or conciliation by, a third party, or make 
use, as appropriate, of any joint watercourse 
institutions that may have been established by 
them, or agree to submit the dispute to arbitration 
or to the International Court of Justice.
3.  Subject to the operation of paragraph 10, if 
after six months from the time of the request 
for negotiations referred to in paragraph 2, the 
parties concerned have not been able to settle 
their dispute through negotiation or any other 
means referred to in paragraph 2, the dispute 
shall be submitted, at the request of any of the 
parties to the dispute, to impartial fact-finding in 
accordance with paragraphs 4 to 9, unless the 
parties otherwise agree.
4.  A fact-finding Commission shall be established, 
composed of one member nominated by each 
party concerned and in addition a member 
not having the nationality of any of the parties 
concerned chosen by the nominated members 
who shall serve as Chairman.
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9.  The expenses of the Commission shall be borne 
equally by the parties concerned.
10. When ratifying, accepting, approving or 
acceding to the present Convention, or at any 
time thereafter, a party which is not a regional 
economic integration organisation may declare in 
a written instrument submitted to the depositary 
that, in respect of any dispute not resolved in 
accordance with paragraph 2, it recognises 
as compulsory ipso facto and without special 
agreement in relation to any party accepting the 
same obligation:
(a)  Submission of the dispute to the International 
Court of Justice; and/or
(b)  Arbitration by an arbitral tribunal established 
and operating, unless the parties to the dispute 
otherwise agreed, in accordance with the 
procedure laid down in the annex to the present 
Convention;
A party which is a regional economic integration 
organisation may make a declaration with like effect 
in relation to arbitration in accordance with, 
subparagraph (b).
33.1 Commentary
33.1.1 The nature of water disputes and 
justiciability 
This section focuses on the diplomatic and legal 
processes for the settlement of disputes and the 
roles and functions of courts and tribunals and 
other institutions or individuals, in relation to dispute 
settlement under Article 33 of the Convention. Before 
examining the meaning of dispute settlement under 
Article 33 it is important to briefly discuss several 
points crucial to understanding the place of Article 
33 of the Convention within the broader context of 
international law. The first point essentially revolves 
around the question:  What is an international dispute? 
And a second related question: What is the distinction 
between and international justiciable dispute and non-
justiciable dispute and why does the distinction matter?
     The term ‘dispute’ has been defined as a ‘conflict 
or controversy; a conflict of claims or rights’.476 
The Permanent Court of International Justice in 
the Mavrommatis case defines a dispute as a, 
‘disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of 
legal views or of interests between two persons’.477 
The distinction is often drawn between legal disputes 
(primarily involving legal issues) and any other kind 
of dispute. Whether a disagreement over an 
international watercourse is considered to be a 
‘dispute’ or not has legal implications for the type 
of dispute settlement response. 
     Only disputes which are ‘justiciable’ are suitable 
for resolution by legal dispute settlement methods.  
A dispute is justiciable if, ‘first, a specific disagreement 
exists, and secondly, that disagreement is of a kind 
which can be resolved by the application of rules of 
law by judicial (including arbitral) processes’, otherwise 
a dispute is non-justiciable.478  Where disputes are 
476  Black’s Law Dictionary (4th edn West 1951). 
477  (1924) PCIJ Ser. A, No. 2, 11. 
478  J Collier and V Lowe, Settlement of Disputes in International Law: Institutions 
and Procedures (Oxford University Press 1999) at 10. 
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What is an International Dispute?
Definition | ‘Conflict or controversy; a conflict of 
claims or rights’  [Black’s Law Dictionary]
‘Justiciable’ / legal disputes | Ability to be resolved by 
‘legal’ means
‘Non-justiciable’ disputes | Resolved by non-judicial 
methods
non-justiciable this means they must be resolved 
through other methods of peaceful settlement, which 
are described below. Finally, a ‘water dispute’ has 
been defined as ‘any conflict of views or of interests, 
which takes the form of opposing claims between the 
states, concerning the use of a transboundary water 
resource.’479  
479  Vinogradov, Wouters and Jones, Transforming Potential Conflict into 
Cooperation Potential: The Role of International Water Law at 26.
33.1.2 Background to Article 33
The drafting of Article 33 gave rise to significant 
controversy over whether or not it was appropriate for 
a framework convention to contain dispute settlement 
provisions and whether, and to what extent, the dispute 
settlement mechanisms should be compulsory.480  
Article 33 in its final form reflected a compromise, 
including a range of diplomatic and legal dispute 
settlement provisions based on the rationale of Articles 
1 (1),  2 (3) and 33 of the UN Charter, that states are 
under a general obligation to settle disputes peacefully 
and in good faith but are free to choose the methods 
for dispute settlement. 
     Since the UN Watercourses Convention was first 
negotiated, the subject matter of international water 
disputes and the kinds of disputants have changed and 
increasingly reflect conflicts between several competing 
water users in two or more states - and now involve 
numerous actors besides national governments.481   
However, Article 33 of the UN Convention (not to be 
confused with Article 33 of the UN Charter) contains 
a broad range of mechanisms which should provide 
the flexibility required to meet these changing 
characteristics of water disputes.
     Article 33 of the UN Convention is also residual in 
nature which means it applies where the watercourse 
states concerned do not have an applicable agreement 
for the settlement of such disputes (Article 33 (1)).482  
480  While one group of states supported compulsory and binding means of 
dispute settlement as part of the Convention (Finland, Hungary, Pakistan, Sudan 
and Syria See U.N. Doc. A/51/275 at 67; UN Doc A/C.6/51/SR.20 at 11; and UN 
Doc. A/51/275/Add.3, at 12) others considered this approach to be too rigid and 
unsuitable for a framework document (Ethiopia: (U.N. Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.20) China, 
India, Israel and Rwanda objected) and argued that such matters should be left 
to the discretion of the states concerned (Turkey: UN Doc. A/51/275, at 68) and 
finally the U.S. and Venezuela thought the provision should be left as proposed. 
See Wouters ‘Universal and Regional Approaches to Resolving International Water 
Disputes: What Lessons Learned from State Practice?’ at 121. 
481  Brown Weiss, ‘The Evolution of International Water Law’ at 270. 
482  1994 Draft Articles at 134.
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Purposes and Principles of the UN 
Charter related to dispute settlement
One of the purposes of the United Nations, set 
out in Article 1(1) of the Charter, is ‘to bring about 
by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment 
or settlement of international disputes or situations 
which might lead to a breach of the peace’. 
Article 2(3) provides that in pursuit of such purposes 
states ‘shall settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international 
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered’. 
33.1.3 Process of Article 33 – Start with 
negotiation and consultation 
Negotiation between the parties is the first stage of 
the process set out in Article 33 (2) and can take 
different forms, including (but not limited to) bilateral 
talks and diplomatic correspondence to international 
conferences.483 Diplomatic negotiations are sometimes 
preceded by the meetings of experts (such as occurred 
between Israeli and Jordanian water experts prior to 
formal negotiations over the 1994 Peace Treaty).484   
Parties are under the obligation to conduct negotiations 
in good faith and in a manner that ‘the negotiations 
are meaningful, which will not be the case when 
either of them insists upon its own position without 
contemplating modification of it’ as stipulated by the 
ICJ in Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros and the North Sea 
483  Vinogradov,  Wouters  and Jones, Transforming Potential Conflict into 
Cooperation Potential: The Role of International Water Law at 27.  Also A Aust, 
Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2001) at 353
484. 1994 Treaty of Peace between the state of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan (signed =October 26 1994) UN Treaty Database, available at <http://
treaties.un.org/pages/UNTSOnline.aspx?id=1> accessed 30 April 2012. For 
discussion see Vinogradov, Wouters and Jones, Transforming Potential Conflict into 
Cooperation Potential: The Role of International Water Law at 27.
 
Continental Shelf case.485 Most disputes are able to be 
settled by negotiation and, if this is the case, parties 
should record the terms of settlement – this often 
takes the form of a non-legally binding Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU).486 Of course parties can also 
mutually agree to formalise the agreed outcome and 
render the MOU as legally binding. 
     For several interesting examples of a demonstrative 
negotiation process see the 2002 agreement between 
the United States and Mexico regarding the Rio Grande 
River, which resulted from negotiations between the 
two countries under the auspices of the International 
Boundary Water Commission (IBWC).487  Also see the 
negotiations leading to the 1995 Mekong Agreement488 
and the negotiations over the Nile Basin.489  Extensive 
study shows that there is a state preference to 
negotiate at the bilateral level,490 although it is multi-
lateral treaties involving participation by all riparians to 
a transboundary river which will normally be the most 
equitable and sustainable for the countries sharing 
transboundary resources.
     Formal negotiations are often preceded by 
consultations, which usually involve the exchange of 
views and information. Consultation is normally an ad 
hoc procedure, but it can also be provided for in any 
watercourse agreement either within an institutional 
mechanism (the Convention specifies that parties 
485  Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros para 14, quoting from North Sea Continental Shelf case 
at para 85.
486  Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice at 353.
487  S McCaffrey, ‘Water Disputes Defined: Characteristics and Trends for Resolving 
Them’ in International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed), Resolution 
of International Water Disputes : Papers Emanating from the Sixth Pca International 
Law Seminar, November 8, 2002 (Kluwer Law International 2003) at 76.  
488  G Browder, ‘An Analysis of the Negotiations for the 1995 Mekong Agreement’ 
(2000) 5 International Negotiation 237. 
489  A Dinar and S Alemu, ‘The Process of Negotiation over International Water 
Disputes: The Case of the Nile Basin’ (2000) 5 International Negotiation 331;  J 
Brunnée and SJ Toope, ‘The Changing Nile Basin Regime: Does Law Matter?’ 
(2002) 43 Harvard International Law Journal 105. 
490  N Zawahri, S Dinar and S Mitchell, ‘Fragmented Governance of International 
Rivers: Negotiating Bilateral versus Multilateral Treaties’ (2011) 55(1) International 
Studies Quarterly 835. 
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should make use of any existing joint institutions) or 
as a dispute prevention and resolution tool.491   Article 
33 does mention consultation but it is provided for 
elsewhere in the Convention (including in Articles 4, 
6, 7, 8, 17, 18, 19, 24, 26 and 30) and these provisions 
attempt to avoid having to utilise dispute settlement 
provisions under Article 33. The Nile River Basin 
Initiative can be considered as an on-going 
multilateral consultation.492
     If states cannot resolve their issues through 
negotiation then Article 33 (2) provides that they ‘may’ 
seek to settle issues in a non-binding way through 
good offices, mediation or conciliation by a third party, 
any joint watercourse institutions that may have been 
established by them, or states can opt for a binding 
method of dispute settlement by agreeing to submit the 
dispute to the binding arbitration or to the International 
Court of Justice. The characteristics of each dispute 
including subject matter and disputants will affect the 
choice of settlement method. It is suggested that when 
disputes involve more than one type of competing 
water use and important actors in addition to states, 
the diplomatic methods used for dispute resolution 
are more favourable.493 Finally if parties are unable to 
agree on a solution using these mechanisms they must 
submit the dispute, at the request of any party, to fact-
finding as per Article 33 (3). 
     This statement is of course qualified at the beginning 
of Article 33 (3) by the words ‘subject to the operation 
under paragraph 10’ which means that if parties 
choose to use either of the two legally binding dispute 
resolution methods (Arbitration or Adjudication) then 
the decision in both these methods is binding and not 
491  Vinogradov, Wouters and Jones, Transforming Potential Conflict into 
Cooperation Potential: The Role of International Water Law at 28. 
492  Dinar and Alemu ‘The Process of Negotiation over International Water Disputes: 
The Case of the Nile Basin’, at 331. 
493  Brown Weiss, ‘The Evolution of International Water Law’ at 207.
appealable. The dispute will be considered closed after 
either of these processes has finished and it is only in 
circumstances where the decision making body, such 
as the International Court of Justice, makes an order 
to the parties that negotiation or fact-finding might 
resume.  Each of the dispute resolution mechanisms is 
discussed in turn and summarised in Figure 6.8 below.
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33.1.4 Joint institutions
Part IV of this Guide (especially commentary on 
Article 24) provides an explanation of the use of 
joint institutions to manage transboundary waters 
including their role in facilitating on-going consultation, 
communication and procedural obligations assisting 
states with strengthening bi-lateral relations and the 
prevention of disputes.  As discussed, what constitutes 
a ‘joint management mechanism’ is quite open and 
the ILC suggested that the term ‘joint management 
mechanism’ might encompass not only formal 
organisational arrangements, but less formal means 
such as, ‘the holding of regular meetings between the 
appropriate agencies or other representatives of the 
states concerned.’494Joint institutions can also provide 
a more formalised framework for dispute resolution 
(when preventative measures are unsuccessful).  Article 
33 of the Convention encourages states to utilise joint 
institutions to resolve disputes where possible and this 
can apply during the process of initial consultations, 
through to formal negotiations and even as part of 
Court orders post Adjudication. As McCaffrey has 
pointed out ‘where disputes have arisen…expert 
bodies in particular joint commissions…are generally 
best equipped to conduct fact-finding…and resolve 
questions concerning the obligations of the states’.495
     The 1960 Indus Treaty between Pakistan and 
India is one of the most extensively examined bilateral 
transboundary water agreements, and provides for 
a joint institution the Permanent Indus Commission 
(PIC) (consisting of one member from each country) 
and corresponding procedures for dispute resolution. 
The PIC serves as the initial venue where a possible 
conflict must first be addressed and is empowered 
to examine any ‘question’ which arises between the 
parties concerning the interpretation or application 
494  1994 Draft Articles at 125. 
495  McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses at 511. 
of the Treaty or the existence of any fact which, if 
established, might constitute a breach of the Treaty 
. . . [and] resolve the question by agreement’ (Article 
IX (1)).  Issues that cannot be resolved by the PIC will 
be deemed ‘differences’ which may, depending on 
their classification, be heard by a ‘neutral expert’. 
The difference will be considered as a ‘dispute’ if the 
matter falls outside those listed in Annex F. Disputes 
are to be resolved through negotiation and if they are 
unsuccessful become subject to arbitration.496  The use 
of these two mechanisms will be discussed further 
below in relation to two recent conflicts over the Indus, 
the Baglihar difference and the Kishenganga dispute.
     Article 35 of the 1995 Mekong Agreement also 
provides for the use of joint institutions to be the first 
point for dispute resolution to be followed by other 
dispute settlement methods if unsuccessful.  
It reads:
‘In the event the Commission is unable to resolve 
the difference or dispute within a timely manner, the 
issue shall be referred to the Governments to take 
cognisance of the matter for resolution by negotiation 
through diplomatic channels within a timely manner. . . 
Should the Governments find it necessary or beneficial 
to facilitate the resolution of the matter, they may, by 
mutual agreement, request the assistance of mediation 
through an entity or party mutually agreed upon, and 
thereafter to proceed according to the principles of 
international law.’
496  See Vinogradov, Wouters and Jones Transforming Potential Conflict into 
Cooperation Potential: The Role of International Water Law at 65.
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33.1.5 Good offices and mediation
Mediation and good offices are diplomatic methods 
of dispute settlement involving third parties.The third 
party can be a single state or a group of states, 
an individual, an organ of a universal or regional 
international organisation, or a joint body.  The good 
offices method is where the third party offers ‘good 
offices’ to the conflicting states to facilitate dialogue 
and assist states towards peaceful settlement of 
the dispute.  The third party offering good offices 
must be acceptable to all the parties.497 Once the 
negotiations have started, the functions of good 
offices are usually considered to be completed.498
     Mediation involves more active third party 
participation in the negotiations. The Mediator 
conducts the negotiations between contending 
parties on the basis of proposals made by the 
mediator aimed at a mutually acceptable 
compromise solution.499  Mediation may be set in 
motion either upon the initiative of a third party 
whose offer to mediate is accepted by the parties to 
the dispute, or initiated by the parties to the dispute 
themselves agreeing to mediation.500 The mediator’s 
role can involve communication, clarification of 
issues, drafting of proposals, identifying areas of 
agreement between parties, and elaboration of 
provisional arrangements to minimise contentious 
and propose alternate solutions.501  
497  For extensive commentary on good offices see United Nations Office 
of Legal Affairs, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between 
States (United Nations 1992) at 33. 
498  Vinogradov, Wouters and Jones, Transforming Potential Conflict into 
Cooperation Potential: The Role of International Water Law at 28. United 
Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes between States at 42. 
499  Brownlie ‘The Wang Tieya Lecture in Public International Law: The 
Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes’ (2009) 8 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 267 at 271. 
500  United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Handbook on the Peaceful 
Settlement of Disputes between States at 42. 
501  Ibid 43. See UN Rules for the Conciliation of Disputes, UN Doc A/50/33 
(1993).  
The World Bank provided good offices and mediated 
the solution to the Indus River dispute, which resulted 
in the negotiation of the 1960s Indus Water Treaty. 
Another example of a mediated dispute is the Israeli–
Jordanian bilateral negotiations which were combined 
with informal discussions where American and Russian 
diplomats acted as mediators which resulted in the 
1994 Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan. 
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33.1.6 Conciliation 
Conciliation involves an impartial third party who can 
be a sole conciliator but normally involves a formal, 
institutionalised and impartial commission which 
investigates the dispute and proposes ways to resolve 
it by combining elements of inquiry and mediation.502  
The conciliator or commission will seeks to objectively 
establish the facts and applicable law but may also 
investigate the problem broadly.503 It may also submit 
proposals for resolving the dispute which the parties 
can choose whether or not to accept. Parties respond 
to the conciliation commission’s proposals within a 
prescribed time limit.
     If they agree to the proposals, the commission 
drafts a procés-verbal, which sets forth the terms of the 
agreement which are non-binding.504  It is argued that 
the fact-finding procedure under Article 33 of the UN 
Convention closely resembles a conciliation procedure 
since the fact-finding commission’s task includes 
providing a ‘recommendation as it deems appropriate 
for an equitable solution of the dispute.’505 
     In 2002 the Permanent Court of Arbitration adopted 
the Optional Rules for Conciliation of Disputes Relating 
to the Environment and/or Natural Resources which 
provide a comprehensive set of environmentally tailored 
dispute resolution procedural rules which can be used 
to complement conciliation under Article 33.506 
502  United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes between States at 45.
503  Vinogradov, Wouters and Jones, Transforming Potential Conflict into 
Cooperation Potential: The Role of International Water Law at 30. 
504  Brown Weiss, ‘The Evolution of International Water Law’ at 286. 
505  Wouters, ‘The International Law of Watercourses: New Dimensions’ at 377. 
506  PCA 2002 Optional Rules for Conciliation of Disputes Relating to the 
Environment and/or Natural Resources, available at <http://www.pca-cpa.org/
upload/files/ENVIRONMENTAL%281%29.pdf > accessed 30 April 2012 at 215. 
 
Conciliation
‘The process of settling a dispute 
by referring it to a commission of 
persons whose task it is to 
elucidate the facts and usually 
after hearing the parties and 
endeavouring to bring them to 
an agreement to make a report 
containing proposals for a 
settlement, which is not binding’
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33.1.7 Fact-finding and inquiry
Inquiry and fact-finding are procedures specifically 
designed to produce an impartial finding of disputed 
facts by engaging a third-party.507  The terms ‘inquiry’ 
and ‘fact finding’ have often been used (sometimes 
interchangeably) for this type of procedure under 
which states refer questions to a panel of experts 
(commission of inquiry or a fact-finding commission) 
for investigation of  factual or technical matters after 
diplomatic negotiations.508  Fact-finding and inquiry can 
also be undertaken by one expert alone.509 
     Fact-finding under Article 33 (3) is the only element 
of the Convention’s dispute settlement procedures 
which does not require every disputing party’s prior 
agreement, and may be invoked unilaterally by any 
of the parties to the Convention at any time after six 
months from the commencement of the consultations 
and negotiations between parties (provided the parties 
have not already initiated one of the legal dispute 
resolution processes (Arbitration and Adjudication). 
The rationale of the inclusion of these provisions was to 
avoid stalemate in the dispute settlement and to assist 
parties in moving forward with data and information 
exchange which are essential for the operation of the 
principle of equitable utilisation, and to enable the 
resolution of a dispute in good faith.510
     Article 33 (4)-(9) provides for the establishment 
of the fact-finding commission which will have three 
members, one from each disputing country and one 
from a third country who will act as chair. The chair 
must be agreed upon by both parties.  If the parties are 
unable to agree on a chairman within three months of 
the request for the establishment of the Commission, 
any party concerned may request the Secretary-
507  Vinogradov, Wouters and Jones, Transforming Potential Conflict into 
Cooperation Potential: The Role of International Water Law at 29. 
508  Ibid. 
509  United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes between States at 26.
510  McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses at 516. 
General of the United Nations to appoint the chair. 
These provisions are intended to avoid the dispute 
settlement mechanism being frustrated by the lack of 
cooperation of one of the parties.511
     Once the Commission is established it shall 
determine its own procedure (Article 33 (6) and 
the parties are to provide the Commission with the 
information it requires and to permit it to have access 
to their territories (Article 33 (7)). The Commission 
will then prepare and adopt a report by majority vote 
which contains findings and ‘such recommendation 
as it deems appropriate for an equitable solution of 
the dispute’ (Article 33 (8). These recommendations 
are not binding but the parties must consider them 
in good faith.  Good faith in this instance means that 
parties must consider the recommendations with a 
view to reaching a negotiated settlement.512  One of the 
most significant recent uses of fact-finding in water 
disputes is by Pakistan and India, pursuant to the Indus 
Waters Treaty, to resolve a ‘difference’ regarding the 
construction by India of the Baglihar hydropower plant 
summarised opposite.
511  1994 Draft Articles at 134.
512  Tanzi and Arcari, The UN Convention on the Law of International Watercourses 
at 284.
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In 2000 India proposed building the Baglihar Dam 
on the Chenab River, which is one of the major 
rivers within the Indus River system governed by 
the 1960 Indus Water Treaty between India and 
Pakistan. Pakistan opposed the dam on the basis 
that it did not comply with the requirements of 
the Treaty. The two parties were unsuccessful in 
bilateral negotiations. Part IX of the Treaty deals 
with differences and disputes, and provides for 
‘differences’ to be referred to a neutral expert. 
The neutral expert has extensive quasi-judicial 
powers, including determination of available waters, 
withdrawals, releases, uses, and procedures for 
providing each party an adequate hearing. The 
decision of the expert is binding. In 2005 Pakistan 
requested that the World Bank appoint a neutral 
expert to investigate the facts and settle the 
difference.  The expert in the Baglihar difference 
issued a decision in 2007, which both parties 
accepted. Although Pakistan was not satisfied 
with the decision and has recently argued (in front 
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration during the 
Kishenganga Arbitration) that the Baglihar case has 
left Pakistan without physical protection against the 
manipulation of flow on the Indus system. 
Indus Waters Baglihar Dam
Figure 6.4 | Indus River Basin (Source TFDD, 2005)513 
513  This map is a product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, 
Department of Geosciences, Oregon State University.  Additional information about 
the TFDD can be found at: <http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu>, accessed 
30 April 2012.
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organisations and companies can be parties to PCA 
proceedings under the 2001 Optional whereas only 
states can be parties to proceedings before the ICJ.517  
     There have been numerous international arbitrations 
of water disputes since the late 19th Century, a select 
list of more recent cases include: the 1941 Trail Smelter 
Arbitration518 ; the 1947 Lake Lanoux Arbitration 
between Spain and France 519; the 1968 Gut Dam case 
between the United States and Canada520 ; the 1994 
Landmark 62-Mount Fitz Roy case between Argentina 
and Chile521; the 2004 arbitration between Netherlands 
and France pursuant to a nearly 70 year dispute; and 
the 1976 Convention on the Protection of the Rhine 
Against Pollution by Chlorides and the Additional 
Protocol of 199522.  Most recently, in 2011, the PCA 
delivered an Order on Interim Measures regarding the 
Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. 
India), which is examined below with a specific focus on 
the process of dispute resolution.523 
517  See Articles 35 and 40 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and 
for ICJ procedure see the 1978 Rules of Court, both available on the ICJ website 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0> accessed 22 
October 2011. 
518  Trail Smelter Arbitration, 33 AJIL (1939) 182 & 35 AJIL (1941).
519  Lake Lanoux Arbitration, 24 ILR (1957). 
520  Gut Dam Arbitration, 8 ILM (1968).
521  Case Concerning Boundary Dispute between Argentina and Chile Concerning 
Delimitation of the frontier line between boundary post 62 and mount Fitzroy (1994).  
Available <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXII/3-149.pdf> 1 November 
2011.
522  Rhine Chlorides Convention Arbitral Award (France/Netherlands) (2004), 
Available online at the Permanent Court of Arbitration <http://www.pca-cpa.org/
upload/files/Neth_Fr_award_English.pdf> accessed 1 November 2011.
523  For the Pakistan v. India Order of Interim Measures see website of Permanent 
Court of Arbitration <http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1392> 
Permanent Court of Arbitration
Established in 1899 located in 
The Hague 2001 Optional Rules 
for Environmental Disputes are 
non-mandatory
33.1.8 Legal methods of dispute 
settlement – Arbitration (Annex 1 UNWC)
Arbitration is a legal method of dispute settlement 
which requires the prior consent of each party to 
the dispute. This is usually done through a special 
agreement between the parties called a compromise.514  
Arbitration is provided for in Article 33 and 
complemented by the Annex to the Convention which 
sets out the rules for the establishment and operation 
of an Arbitral Tribunal (Article 33 (10) (b) and (Annex 
Articles 1-14) as included in the following text box.
     It is important to note that parties are not bound to 
use the particular arbitral formula of Article 33 and are 
instead able to utilise other procedures if ‘the parties to 
the dispute otherwise agree’ (Article 33 (10)(b)). These 
other options could include use of the procedures 
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), which 
is not a ‘court’ but rather a special mechanism, the 
primary purpose of which is to assist states in settling 
their international controversies.515  The PCA was 
established in 1899 under the Hague Convention for 
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and 
is able to provide its services to all arbitration cases 
submitted to it by agreement of the parties to a dispute. 
It has recently updated its procedures to respond to 
current international practice and a particularly relevant 
outcome is the 2001 Optional Rules for Arbitrating 
Environmental Disputes which provides more detailed 
provisions than the arbitration procedure in the 
Convention.516  One significant distinguishing factor 
between the ICJ and the PCA is that both international 
514  Ibid at 31.
515  See website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, <http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pag_id=363> accessed 10 November 2011.
516   The 2001 Optional Rules for Environmental Disputes are non-mandatory 
and designed to facilitate arbitration pertaining to disputes that involve public 
international law and the utilisation of natural resources and environmental 
protection. See PCA, 2001 Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to 
the Environment and/or Natural Resources, <http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/
ENVIRONMENTAL%281%29.pdf> accessed 10 November 2011. 
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Article 1 
Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the 
arbitration pursuant to article 33 of the Convention 
shall take place in accordance with articles 2 to 14 of 
the present annex.
Article 2 
The claimant party shall notify the respondent party 
that it is referring a dispute to arbitration pursuant to 
article 33 of the Convention.  The notification shall 
state the subject matter of arbitration and include, 
in particular, the articles of the Convention, the 
interpretation or application of which are at issue.  If 
the parties do not agree on the subject matter of 
the dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the 
subject matter.
Article 3
1. In disputes between two parties, the arbitral 
tribunal shall consist of three members.  Each 
of the parties to the dispute shall appoint an 
arbitrator and the two arbitrators so appointed 
shall designate by common agreement the 
third arbitrator, who shall be the chairman of 
the tribunal.  The latter shall not be a national 
of one of the parties to the dispute or of any 
riparian state of the watercourse concerned, 
nor have his or her usual place of residence 
in the territory of one of these parties or such 
riparian state, nor have dealt with the case in 
any other capacity.
2.    In disputes between more than two parties, 
parties in the same interest shall appoint one 
arbitrator jointly by agreement,
3.    Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner 
prescribed for the initial appointment.
Article 4
1. If the Chairman of the arbitral tribunal has 
not been designated within two months of 
the appointment of the second arbitrator, the 
President of the International Court of Justice 
shall, at the request of a party, designate the 
Chairman within a further two-month period.
2. If one of the parties to the dispute does not 
appoint an arbitrator within two months of receipt 
of the request, the other party may inform the 
President of the International Court of Justice, 
who shall make the designation within a further 
two-month period.
Article 5 
The arbitral tribunal shall render its decisions in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention and 
international law.
Article 6 
Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, 
the arbitral tribunal shall determine its own rules of 
procedure.
Article 7
The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of one of the 
parties, recommend essential interim measures of 
protection.
UNWC Annex Articles 1-14 on Arbitration
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Article 13 
If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear 
before the arbitral tribunal or fails to defend its case, 
the other party may request the tribunal to continue 
the proceedings and to make its award. Absence 
of a party or a failure of a party to defend its case 
shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before 
rendering its final decision, the arbitral tribunal must 
satisfy itself that the claim is well founded in fact and 
law.
Article 14
1. The tribunal shall render its final decision 
within five months of the date on which it is 
fully constituted unless it finds it necessary to 
extend the time limit for a period which should 
not exceed five more months.
2. The final decision of the arbitral tribunal shall 
be confined to the subject matter of the 
dispute and shall state the reasons on which 
it is based.  It shall contain the names of the 
members who have participated and the 
date of the final decision.  Any member of the 
tribunal may attach a separate or dissenting 
opinion to the final decision.
3. The award shall be binding on the parties to 
the dispute.  It shall be without appeal unless 
the parties to the dispute have agreed in 
advance to an appellate procedure.
4. Any controversy which may arise between 
the parties to the dispute as regards the 
interpretation or manner of implementation of 
the final decision may be submitted by either 
party for decision to the arbitral tribunal which 
rendered it.
Article 8
1. The parties to the dispute shall facilitate the 
work of the arbitral tribunal and, in particular, 
using all means at their disposal, shall:
 (a)  Provide it with all relevant documents,  
 information and facilities;
 (b)  Enable it, when necessary, to call witnesses  
 or experts and receive their evidence.
2. The parties and the arbitrators are under an 
obligation to protect the confidentiality of any 
information they receive in confidence during 
the proceedings of the arbitral tribunal.
Article 9 
Unless the arbitral tribunal determines otherwise 
because of the particular circumstances of the case, 
the costs of the tribunal shall be borne by the parties 
to the dispute in equal shares.  The tribunal shall 
keep a record of all its costs, and shall furnish a final 
statement thereof to the parties.
 
Article 10 
Any party that has an interest of a legal nature in the 
subject matter of the dispute which may be affected 
by the decision in the case may intervene in the 
proceedings with the consent of the tribunal.
Article 11
The tribunal may hear and determine counterclaims 
arising directly out of the subject matter of the dispute.
Article 12  
Decisions both on procedure and substance of the 
arbitral tribunal shall be taken by a majority vote of its 
members.
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Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration 
(Pakistan v. India) 
Background | This overview focuses on some key 
features of the arbitration process rather than the 
legal merits of the dispute or the parties’ arguments. 
In 2008 a dispute arose over India’s construction of 
the Kishenganga Hydroelectric Project (KHEP). The 
KHEP aims to divert water from the Kishenganga 
River (also known as the Neelum River) to a tributary 
of the Jhelum River in Kashmir through a by-pass 
tunnel. Pakistan is also building a dam (known as 
the Neelum-Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NHJEP). 
Pakistan raised technical and legal objections to 
Kishenganga and claimed that it is a violation of 
the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. It claimed that the 
diverted water would reduce downstream flows and 
hydropower generation capacity in NHJEP as well as 
other issues. India counter-argued that the flows into 
Pakistan will not be reduced and the KHEP will have 
no impact because NJHEP is not an existing project. 
Some observers suggest the parties are building 
their respective projects with the hope of claiming 
‘prior appropriation’ and ‘existing use’ to the water of 
the tributary (Uprety and Salman at 647).
Contentious points | The Treaty allocates the waters 
of the eastern rivers of the Indus basin – Sutlej, Beas 
and Ravi – to India, while Pakistan has unrestricted 
use of the western rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab 
(Article III). The questions at the centre of the dispute 
from Pakistan’s view point are:
a) Whether India’s proposed diversion of the river 
Kishenganga (Neelum) into another tributary 
breaches India’s legal obligations owed to 
Pakistan under Article III (2) of the Treaty to let 
all the waters of the Western rivers flow (and 
not permit any interference with those waters) 
and Article IV(6) - maintenance of natural 
channels. 
b) Whether under the Treaty India may deplete 
or bring the reservoir level of a run-of-river 
storage plant below Dead Storage Level?
Arbitration Process and Provisional Measures | In 
May 2010 Pakistan instituted arbitral proceedings 
against India under Article IX and Paragraph 2(b) 
of Annexure G to the Indus Waters Treaty 1960. 
Article IX of the Treaty provides for a system for the 
settlement of differences and disputes that may arise 
in relation to the Treaty.  Article IX states:
(4)  Either Government may, following receipt of 
the report referred to in Paragraph (3), or if 
it comes to the conclusion that this report is 
being unduly delayed in the Commission, invite 
the other Government to resolve the dispute 
by agreement
(5)  A Court of Arbitration shall be established to 
resolve the dispute in the manner provided by 
Annexure G
 (a) upon agreement between the parties to do 
so; or
 (b) at the request of either party, if, after 
negotiations have begun pursuant to 
Paragraph (4), in its opinion the dispute is 
not likely to be resolved by negotiation or 
mediation; or
 (c) at the request of either party, if, after the 
expiry of one month following receipt by the 
other Government of the invitation referred 
to in Paragraph (4), that Party comes to the 
conclusion that the other Government is 
unduly delaying the negotiations.
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 Paragraph 2 of Annexure G of the Treaty 
provides as follows:
2. The arbitration proceeding may be instituted 
[...]
 (b) at the request of either party to the other 
in accordance with the provisions of Article 
IX (5) (b) or (c). Such request shall contain 
a statement setting forth the nature of the 
dispute or claim to be submitted to arbitration, 
the nature of the relief sought and the names 
of the arbitrators appointed under Paragraph 6 
by the Party instituting the proceeding.
In its Request for Arbitration, Pakistan stated parties 
had failed to resolve the dispute concerning the 
KHEP by agreement pursuant to the terms under 
Article IX (4) of the Treaty. This is the first time a 
dispute under the Indus Treaty has been referred to 
arbitration. A Court of Arbitration composed of seven 
members was constituted pursuant to Article IX (5) 
and Annexure G. The Permanent Court of Arbitration 
acts as Secretariat to the Court of Arbitration 
pursuant to Paragraph 15(a) of Annexure G. The 
first meeting of the Court of Arbitration was held 
in January 2011 where the Court made personnel 
appointments with the consent of the parties. In 
June 2011 the Tribunal conducted a site visit to both 
the Neelum-Jhelum Dam in Pakistan and KHEP in 
India. 
In June 2011 Pakistan requested the Court to lay 
down interim measures for a specified time period 
necessary to safeguard interests and avoid prejudice 
to the final solution and aggravation or extension 
of the dispute (Annexure G, para 28).  Essentially 
Pakistan sought an interim order which would 
restrain India from proceeding with the diversion 
of the Kishenganga River until the legality of the 
diversion had been determined by the Court of 
Arbitration (paras 52 and 53).  India requested the 
court to reject this application.  For an overview of 
the process of communication exchange between 
the parties including the Procedural Orders of the 
Court – see paras 28-51 of the Interim Order. 
On 23 September 2011, the arbitral tribunal ordered 
interim measures pending its final decision on the 
merits of the case – in order to avoid prejudice to the 
final solution.  The Tribunal ordered India to halt any 
‘permanent constructions or works within the river 
bed that would cause irreparable reduction in water 
flow’ until the final decision was reached on the 
merits of the case – this includes the construction 
of a portion of the KHEP which presents a real risk 
of ‘prejudice to the final solution’. However, the 
Court also ordered that India would be allowed to 
continue construction on the diversion tunnel and 
hydro-electric facilities, as well as any temporary 
coffer dams within the Kishenganga River, at its 
own risk, pending a final decision.  Finally the 
Court requested the two countries to submit a joint 
report setting forth the areas of agreement and any 
points of disagreement that may arise regarding the 
implementation of its order (para 152). It is expected 
the Court will deliver its final Award in December 
2012/January 2013.
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33.1.9 Legal methods of dispute 
settlement – Adjudication
The International Court of Justice was established 
in 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations and is 
the principal judicial organ of the UN – although this 
status does not give it priority as a forum of dispute524 
settlement and the Court’s jurisdiction is based on the 
consent of all parties to each dispute.  The Court’s 
general mandate is to settle, in accordance with 
international law, legal disputes submitted to it by states 
(contentious disputes) and to give advisory opinions 
on legal questions referred to it by authorised United 
Nations organs and specialised agencies (advisory 
proceedings).525  Proceedings may be instituted either 
through the notification of a special agreement or by 
means of application.526  
     The ICJ or its predecessor the Permanent Court 
of International Justice (PCIJ) have heard numerous 
freshwater related disputes including: River Oder 
case (1929)527; River Meuse case (1937)528; Gabcíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia)(1997)529 ; 
Kasilili/Sedudu Island (boundary river) case, Botswana/
Namibia (1999); River Niger boundary dispute Benin/
Niger (2005); Case concerning Navigation and Related 
Rights Costa Rica v. Nicaragua (2009; Pulp Mills on 
the River Uruguay Argentina v. Uruguay (2010); and 
Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border 
Area, Costa Rica v. Nicaragua (case pending). All of 
accessed 28 October 2011.
524  Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell C, International Law and the Environment at 250. 
525  For a general explanation of the Court’s jurisdiction, mandate and functions 
and to find cases and advisory opinions see the website of the International Court of 
Justice, <http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/index.php> accessed 20 October 2011.
526 See Article 40 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and for ICJ 
procedure see the 1978 Rules of Court, both available on the ICJ website <http://
www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0> accessed 22 October 
2011.  
527 Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder Case, 
PCIJ Ser. A, No.23 (1929). 
528  River Meuse Case (Netherlands v Belgium) PCIJ Reports Series A/B No 70.  
Available online at <http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1937.06.28_
meuse.htm> accessed 1 November 2011. 
529  1997 Case Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. 
Slovakia). Available online at the International Court of Justice website <http://www.
icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=hs&case=92&k=8d> accessed 2 
November 2011. 
these cases going back to 1947 can be accessed 
from the ICJ Website.530  The salient cases which 
involve several of the legal and diplomatic dispute 
resolution techniques are summarised in the text boxes 
below – the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary 
v. Slovakia) is a particularly interesting case for its 
long and varied negotiation and dispute resolution 
experience, both prior and immediately after the 
1977 Treaty, and before and after the ICJ judgment.  
However, although interesting for our purposes of 
examination, this case remains unresolved. The Pulp 
Mills case is also briefly examined with a focus on 
process – for further analysis of the legal merits of the 
case see Parts III and IV of the Guide.
     Most importantly for the procedural purposes of 
this Guide, Article 33 (10) (b) of the UN Convention 
provides for the submission of a dispute to the ICJ 
with the agreement of all states concerned. At the time 
of becoming a contracting party to the Convention 
or at any time after, a state party may declare in a 
written instrument submitted to the depositary that, in 
respect of any dispute not resolved in accordance with 
Article 33 (2) and where both parties to a dispute have 
declared their willingness – either party can unilaterally 
submit their dispute to the ICJ. The judgment is final, 
binding on the parties to a case, and without appeal.531  
A selection of the reasons why a party may choose to 
submit an instrument declaring willingness to have any 
dispute resolved by compulsory third party adjudication 
are: the certainty of a neutral, orderly and principled 
dispute settlement procedure; and the increased 
certainty that the dispute will be resolved. Since the 
530  International Court of Justice <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.
php?p1=3&p2=2> accessed 3 November 2011.  
531  See Article 40 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and for ICJ 
procedure see the 1978 Rules of Court, both available on the ICJ website <http://
www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0> accessed 22 October 
2011.  
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decision to submit to adjudication is consensual; 
the rate of compliance with decisions is high.532 The 
disadvantages of utilising the ICJ include the significant 
cost, time constraints, less privacy, and a lack of 
control over the process.533 
532 R Bilder, ‘Adjudication: International Arbitral Tribunals and Courts’ 
Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, eds. I Zartman and 
JL Rasmussen (Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press 1997) at 
155-190. 
533 Ibid.
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Facts and focus on dispute resolution process| 
After 25 years of negotiation, in 1977 Hungary 
and  Czechoslovakia (now Slovakia) concluded 
a Treaty on the joint utilisation of the Danube 
River including the construction of a joint barrage 
system – one dam in Czechoslovakia and one 
dam in Hungary. In 1989 Hungary suspended 
work on the dam at Nagymaros due to alleged 
environmental concerns in order to investigate and 
in response Czechoslovakia proposed a solution 
which would enable them to continue unilaterally 
with the first dam ‘Variant C’.  New negotiations 
began between the countries but subsequently 
failed. In 1992, in response, Hungary unilaterally 
terminated the Treaty. Czechoslovakia then 
diverted 90% of the water from the Danube into an 
artificial canal in order to pursue Variant C.  In 1992 
Hungary initiated a case before the ICJ - this failed 
because Czechoslovakia had not given express 
consent so the Court had no jurisdiction.   The 
Commission of the European Communities offered 
to mediate and establish a fact-finding commission 
to investigate Variant C and create a Group of 
Experts including an expert designated by each 
party and three by the Commission of European 
Communities.  The Group was to report on 
emergency measures, establish a temporary water 
management regime for the Danube and agree on 
terms of submission to the ICJ. The working group 
produced recommended measures and on this 
basis the parties in 1993, concluded an agreement 
‘Concerning Certain Temporary Technical 
Measures and Discharges in the Danube and 
Monsoni Branch of the Danube’ which addressed 
the issues above and also included agreed process 
for joint submission to the ICJ by Special Agreement. 
In 1993 Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia.
The parties submitted the dispute to the ICJ by 
Special Agreement asking three questions related to 
interpretation and implementation of the 1977 Treaty 
and general principles of international law.
Q1. Was Hungary entitled to abandon works on the 
project?
Q2. Was Slovakia entitled to proceed with Variant C?
Q3. What were the legal effects of Hungary’s 
notification and termination of the 1977 Treaty?
The ICJ responded to the three questions:
A1 | Hungary acted unlawfully when it suspended 
works on Nagymaros. Hungary relied on the ‘state of 
ecological necessity’ and ‘ecological risk’ to justify 
this act and the ICJ found that Hungary’s concerns 
were ‘an essential interest of the State’ but the 
potential environmental problems did not constitute 
a ‘grave and imminent peril’ which threatened the 
State’s interests. The Court held that the acts of 
Hungary were not justified by the exception of 
necessity relying on Article 25 of the 2001 Draft 
Articles on International Responsibility of States.
1997 Case Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia)
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A2 | Slovakia was entitled to proceed with building 
Variant C but acted unlawfully when it began 
operating the system and diverting the flow of the 
Danube. The ICJ based it reasoning on the law of 
state responsibility which requires a countermeasure 
to be proportional to the unlawful act and the Court 
found that Hungary was deprived of its right to an 
equitable and reasonable share of the watercourse. 
The Court also referred to the ‘Community of 
Interest’ from the River Oder case which also 
applied to non-navigational uses and cited the 1997 
UN Watercourses Convention – especially Article 5 
in support.
A3 | Hungary was not legally entitled to terminate the 
1977 Treaty. Both parties were found to have acted 
unlawfully, and the parties were legally obligated to 
enter into negotiations to implement the purpose 
and obligations of the 1977 treaty given the existing 
circumstances, which include the operation of 
Variant C. The ICJ also provided the option to bring 
the dispute back to Court if necessary.
Summary of dispute settlement procedure post 
1997 ICJ Judgement | More than 13 years after the 
ICJ decision the parties have been unable to reach 
a settlement. The parties started their negotiations 
regarding implementation of ICJ Judgment in 1997, 
several milestones have been achieved including: 
a 2001 Draft Agreement on implementation of the 
Judgment’, several joint Working Groups on legal 
matters, economic matters and water management 
and a Strategic Environmental Assessment of the 
Bratislava-Budapest section of the Danube, but the 
parties are still unable to agree and proceedings are 
still pending in the ICJ. It is suggested that parties are 
very close to realising that they may need to ask for 
third party assistance which could include returning 
to the ICJ to request an additional judgment as 
provided for in the Special Agreement. However this 
will be complicated because Slovakia has already 
requested an additional judgement in 1998 although 
that procedure was suspended. 
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Figure 6.5 | Danube River Basin (Source WWF, 2005)
Figure 6.6 | Original Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Source Authors (2012), adapted from ICJ (1997))
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Figure 6.7 | Provisional Solution: Variant 
“C” Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Source 
Authors (2012), adapted from ICJ (1997))
Facts and Process | Uruguay wanted to build two 
cellulose pulp mills located on the banks of the River 
Uruguay (the boundary river between Argentina and 
Uruguay). The River Uruguay is governed by the 
1975 River Uruguay Statute between Argentina and 
Uruguay which sets down rules for the protection of 
the river, procedural requirements for notification of 
projects and the establishment of a joint commission 
(CARU).  In 2002 the Spanish company ENCE 
informed CARU of its intention to build a pulp mill 
- this project was abandoned in 2006 because of 
large public opposition within Argentina, and investor 
uncertainty. In 2004 the Finnish company Botnia 
informed CARU of its intention to build a cellulose 
Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay)
pulp mill on the river bank, on Uruguayan territory – 
this became operational in 2007.
In 2006 Argentina initiated proceedings before the 
ICJ pursuant to Article 60(1) of the 1975 Statute 
of the River Uruguay which provides: ‘Any dispute 
concerning interpretation or application of the 1961 
(Montevideo) Treaty and the 1975 Statute which 
cannot be settled by direct negotiations may be 
submitted by either party to the ICJ’ (For details of 
the proceedings and jurisdiction see paras 1-24 and 
48-66 of the Judgment).
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The dispute centred on whether Uruguay complied 
with its procedural obligations under the 1975 Statute 
in authorising construction of the ENCE mill and the 
construction and commission of the Botnia mill and 
whether Uruguay had complied with its substantive 
environmental obligations under the Statute since 
the Botnia mill began operation in 2007. Argentina 
claimed Uruguay had breached the procedural 
provisions relating to notification, conduct of an 
environmental impact assessment, and information 
disclosure under Articles 7-12 of the 1975 River 
Uruguay Statute and substantive obligations related 
to optimum and rational utilisation, State’s right to 
use, management of soil and woodlands so as not 
to impair, coordinating measures to avoid ecological 
changes, protecting and preserving the environment 
and preventing pollution (Articles 1, 27, 35, 36, 40 
and 41).   
In 2006 Argentina also requested injunctive relief 
from the ICJ by making an application for provisional 
measures to suspend construction of the Pulp Mills 
– which was rejected by the ICJ because Argentina 
failed to demonstrate that the construction would 
cause imminent harm to the river sufficient to meet 
the test of urgency under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute 
justifying provisional measures.  
Essentially the ICJ had to address whether the 
River Uruguay would be adversely affected by the 
discharges from the Botnia plant taking into account 
the variability in seasonal flow. There was an unprec-
edented quantity of scientific and technical evidence 
put before the Court which had an impact upon the 
process of the hearing and discussion around the 
possibility of the Court retaining its own scientific 
expertise (Phillipe Sands Co-Agent for Argentina). 
The ICJ delivered the verdict in April 2010, 
finding that Uruguay had breached its procedural 
obligations (paras 67- 158), however Uruguay did 
not breach the substantive obligations and Uruguay 
was thus not barred from proceeding operating the 
Botnia mill and Argentina was not entitled to any 
compensation (paras 169-266). The Court finally 
stressed the State’s obligation to cooperate (ongoing 
monitoring) (para 281).
Significant observations are the court’s linking 
of notification of new projects to the customary 
due diligence obligation to prevent significant 
transboundary harm. Also an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) was found to be an essential 
requirement of customary international law in 
respect to activities having potential transboundary 
effects. Finally the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilisation was found to be synonymous 
with sustainable development and should be 
considered as a process.
For analysis of the judgement and the broader 
contribution of the case to international law see 
P Sands ‘Water and International Law: Science 
and Evidence in International Litigation’ (2010) 22 
Environmental Law & Management 151. O McIntyre 
‘The Proceduralisation and Growing Maturity 
of International Water Law’ (2010) 22 Journal of 
Environmental Law 475.
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Figure 6.8 | 
Article 33 Dispute Settlement 
(Source Authors)
| Article 33
257
33.2 Application
33.2.1 Dispute resolution scenario
Upstream state A is currently operating an opencast 
coal mine on mountain plateau situated beside an 
international watercourse. Downstream state B has 
recently experienced increased downstream sediment 
and acid mine drainage issues that arise from mining 
activities during periods of flooding.  State A has 
significant potential to generate hydropower from 
the rainfall in the surrounding catchment of the coal 
mine and in the process utilise and clean the slightly 
contaminated water.
     Downstream state B is eager to avoid future 
contam-ination and also to develop its agricultural 
potential which requires irrigation and a reliable flow 
regime. State B has also recently had an election 
and is opting to move away from Nuclear power as 
its domestic energy supply. States A and B conclude 
Treaty X on the joint utilisation of their border River Y. 
Treaty X provides for the Parties to construct a joint 
barrage system which will involve two dams, one in 
upstream state A (Dam I) and one further downstream 
in the territory of state B (Dam II). 
     The Treaty provides that Dam I is located on a 
tributary of River X in state A and will collect water from 
the majority of the catchment then divert and transfer 
the water via a canal to Dam II which is located on River 
X just inside the border of state A.  This will alter the 
flow regime of River X into state B.  Under the Treaty, 
state A will produce power to sell at a very reduced rate 
to state B. State B will finance the construction of Dam 
II and will also receive flood control, navigation benefits 
and be able to irrigate with a more reliable flow regime.
Both states are contracting parties to the 1997 UN 
Watercourses Convention which has recently come into 
force and it is agreed that the dispute resolution clause 
under Treaty X is drafted as follows:
Paragraph XX: ‘In the event of a dispute between par-
ties concerning the interpretation or application of the 
present Treaty X, the parties concerned shall, in the 
absence of an applicable agreement between them, 
seek a settlement of the dispute by peaceful means 
in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the 
1997 UN Watercourses Convention’.
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Dispute 1
During the construction of Dam I, state B has concerns 
that the filtration and cleaning systems will be 
insufficient to protect its citizens against contamination. 
It enters into a dispute with state A over the dam 
design. What dispute settlement process is to be 
followed by the parties to resolve the dispute?
     In accordance with Article 33 (2) of the UN 
Convention (the adopted dispute settlement 
procedures of Treaty X), the states must first attempt 
to resolve the dispute by negotiation which can take 
different forms, including (but not limited to) bilateral 
talks or diplomatic correspondence. Diplomatic 
negotiations are sometimes preceded by the 
meetings of experts and thus a Water Management 
Working Group of Experts is informally established 
between states A and B to discuss the issues
 and put forward suggestions for improved pollution 
management – the results of which are submitted to 
a diplomatic conference where parties who are 
under an international legal obligation to conduct 
negotiations in good faith and in a manner that 
the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be 
the case when either of them insists upon its own 
position without contemplating modification of it. 
The results of this negotiation are successful and 
the parties record the terms of settlement – in a 
Memorandum of Understanding on future pollution 
management procedures.
Dispute 2
State B reviews the designs and schedules of flow 
release for Dam II and concludes that the times 
at which maximum flows will be released and the 
rate of flow does match the demand times for 
water in state B, and also the dramatic increase 
in flow rate during peak generation periods will 
cause environmental consequences for aquatic life 
which have only recently been discovered. State 
B refuses to pay for the construction of Dam II 
and State A decides to proceed unilaterally 
with Dam I and abandon Dam II.  State B 
enters into a dispute with State A. 
What dispute settlement process is to be followed 
by the parties to resolve the dispute? 
     As before, the parties attempt to resolve their 
dispute this time by negotiation which fails.  Mediation 
involves more active third party participation in the 
negotiations. State A suggests engaging a mediator in 
accordance with Article 33 (2) of the Convention. State 
B agrees and the mediator conducts the negotiations 
between contending parties on the basis of proposals 
made by the mediator aimed at a mutually acceptable 
compromise solution. The mediator attempts to clarify 
issues and drafts a solution of provisional arrangements 
to minimise contentious issues.  Neither party is satisfied 
with this solution and both reject it.  Both parties then 
agree to submit the dispute to Arbitration in accordance 
with the procedure under Article 33 (10)(b) and Annex 
Articles 1-14 of the Convention.  The outcome of this 
decision will binding in accordance with Annex 
Article 14(3).
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Part VII – Final Clauses 
(Articles 34-37)
Article 34 | Signature
The present Convention shall be open for signature 
by all states and by regional economic integration 
organisations from 21st May 1997 until 20 May 2000 at 
United Nations Headquarters in New York.
34.1 Commentary
34.1.1 Opening for signature
On 21 May 1997, the UN General Assembly adopted 
the UN Watercourses Convention. It proclaimed that, 
in accordance with Article 34, the Convention shall be 
open for signature to all states and regional economic 
integration organisations from the same day until 20 
May 2000.534  Many multilateral agreements, especially 
UN conventions, provide that they will be ‘open for 
signature’ until a specified date, after which signature 
will no longer be permitted. By 20 May 2000, however, 
only 16 states had signed the Convention. Since it is 
now closed for signature, the question may arise: Can 
states which did not sign the Convention still become 
a contracting party? In these cases, international law 
allows states to do so by ‘acceding’ to a treaty (see 
Article 35); meaning that, in practice, the ‘closing for 
signature’ has no impact on the process of entering into 
force. As a matter of fact, half of the states party to the 
Convention became so by accession.
534  UNGA Res 51/229 (21 May 1997) UN Doc A/RES/51/229, <http://www.
un.org/documents/ga/res/51/ares51-229.htm> accessed 30 April 2012
Key points
•	 Article	34	related	to	the	process	for	signing	the	
Convention which has now closed.
•	 Pursuant	to	Article	35,	states	may	however	still	
become a party to the Convention by lodging an 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession.
•	 States	and	regional	economic	integration	
organisations can become party to the 
Convention, but there are differences in terms 
of the rights and responsibilities that both have 
under the instrument.
•	 Article	36	stipulates	which	texts	of	the	Convention	
are deemed authentic.
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34.1.2 All states formula
Since the UNWC seeks universal participation,535  it 
seems obvious to open it for signature to ‘all states.’ 
However, the ‘all states formula’ also has its draw
backs, since it has given rise to the question whether 
certain territories or entities whose status under 
international law as sovereign states was unclear
 would be permitted to become a signatory to the 
respective treaty.536
     The Secretary-General, as the depositary for the 
Convention (see Section 35.1.1), follows the advice 
of the UN General Assembly when he receives 
instruments relating to a treaty from an entity whose 
claim to being a state seems questionable, since 
determining whether such a territory or entity would 
fall within the ‘any state formula’ would be outside his 
sphere of competence. The General Assembly issued a 
general understanding in this matter, stating that: ‘The 
Secretary-General, in discharging his functions as a 
depositary of a convention with an ‘all States’ clause, 
will follow the practice of the Assembly in implementing 
such a clause and, whenever advisable, will request the 
opinion of the Assembly before receiving a signature or 
an instrument of ratification or accession.’537
535 See, e.g., treaties concerning human rights, disarmament, or environment. 
536  Treaty Section of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Final Clauses of 
Multilateral Treaties : Handbook (United Nations Publications 2003) at 14.  
537 See United Nations Juridical Yearbook, 1973, Sales No. E.75.V.1, at 79, 
footnote 9.
34.1.3 Regional economic 
integration organisations
For ‘regional economic integration organisations,’ 
see Section 2.1.6. As of today, no regional economic 
integration organisation has initiated steps towards 
becoming a party to the Convention.
34.3 Additional reading
Treaty Section of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, 
Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties: Handbook (United 
Nations Publications 2003). 
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Article 35 | Ratification, 
Acceptance, Approval 
or Accession
1.  The present Convention is subject to ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession by states and 
by regional economic integration organisations. 
The instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession shall be deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2.  Any regional economic integration organisation 
which becomes a Party to this Convention 
without any of its member states being a party 
shall be bound by all the obligations under the 
Convention. In the case of such organisations, 
one or more of whose member states is a party 
to this Convention, the organisation and its 
member states shall decide on their respective 
responsibilities for the performance of their 
obligations under the Convention. In such 
cases, the organisation and the member states 
shall not be entitled to exercise rights under the 
Convention concurrently.
3.  In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, the regional economic 
integration organisations shall declare the extent 
of their competence with respect to the matters 
governed by the Convention. These organisations 
shall also inform the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations of any substantial modification in 
the extent of their competence.
35.1 Commentary
35.1.1 Depository of instruments
Due to the increasing number of multilateral 
agreements and their growing complexity, the practice 
to designate a ‘depositary’ of multilateral treaties came 
into being. Usually, treaties were prepared and signed 
in one copy only, which then was entrusted to one 
of the parties to the agreement. The depositary’s job 
was to prepare certified copies for all the parties, verify 
the acceptability of signatures, instruments and of 
corresponding reservations or declarations, and inform 
the respective parties through depositary notifications 
of any developments regarding the treaty – especially 
its entry into force.538
     While in the past only states were depositaries, the 
establishment of the United Nations deemed it suitable 
for depositary functions. The treaties database of the 
UN contains information on the status of more than 
500 important multilateral agreements deposited with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations – including 
the instruments of states as they sign, ratify, accede or 
provide declarations, reservations or objections.539  As 
with other multilateral treaties of global interest (usually 
adopted by the UN General Assembly or concluded 
by conferences convened by the United Nations) the 
Secretary-General did accept the role of depositary for 
the UN Watercourses Convention.
538  See also Articles 76 and 77 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 
331 (Vienna Convention).
539  United Nations Treaty Collection (2011) <http://treaties.un.org/> accessed 30 
April 2012. 
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35.1.2 Consent to be bound
The consent of the states party to the Convention is 
a vital factor, since states may (in the absence of a 
rule being also one of customary law) be bound only 
by their consent. A state can express this consent 
in several ways which are detailed below. The UN 
Watercourses Convention was opened for signature 
by all states and by regional economic integration 
organisations from 21 May 1997 until 20 May 2000 and 
is now closed for signature. Hence, only those states 
which signed the Convention can now ratify it. States 
which did not sign the Convention can now becoming 
contracting parties by accession to the Convention. 
The differences between these methods are described 
below; however the resulting legal effect and 
obligations for those states which become contracting 
parties by ratification or accession are the same.
35.1.3 Ratification
Ratification defines the international act by which a state 
indicates its consent to be bound to a treaty, and 
usually follows signature. It allows states the necessary 
time frame to seek the approval for the treaty required 
by national law (constitutional control) and to enact rele-
vant legislation to give domestic effect to the treaty.540
540  Arts 2(1) (b), 14(1) and 16 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. 
35.1.4 Acceptance and approval
The instruments of acceptance or approval have the 
same legal effect as ratification and consequently 
express the consent of a state to be bound by a treaty. 
It is used instead of ratification when constitutional law 
(national level) does not require the treaty to be ratified 
by the head of state.541
35.1.5 Accession
Accession is the method whereby a state which has not 
signed the treaty subsequently expresses its consent 
to become a party to that treaty. Generally, accessions 
occur once a treaty is closed for signature or after its 
entry into force.542
541  Arts 2(1) (b), 14(2) and 16 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
542  Arts 2(1) (b), 15 and 16 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
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35.1.6 Regional economic 
integration organisations
In case a regional economic integration organisation 
(see Section 2.1.6) intends to become a party to the 
Convention, Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 35 cover the 
particularities in such an event.
     If none of its member states is a party to the 
Convention, the organisation is bound by all the 
obligations under the Convention. In all other cases, the 
regional body and its member states which are party 
to the Convention have to decide on their respective 
responsibilities, since they are not entitled to exercise 
rights under the Convention simultaneously.
     This is why any regional economic integration 
organisation has to declare the extent of its compe-
tences regarding the Convention in its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, and 
keep the Secretary-General of the UN informed about 
any substantial changes to such competences.
35.2 Application
Given the fact that the Convention is now closed for 
signature, only the five states which have already 
signed the UNWC but not (yet) ratified, accepted 
or approved it can still do so – depending on their 
respective national legal requirements.
     All other states only have the option of acceding to 
the Convention. As stated before, however, the legal 
implications following an accession do not differ from 
the ones following ratification.
Figure 7.1 | States with the 
option of ratifying, accepting 
or approving the Convention
(Source Authors)
Côte d’Ivoire  25 Sep 1998
Luxembourg   14 Oct 1997 
Paraguay  25 Aug 1998
Venezuela  22 Sep 1997 
Yemen  17 May 2000
  STATE              SIGNATURE
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35.3 Additional reading
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 
331.
Aust A, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2007) at 103-113.
Shaw MN, International Law (6th edn, Cambridge University 
Press 2008) at 910-913.
Treaty Section of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, 
Summary of Practice of the Secretary General as Depositary 
of Multilateral Treaties (United Nations 1994).  
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Article 36 | Entry 
into Force
1.  The present Convention shall enter into force 
on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit 
of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2.  For each state or regional economic integration 
organisation that ratifies, accepts or approves 
the Convention, or accedes thereto after 
the deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, 
the Convention shall enter into force on the 
ninetieth day after the deposit by such state or 
regional economic integration organization of its 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession.
3.  For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, any 
instrument deposited by a regional economic 
integration organisation shall not be counted as 
additional to those deposited by states.
36.1 Commentary
A treaty is intrinsically different to national legislation 
which, once in force, applies to all whom it has been 
directed at. An international agreement, like the UN 
Watercourses Convention, is much closer to a contract, 
which can only be in force for those states that have 
consented to be bound by it. A state can express this 
consent in several ways – by ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession (see Section 35.1).
     Each of the states which has expressed consent 
is then a ‘contracting state’ to the Convention,543  and 
should, from that point on, never be referred to as 
‘signatory,’ to avoid confusion. Signature is only one 
of the ways of consenting to be bound, and is in most 
cases subject to ratification; making it a rather loose 
term.544 However, when states express their consent to 
be bound, the entry into force of the Convention does 
not automatically follow for them. This depends on 
whether the Convention is already in force or whether 
more contracting states are needed to reach the 
number of states required for its entry into force. Only 
once this has happened will all ‘contracting states’ also 
become ‘parties’ to the Convention.545
     The UN Watercourses Convention follows the 
tradition of other multilateral treaties:546 It enters into 
force after a specified period (‘on the ninetieth day’) 
following the deposit of the last instrument of ratification 
needed for the entry into force (thirty-fifth instrument). 
In case a state or regional economic integration 
organisation accedes to the Convention after its entry 
into force, it will enter into force for that particular state 
or organisation on the ninetieth day after the deposit of 
the instrument.
543  Article 2 (1) (f) 1969 Vienna Convention. 
544   A Aust, Handbook of International Law (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 
2010) at 62. 
545  Article 2 (1) (g) 1969 Vienna Convention.
546  A Aust, Handbook of International Law at 74.
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36.2 Application
The UN Watercourses Convention secures 35 
instruments of accession, approval, acceptance 
and ratification.  However, the 35th instrument 
of accession came from the European Union.  
Given that the European Union is classified as a 
‘Regional Economic Integration Organisation’, it 
is determined that the Convention will not enter 
into force until an additional contracting state, 
accedes, approves or accepts this instrument. 
36.3 Additional reading
Aust A, Handbook of International Law (2nd edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2010) at 73.
Treaty Section of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, 
Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties: Handbook (United 
Nations Publications 2003).
Paragraph 3 of Article 36 clarifies that in case a 
regional economic integration organisation deposits 
an instrument, it cannot be counted as an additional 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession to those of states regarding 
Paragraphs 1 and 2.
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37.1 Commentary
Since treaties represent negotiated compromises – 
often reconciling strong differences between a large 
number of states – imaginative and subtle drafting is 
vital in order to bridge the gap between the opposing 
views. This is equally true for the UN Watercourses 
Convention, which serves as a global framework for 
law related to the non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses. Hence, it is inevitable that some terms 
are unclear or ambiguous. In applying these sometimes 
vague provisions, the question may arise which text of 
the Convention has priority in interpreting it?
     An authentic, or ‘authoritative,’ version of the text 
of the Convention has to be distinguished from an 
‘official’ one. The former is the text being used for the 
authentication, i.e. the verification, of the Convention. 
The latter may have been used by a party for signing, 
but never reached the status of being ‘authentic,’ 
since it may merely be an official translation by a 
particular state.547
547  BS Murty, The International Law of Diplomacy : The Diplomatic Instrument and 
World Public Order (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1989) at 648.
Article 37 | Authentic Texts
37.2 Application
One could think of two cases where Article 37 may 
become relevant. First, discrepancies in interpretation 
of two or more authentic texts existing between 
watercourse states. Since none of the mentioned 
languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian 
and Spanish) possesses superior authority, the 
various language versions have to be compared by 
the interpreter who then has to arrive at a common 
meaning.548  In practice, however, during the process of 
comparing and reconciling texts, tribunals and
courts often give priority to one particular text on the 
ground that it is less ambiguous and clearer; or to
the one in the language in which the interpreter is
more proficient.549
     Article 33 (4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of the Treaties 550 states that conflicts between 
authentic texts of equal authority should be resolved 
by: (1) applying the principles specified in Articles 31 
(General rule of interpretation) and 32 (Supplementary 
means of interpretation) of the Vienna Convention; 
and (2), if necessary, by taking into account the object 
and purpose of the agreement, i.e. the Preamble.
     The second scenario involves differences in 
interpretation of authentic and official texts. While, 
certainly, a distinction has to be drawn between 
the two – the former being authoritative – official
versions of the Convention cannot be regarded as 
548  Ibid at 649.
549  See J Hardy, The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts 
and Tribunals (Oxford University Press 1961) at 82. 
550  969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (Vienna Convention), <http://www.
unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a10.html> accessed 30 April 2012.
The original of the present Convention, of which 
the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian 
and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.
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irrelevant. The interpreter might focus, and rightly so, 
on the authentic versions of the Convention as the 
expression of agreement between the parties, but 
reference to the official versions can be crucial as well 
in determining the states’ expectations. This is due to 
the fact that some parties to the Convention agreed 
to the authentic versions only because they were 
recognised to correspond with the respective official 
text. Hence, the merit of official versions of agreements 
is generally being regarded as more valuable for the 
interpretation of the treaty than extrinsic materials.551
     Given the fact that during the whole process of 
drafting the convention English has been the working 
language, it seems highly likely that, in any case, the 
English version of the Convention will receive greater 
attention from any interpreter.
551  Hardy, The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties by International Courts and 
Tribunals at 651.
37.3 Additional reading
Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331.
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Due Diligence | A standard of care that a state of similar 
standing in, for example, financial, legal, technical and 
administrative terms would adopt in similar circumstances. 
Ecosystem | An ecological unit consisting of living and non-
living components that are interdependent and function as a 
community.554
Equitable and reasonable utilisation | Equitable and 
reasonable is often considered as synonymous with fair 
and sustainable respectively. All relevant factors and 
circumstances must therefore be considered to determine a 
solution that maximises benefits while minimising detriment. 
Equity has a long tradition in legal systems where prescriptive 
and rigid rules applied to complex situations would lead to 
unfair results. 
General International Law | Applicable to relations between 
all states and subjects of international law, it usually derives 
its authority from customary international law and multilateral 
agreements. 
Good Faith | Conduct with honest intent, fairness and 
sincerity, and with no intention of deceit.555
Jurisdiction | The right in international law for a state to 
exercise authority over its national and persons and things in 
its territory.
Justiciable | Legal disputes are able to be resolved by ‘legal’ 
means as opposed to  ‘Non-justiciable’ disputes  which are 
resolved by non-judicial methods.
554  Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, in (1994) Yearbook of the International Law Commission (Vol. II, part 
II), <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l493.pdf> accessed 21 
September 2011, at 118.
555  See `good faith’ in J Law, E A Martin (eds.) A Dictionary of Law (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 2009), <http://www.oxfordreference.com> accessed 21 
November 2011. 
Glossary of Legal Terms 
Acceptance/Approval | Same legal effect as ratification and 
consequently expresses the consent of a state to be bound 
by a treaty. It is used instead of ratification when constitutional 
law (national level) does not require the treaty to be ratified by 
certain branches of government (Arts. 2(1)(b), 14(2) and 16 of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).552 
Accession | The method whereby a state, which has not 
signed the treaty, subsequently expresses its consent to 
become a party. Generally, accessions occur once a treaty 
is closed for signature or after its entry into force (Arts. 2(1)(b), 
15 and 16 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties).553
Appropriate measures | See ‘due diligence’ below. 
Contracting state | A state that has consented to be bound by 
a treaty that has not entered into force.
 
Convention | The creation of a written agreement whereby 
the states participating bind themselves legally to act in 
a particular way or to set up particular relations between 
themselves. The term is used interchangeably with Treaty. 
Treaties are also known by a variety of differing names, 
ranging from International Agreements, Pacts, General 
Acts, and Charters, through to Statutes, Declarations and 
Covenants.
Customary International Law | Rules derived from the general 
practice among states and accompanied by a belief that such 
practice is legal binding (opinio juris).
552  A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 
2007) at 109-110. 
553   Ibid at 110-111.
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State responsibility | Responsibility of a state in international 
law for its wrongful acts. 
Sustainable utilisation | Comprises two key elements in the 
context of natural resources, rational use and the protection of 
the ecosystem; which in the context of renewable resources 
means protecting the long-term viability of the resources for 
present and future generations. 
Third state | A state which is not party to a treaty.  A treaty 
does not create either obligations or rights for a third state 
without its consent (Article 34 Vienna Convention (see Part I)).
Vital human needs | Sufficient water to sustain human life.
Lex lata | An existing rule of international law.
Opinio juris | General belief by states that a state practice is 
legally binding. 
Optimal utilisation | The best possible or desirable use under 
certain restrictions, for example, satisfying the interests of two 
or more states. 
Party | A state or regional economic integration 
organisation that has consented to be bound by the 
Convention once in force. 
Precautionary approach | Where scientific understanding of a 
particular harm to the public or environment is not fully known, 
the burden of proof falls upon those seeking to take the action 
to prove that the harm will not be significant. 
Ratification | Following signature, the expression of a state’s 
consent to be bound by a treaty. Often the term ratification 
is used interchangeably with ‘accession’, ‘approval’ and 
‘acceptance’ but there are procedural differences between 
the terms; as noted above.  
Significant harm | Something that is more than detectable 
but not necessarily to a level of serious or substantial.  To 
be significant the harm must lead to a ‘real detriment’ to, for 
example, human health, industry, property, environment or 
agriculture.556
Significant adverse effect | A lower threshold than significant 
harm. There may therefore be both a detectible and causal 
link between activities and impact, but such impacts may not 
necessarily amount to significant harm. 
556  Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, 
in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, 
UN GAOR, Supp (No. 10), UN Doc. A/56/10.  
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Adopted in 1997 by the UN General Assembly, the Convention on the Law of the Non-
navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UN Watercourses Convention), seeks 
to, ‘ensure the utilisation, development, conservation, management and protection of 
international watercourses and the promotion of the optimal and sustainable utilisation 
thereof for present and future generations’ (Preamble). The User’s Guide to the UN Wa-
tercourses Convention provides an Article by Article explanation of the text of this global 
framework instrument. In so doing, the Guide explains the meaning and purpose of 
each Article, and offers guidance on how the rights and obligations contained therein 
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policy?makers and decision makers, implementation agencies and other bodies responsi-
ble for transboundary water issues. It is hoped that the document will also be useful for 
managers and stakeholders from other sectors with a direct relevance to water, such as 
health, environment, education, agriculture, food, energy, fisheries and industrial 
water users.
“I have absolutely no doubt that this User’s Guide will quickly become an indispensable tool for all those 
engaged in making sense of the provisions of the  UN Watercourses Convention, or of any legal regime apply-
ing to the management of transboundary water resources. I have already found myself routinely reaching 
for it to look up the authors’ incisive commentary on a range of specific issues – the role of transboundary 
EIA, the meaning of ‘equity’ in the specific context of transboundary waters, the significance of procedural 
and informational obligations, the nature of the obligation to protect watercourse ecosystems, etc. – and 
can honestly say that I’ve learned something new on each occasion.  The commentary on each provision 
of the Convention is also pleasantly readable, concise and readily accessible to the non-expert reader – a 
hugely important achievement!  Indeed, I feel certain that this Guide will play a key role in addressing lingering 
uncertainties and misconceptions about this important instrument, which can only encourage ratification by 
States and thus promote the Convention’s ultimate entry into force!”
Dr. Owen McIntyre, Senior Lecturer in Environmental Law, Faculty of Law, University College Cork.
“The Guide is very user friendly, is a model work and will, undoubtedly, become the standard training manual 
in the field for the UN Watercourses Convention.”
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“The User’s Guide is a very rich document and will be a great source book for water law 
students or water law professionals.” 
????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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